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Abstract
Phenomenology of Death: The Religious Dimension in the Ethical Thought of Emmanuel Levinas
By
Changhyun Kim
Claremont Graduate University: 2021
This dissertation explores Levinas’s phenomenology of death in order to unveil the
religious dimension in his ethical thought through examining the political moment of the third
party. I argue that death is neither a pure phenomenon transparently intelligible in the noemanoesis structure of intentionality nor a mere non-phenomenon totally irrelevant to the
phenomenological investigation. Rather, death is a para-phenomenon whose unfathomable feature
calls into question Levinas’s two important philosophical precedents: 1) Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology, in a methodological sense, and 2) Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of death,
in a thematical sense. On the one hand, Levinas faces in the para-phenomenality of death the failure
of phenomenology in the sense that phenomenology fails to capture a para-doxical feature of death
in terms of a noetico-noematic correlation. On the other hand, Levinas ceaselessly contests
Heidegger’s ontological thematization, which neutralizes the para-phenomenality of death and
thereby reduces the enigmatic mystery of death into the heroic mastery of death; in sum, the paraphenomenality of death is subsumed under the doxical architecture of ontology. By appealing to
the para-doxical character of death, this dissertation claims that the architectonic structure of
Heidegger’s ontology dissimulates or covers up a more primordial and exigent signification of the
death of the other than the ontological mineness [Jemeinigkeit] of death. Therefore, Levinas’s
phenomenology of death justifies its raison d'être not in its adroit achievement to thematize death
but rather in its failure to thematize and make sense of it since the ethical meaning of death emerges
from the miscarriage of the doxical-ontological thematization of death.

In order to disclose the ethical signification of death that remains concealed, obscured, and
suppressed in the “Sein-topped” architecture of ontology, Levinas endeavors to uncover what
ontology has covered up—i.e., the brutal nakedness of being [être] that is concretized in the ethical
encounter with the other who commands: “Thou shalt not kill.” This primordial interdiction
obsesses and overwhelms me [moi] more than the anxiety [Angst] for my death does, as if the death
of the other would matter to me even more than my own. The ethical signification of death comes
from the primordial call inscribed in the face of the other, which makes me vigilant, restless, and
non-indifferent to the death of the other. However, the advent of the third party puts into question
my exclusive, unconditional, or unquestioned responsibility for the other and orders what the other
orders: “Me voici.” Nevertheless, the political interrogation of the third party never compromises
the ethical structure but, on the contrary, makes it possible for ethics to remain ethical without
relapsing into an impotent, silent, or angelic form of ethics, which entails violent, apolitical, and
anti-ethical rapprochements. This dissertation insists that the radical peculiarity of Levinas’s
phenomenology of death culminates in his para-doxical conception of religion, “rapport sans
rapport,” in which the ethical rapport always remains as a question par excellence within the
political context. To be religious does not require an ontological question of “to be or not to be,”
of being or non-being; rather, it is otherwise than being, beyond essence, or beyond the conatus
essendi, in which Levinas recognizes the primordial signification of death, such as substitution,
sacrifice, or dying for others.
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Introduction

It is opinion [doxa] that suppresses questions.1

This dissertation is much inspired by Paul Ricoeur’s (1913-2005) ellipsis in his reading of
Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) later work, Otherwise Than Being or beyond Essence (1974):
“To the memory of those [êtres] who were closest….” 2 What Ricoeur emphasizes here is a
seemingly contradictory aspect of Levinas’s notion of memory; that is, he hints at the problem of
how Levinas could possibly write the dedication about any memory as a form of epigraph while
rigorously rejecting a synchronization of “phenomenology of memory, history, and narration”3 in
which a transcendent alterity of the Other can be represented, assembled, remembered, and
synchronized in the midst of the identification of the Same. As Levinas himself states, “The
assembling of being [être] in the present—its synchronization by retention, memory and history,
reminiscence—is representation; it does not integrate the responsibility for the separated being
[étant].”4 However, the focus of this dissertation lies in Ricoeur’s ellipsis in reading Levinas’s
epigraph; in fact, Ricoeur’s own ellipsis “…” reads in Otherwise Than Being or beyond Essence,
“among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of
all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other human, the same anti-

1

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2004), 374.
2
Paul Ricoeur, Autrement: Lecture d’Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence d’Emmanuel Levinas (Paris:
Presses universitaires de France, 1997), 14, 39 (henceforth my translation). This phrase is originally from the epigraph
to Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence (The Hague and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
Ricoeur considers this work “Levinas’s greatest book.” Paul Ricoeur, “In Memoriam Emmanuel Levinas,” Philosophy
Today, 40:3 (1996), 331.
3
Ricoeur, Autrement, 12.
4
OBBE, 140; AEAE, 179 (translation slightly modified).

1

Semitism.” 5 In his concise yet penetrating reading of Levinas entitled Autrement: Lecture
d’Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence d’Emmanuel Levinas (1997), what Ricoeur keeps
silent about is the problem of the millions of Holocaust victims. The fundamental question of this
dissertation starts with this ellipsis—that is, the neglect of the death of others.
Rather than making up for the ellipsis, this dissertation will problematize it by taking the
issue of death as a question. In opposition to the question of Being [Seinsfrage] in the Heideggerian
sense of the term in which an ethical meaning of the death of the Other is subordinated to an
ontological meaning of Dasein’s death, Levinas recognizes the enigma of death qua a “departure
without return, a question without givens, a pure interrogation mark.” 6 It is the unknowable
mystery of death that calls into question the mineness [Jemeinigkeit] of death as the most authentic
[eigentlich] possibility for Dasein and that discloses an exigency of an ethical meaning of death
more primordial than an ontological meaning of death. For Levinas, the face of the other
commands me, “Thou shalt not kill,” and calls for my responsibility for the death of the other: “me
voici.” The ethical meaning of death emerges from my “non-indifference” to the death of the other
beyond or on the hither side of the mineness of death. The interdiction “Thou shalt not kill”
signifies that in my indifference to the other’s death, I become an accomplice in murdering the
other. The central thesis of this dissertation is that Heidegger’s ontological thematization of death,
which culminates in the mineness of Dasein’s authenticity in total isolation from the death of the
other, cannot exhaust the signification of death. It is in this context that Levinas claims that “The
meaning of death begins in the interhuman.”7

5

OBBE, v; AEAE, v.
GDT, 14; DMT, 23.
7
GWCM, 163; DD, 246.
6

2

However, the interhuman relationship does not simply refer to a duo-relationship between
the same and the other; there is always already the third party [le tiers] who is other than the other.
The entry of the third party does not mean that the third person is numerically added to the relation
between the first and the second person but that all the others other than the other—albeit in
absentia—already gaze, call, and obsess me from the very beginning. Levinas thus state: “The
third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other.”8 The third party puts into question any exclusive
relationship between the same and the other and introduces justice or “the political” into the ethical
from the perspective of a third person; indeed, there occurs a shift from the ethical responsibility
for the Other to the political justice for others and for the whole of humanity. As Adriaan T.
Peperzak points out, if there is a “transition” with the entry of the third party “from transcendence
to universality,”9 i.e., from the responsibility for the Other to justice for others in Levinas’s ethics,
the advent of the third party makes the ethical relation more problematic since it cannot be said
that the ethical relationship is fulfilled by my unilateral, unconditional, or unlimited responsibility
for the other alone. Insofar as the ethical relation takes place within the political context, the death(s)
of the others is already inscribed in the death of the other in terms of the third party and justice.
Now, death is no longer a matter of a rivalry between my death and the death of the other,
between the ontological mineness of Dasein’s death and the infinite responsibility for the other’s
death. Rather, at issue here is what is put in the ellipsis in Ricoeur’s Autrement, that is, the death
of the others in terms of the third party, which underlies the problem of a great number of the
victims in the Nazi concentration camps. As Ricoeur remains silent in his reading of Levinas, little
8

TI, 213; TeI, 188.
Adriaan T. Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Indiana:
Purdue University Press, 1993), 180. For a general introduction to Levinas’s transition from Totality and Infinity to
Otherwise Than Being, see Bettina Bergo, Levinas between Ethics and Politics: For the Beauty That Adorns the Earth
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2003), 132-47. This work includes several remarks on this transition
presented by Levinasian scholars; among these are Stephan Strasser, Fabio Ciaramelli, Etienne Feron, and Adriaan T.
Peperzak.
9

3

attention has been given to the death of the others with regard to the third party by Levinasian
scholarship. Levinas also rarely investigates or thematizes it beyond some confessional remarks
or epigraphs as in Otherwise Than Being or beyond Essence. In this regard, the lack of significant
consideration on the death of the others is quite surprising because the ongoing status of the third
party, which proclaims that the ethical relation always takes place within a political realm, entails
a necessary moment in which one must rethink the ethico-political meaning of the death of the
others in terms of the third party. Therefore, the ethico-political meaning of death deserves to
receive more attention from the perspective of the third party that has largely been put in the ellipsis.
Based upon this mise-en-scene of the Levinasian scholarship, in which the death of the
others has been left behind-the-scene, this dissertation brings the theme of death qua a question on
the stage to set the scene for “phenomenology of death.” However, the purpose of this dissertation
is not to answer the question of death but to radicalize it by means of the political moment of the
third party, which brings forth “the latent birth of the question in responsibility”10 and introduces
a contradiction or dilemma into ethics. Nevertheless, this political dilemma does not undermine
Levinas’s ethical project; on the contrary, the political interrogation of the third party makes ethics
remain ethical without lapsing into an impotent, futile, or angelic form of abstract ethics. This
dissertation will argue that, far from being reduced into or opposed to politics, ethics can be ethical
in the political challenges since the political always puts any ethical answer into question,
disquietude, and non-indifference, and thereby allows ethics to remain as a question par excellence.
It is at this point that the political signification encounters the religious dimension in
Levinas’s ethical thought. In spite of the fact that Levinas himself never produces an articulation
of the notion of “religion” in a systematic way but only sporadically mentions it throughout his

10

OBBE, 157; AEAE, 200.

4

oeuvre, the crux of religion in Levinas’s ethics can be epitomized as the paradoxical expression
“rapport sans rapport.”11 This paradoxical rapport as religion is in no way any kind of a doxical,
intimate, or sacré rapprochement, in which the same and the other is integrated into a mystical
fusion, reconciliation, or participation. Rather, Levinas claims that religion is the para-doxical,
absolute, or holy [saint] “bond that is established between the same and the other without
constituting a totality.” 12 The political interrogation of the third party precludes ethics from
reverting into a tranquil rapprochement in its self-satisfaction, contention, complacency, and
repose en paix, totally indifferent to the commands, callings, sufferings, tears, bloods, and deaths
of an infinite number of the third parties. This dissertation will phenomenologically re-describe
Levinas’s description of death in order to argue that the ethical relation within the political context
is crystallized in this para-doxical conception of religion. The ultimate scene that this dissertation
sets up is to prepare the way for uncovering the religious dimension of the ethical thought of
Levinas through the consideration of phenomenology of death. In the conviction that the events of
the Holocaust concerning the victims should be considered as ethical, political, and—among all—
religious, this dissertation will investigate phenomenology of death to uncover the religious
dimension in Levinas’s ethical thought by means of examining the political moment of the third
party.

The topic, “phenomenology of death,” informs both a methodology and a theme of this
dissertation. On the one hand, phenomenology as a philosophical method based upon the
transcendental methodology of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) shapes the evolution of Levinas’s

11

TI, 40; TeI, 10. See also TI, 80, 295; TeI, 52-3, 271 and OBBE, 168; AEAE, 214. Alphonso Lingis
translates “rapport sans rapport” as either “relation without relation” or “unrelating relation.”
12
TI, 40; TeI, 10.

5

ethical thought. On the other hand, Levinas develops his own consideration of death against the
backdrop of the ontological thematization of death that Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) exemplarily
presents in Being and Time. However, Levinas’s engagement of both Husserl and Heidegger turns
out to be the basis of his divergence from their thoughts—and the Western philosophical tradition
in general—and thereby the basis of the launch of his own articulation of ethics as first philosophy.
This dissertation claims that Levinas’s phenomenology of death discloses that death is neither a
mere phenomenon, which can be intelligible by transcendental phenomenology, nor a pure nonphenomenon, which remains meaningless or irrelevant to the phenomenological investigation;
rather, it is a para-phenomenon that overflows, exceeds, and ruptures the binary alternative of a
phenomenon or a non-phenomenon—all of which are reduced to the doxical thematization of death.
The paradox of Levinas’s own phenomenology consists in the fact that phenomenology should fail
in order to be phenomenology itself. It is Levinas’s para-doxical gesture to describe what cannot
be described, to thematize what cannot be thematized, and to phenomenologize what cannot be
phenomenologized. The failure of phenomenology culminates in the para-phenomenality of death
since death as the para-phenomenon neither transparently appears to consciousness nor remains
entirely outside of consciousness. Therefore, Levinas’s phenomenology of death begins when
phenomenology fails to make sense of death whose para-phenomenality is the ethical locus from
which the para-doxical meaning of death emerges beyond or on the hither side of all doxicalontological meanings of death.
It is worthwhile to note that Levinas’s peculiar terminology “on the hither side of [en deça
de]” appears throughout this dissertation. This terminology describes not only Levinas’s equivocal
stance toward Husserl and Heidegger but also an equivocal relation between ethics and ontology.
The term “hither” literally means “toward this place” and hence refers neither to any fictitious

6

utopia [ou-topos] since it conveys this place or topos, nor to an already explored, fixed, or
conclusive topos because it is still on the way toward this place. In this context, “A on the hither
side of B” does not mean that A simply goes beyond or leave B behind to find a utopia, which is
in fact not any topos at all, but that A moves toward this place by interrupting, disrupting, or
suspending any allegedly proper, veritable, or authentic place for B. It is an other of topos or
otherwise than topos that has been there but remains clandestine, indefinite, and unknown within
this topos. The topology of “hither” illustrates the ambiguity of Levinas’s relation to Husserl and
Heidegger; it is a faithful and, simultaneously, unfaithful one. In other words, although Levinas
departs from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s ontology, he never forgets
his points of departure, which ceaselessly haunt throughout his elaboration of ethics. The radical
peculiarity of Levinas’s ethical thought does not consist in his successful criticism of these great
philosophers, but in the fact that he remains faithful to them by calling into question their proper
places where their thoughts dwell. Levinas’s critical stance toward both Husserl and Heidegger
reveals his own ethical stance toward them since it does not aim to entirely dismiss their topoi to
leave them behind, but to expose other places within their authentic topoi that they fail to explore.
By means of the elaboration of Levinas’s phenomenology of death, this dissertation will
demonstrate that Levinas is keen to become methodologically more Husserlian than Husserl
himself and thematically more Heideggerian than Heidegger himself, even when he pungently
criticizes both.
Moreover, Levinas states in Otherwise Than Being or beyond Essence that the task of the
work is to establish a primordial and irreducible locus of ethics “on the hither side of [en deça de]
ontology.” 13 This hither side does not imply ethics’ impotent or angelic movement toward an

13

OBBE, 46; AEAE, 59 (translation modified and italics removed). Lingis translates alternately “en deça de”
as “on the hither side of” or as “beyond.” This determination is quite understandable since Levinas also uses both “en

7

otherworldly utopia in order to totally leave behind this ontological place, as the early Derrida
might understand in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Rather, it signifies ethics’ enduring and painful
movement toward an other place unknown or unexplored [lieu inconnu] within this place of
ontology, as Derrida’s later reading appreciates in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas.14 This other topos
never destroys any authentic or ontological place for the sake of taking its own proper place in
place of ontology. Rather, as will be seen throughout the dissertation, it is a primordial topos that
renders any ontological place possible by rupturing the rigid, suffocating, and architectonic topos
of ontology. Consequently, the primordial signification of the hither side evinces the ethical
significance of the peculiar way in which Levinas does phenomenology in his treatment of death
against the background of Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian thematization of death.

The main body of this dissertation consists of five chapters. The preliminary observations
of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (Chapter One) and Heidegger’s ontological
thematization of death (Chapter Two) constitute an introductory part of this dissertation in terms
of methodology and theme. Chapter One revisits Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which
paves the way for the “phenomenological method” of this dissertation. This chapter begins by
scrutinizing why Husserl criticizes psychologism for its natural attitude and then how he
formulates his own phenomenological method by means of the elaboration of his theories of
transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity. This chapter will argue that Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology remains solipsistic and even imperialistic in the transcendental turn
from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. In this solipsistic feature of the transcendental method,

deça de” and “au-delà” in a similar context. When Levinas employs the term “au-delà,” and when Lingis translates
“en deça de” as “beyond,” it is important to remember that these terms carry the connotation of the hither side.
14
I will examine Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Levinas in Chapter Five.

8

Levinas recognizes the failure of phenomenology, which in turn provides him with methodological
ingredients indispensable to nourishing phenomenology of death. At the edge of phenomenology,
both the possibility and the impossibility of Husserlian phenomenology suggest the paradoxical
peculiarity of Levinas’s own phenomenology. That is to say, the paradox of phenomenology of
death discloses not only that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is not Husserlian enough in
its deliberation of the phenomenological method, but also that Levinas would want to be
Husserlian more than Husserl himself even in his trenchant attack on Husserlian phenomenology
itself.
Chapter Two examines the “thematical approach” to the topic of the dissertation: the theme
of death. Drawing upon the Seinsfrage, Heidegger seeks to discover the meaning of the authentic
Being, which culminates in his ontological thematization of death. Unlike the Husserlian
transcendental Ego, Dasein qua the exemplary being, who can raise the question about its own
Being-there, anticipates its-no-longer-able-to-be-there, that is, its own death. Dasein understands
its death not simply as a mere impossibility of its existence but rather as the very possibility of this
impossibility. The ontological meaning of death consists in the fact that the most authentic
possibility as death characterizes the solitary finitude of Dasein’s authentic Being in its totality
[Ganzheit]. This chapter will show that Heidegger’s ontological thematization of death takes death
to be a doxical or flat phenomenon that Dasein transparently understands as its most authentic
possibility; accordingly, death as the possibility par excellence individualizes Dasein itself down
to its own Being in isolation from the anonymous they [das Man]. It is Heidegger’s exceptional
achievement found in Being and Time that the meaning of death is fully clarified by the doxical
architectonic structure of ontology. However, this is where Levinas’s challenge against Heidegger
comes in by asking whether the meaning of death as such can be exhausted by the doxical-
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ontological thematization of death. For Levinas, the ontological-existential architecture never
allows a para-phenomenality of death and thus fails to capture the ethical signification of death
itself, which is more primordial and exigent than the ontological mineness of death. By appealing
to the enigmatic character of death as a para-phenomenon, Levinas calls into question Heidegger’s
thanato-logy, which logicalizes, thematize, and neutralizes the enigmatic mystery of death into the
heroic mastery of death, and thereby which dissimulates or covers up the para-doxical signification
of death.
Chapter Three explores how Levinas begins to develop his own phenomenology of death
by uncovering the most brutal and barest facet of être, existence without existents, or “there is [il
y a]” which has been covered up by the ontological coverings and Sein in particular. The early
Levinas formulates his notion of “il y a” against the background of Heidegger’s concept of “there
is/it gives [es gibt].” Although the initial allusion to the es gibt suggested in Being and Time (1927)
much inspires Levinas’s early elaboration of the il y a, this chapter will argue that the early Levinas
in Existence and Existents (1947) and Time and the Other (1947) already anticipates, suspends,
and disrupts Heidegger’s mature idea of the es gibt fully articulated in On Time and Being (196264). It is as if the early Levinas would anticipate the later Heidegger, as if he would not accept the
so-called Kehre in Heidegger’s thought. Levinas’s critique of the es gibt in favor of the il y a
explicates not only that Heidegger remains consistent and constant in the thinking of Sein but also,
on that account, the reason why the later Heidegger remains of little interest to Levinas himself.
Levinas’s polemic against Heidegger lies in his ongoing obsession with Sein, which hides,
conceals, and dissimulates the brutal nakedness of être in general, that is, the anonymous il y a.
Despite Levinas’s little attention to the later Heidegger, this chapter brings the early Levinas face
to face with the later Heidegger in order to expose the anonymous, enigmatic, and an-archic il y a
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prior to Sein and even to the es gibt. This chapter will show that the irremissible persistence of the
an-archic il y a characterizes the most primordial dimension of être in general where there is neither
beginning [Anfang] nor end [Ende], neither arche nor telos. It is the horror of the il y a that there
is no exit, evasion, or escape from être prior to or on the hither side of the anxiety for no-longerable-to-be-there. The horror of être comes from the perpetual weight of existence with no exit, that
is, the irremissible tragedy of not being dead enough. Therefore, the horror of être outlives the
anxiety for Sein, as Levinas states “death is not as strong as être.”15
Chapter Four takes into consideration the hypostatic transition from the purely verbal être
to a substantive étant which prepares the way for producing the ethical relationship between the
same and the other. If the early Levinas in Existence and Existents and Time and the Other
discovers the pure depth of être without any substantive étant, that is, the anarchic il y a prior to
Sein and to Es gibt involved in the complicity of Being and beings, the mature Levinas in Totality
and Infinity and other related texts delves further into the concrete dimension of être “produced as
multiple and as split into same and other; this is its ultimate structure.”16 Ontologically, in order to
have any relation to the other, the subject must maintain its proper place where it finds its solitude
in advance; thus, the ontological relations always assume an authentic place for the subject before
encountering the other. By means of the anachronic or an-archic logic of “the posteriority of the
anterior,” 17 however, Levinas provides a phenomenological account of subjectivity, which
undermines the ontological presupposition of the solitude of the subject. That is to say, the anterior
solitude of the subject is found only after the fact in its posterior relation to other than itself. The
task of this chapter is to elucidate that the posterior and concrete relationship between the same
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and the other phenomenologically precedes the anterior solitude of the subject. Consequently,
subjectivity consists in the exposure of the same to the other since the ultimate structure of being
is concretized in the ethical, religious, and metaphysical relationship between the same and the
other even before the ontological constitution of the subject.
Chapter Four will exhibit that the ontological coverings and Sein in particular have
dissimulated the concrete and ultimate dimension of être, and thereby the anterior posteriority of
the other is marginalized as something ontic or inauthentic. Inspired by the Cartesian idea of the
infinite, Levinas endeavors to strip off what has been accumulated in the pure depth of being to
reveal the concrete structure of being produced as separate into same and other. The formal
structure of a relation of the idea to its ideatum, which presupposes the absolute distance,
separation, or holiness [sainteté] between the relata, takes its concrete form in the ethical encounter
with the other who forbids me [moi] to murder: “Thou shalt not kill.” It is the very first word of
the other that commands, accuses, overwhelms, and obsesses me on the hither side of my
understanding, thematization, and comprehension. The primary purpose of this chapter is to clarify
the ethical signification of this interdiction, which signifies the exigent call of the other that calls
for my responsibility for the death of the other as if the death of the other would matter to me even
more than my own. Prior to my death in which I am able to be toward the end of my existence in
the ontological responsibility for my own, proper, or authentic Being, I still have time to be against
my death in my response to the death of the other: “me voici.”
Chapter Five considers the ethical signification of “me voici” in the political context
through scrutinizing Levinas’s later texts and especially Otherwise Than Being or beyond Essence.
The ethical relationship is not an intimate, congenial, or exclusive relationship between the same
and the other but a traumatic, unsettling, and vulnerable one in which the third party is always
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already involved. The appearance of the third party does not tolerate my exclusive and excessive
responsibility for the other and commands what the other commands: “me voici.” The ethical
response “me voici” is no longer performed in my unconditional, unlimited, and unquestioned
responsibility for the other alone and thus should be articulated, thematized, and said [dit] in and
through ontological language. It is the political moment or justice that engenders “the latent birth
of the question in responsibility.”18 The central task of this chapter is to investigate how the later
Levinas articulates the convoluted question of “the political moment in the ethical” with regard to
the interruption of the third party. This chapter will claim that far from undoing the ultimate
structure of being concretized in the ethical relationship, the ticklish moment of the political
interrogation renders ethics ethical without falling into a pure, impotent, silent, or angelic form of
ethics, which entails violent, apolitical, and so anti-ethical relations.
Chapter Five begins by discussing Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Levinas in
“Violence and Metaphysics,” where Derrida claims that the ethical discourse of the other should
go through ontological language and the passage of Being in particular; otherwise, it would remain
a silent or angelic language that does not deserve its name. The purpose of this chapter does not
lie in verifying or censuring Derrida’s deconstruction of Levinas but in tracing his ethical gesture,
which clarifies Levinas’s own question running through his later texts. In Otherwise Than Being
or beyond Essence, Levinas becomes more attentive to the problem of language by distinguishing
between ethical language as the Saying [le Dire] and ontological one as the Said [le Dit]. Due to
the interrogation of the third party, the unthematizable Saying of “me voici” must find its way into
ontological language to be Said and thus undergo the circulation of the verb “to be” in the Said.
The overarching challenge of this later work lies in the question of how to articulate the Said
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inspired by the Saying, i.e., “in other words or otherwise Said [autrement dit],” in terms of the
third party. However, the advent of the third party does not lessen or compromise the ethical weight
and exigency of responsibility for the other by distributing it to all the others; on the contrary,
Levinas intensifies it to the point of substitution, sacrifice, or dying for others. In this hyperbolic
phenomenology of death, the ontological question no longer matters since death is not a matter
either of “to be or not to be”; rather, what is at stake is otherwise than being or beyond essence,
which cannot be captured by the dialectic of Being and nothingness. On the hither side of the
alternative of “to be or not to be,” beyond the dialectic of Being and nothingness, the ethical
signification of death emerges from otherwise than being or beyond essence.

14

Chapter I
Husserl’s Phenomenological Methodology
Chapter One is dedicated to the preliminary consideration of the Husserlian methodology
of phenomenology, which paves the way for the “phenomenological method” that Levinas
develops in his articulation of ethics. Phenomenology as a philosophical method deeply rooted in
the transcendental methodology of Husserl governs, though not exclusively, the evolution of
Levinas’s ethical thought. As a philosopher of ethics, Levinas wants to remain a phenomenologist
who seeks to ensure the alterity of the Other in order to unearth an ethical meaning that has been
buried behind the remarkable accomplishments of phenomenology.19 Throughout his scholarly
works where he incessantly endeavors to distance himself from traditional metaphysics and to
establish ethics as a “first philosophy,”20 Levinas elaborates his own phenomenological method
via fully engaging with Husserlian phenomenology. This chapter claims that Levinas’s critical
engagement of Husserl’s phenomenology refers neither to indiscriminately following his
phenomenological method nor to simply rejecting it; rather, it is Levinas’s ethical gesture to
disclose a hither side of Husserlian phenomenology that Husserl himself fails to capture. By means
of this hither side, which divulges the doxical foundation of Husserl’s intellectualism, Levinas
formulates his own phenomenological method. In this chapter, I will first show why Husserl
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In a conversation with Theodor de Boer at the University of Leyden in 1975, Levinas states, “I think that,
in spite of everything, what I do is phenomenology even if there is no reduction, here, according to the rules required
by Husserl; even if all of the Husserlian methodology is not respected.” GWCM, 87; DD, 139-40. In another interview
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Irigaray, Le Doeuff, Derrida (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 14; In this vein, Oona Eisenstadt points out
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(Eisenstadt), Driven Back to the Text: The Premodern Sources of Levinas’s Postmodernism (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:
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censures sheer psychologism for its natural attitude, and then how he develops his own
phenomenological methodology through examining his theories of transcendental subjectivity and
intersubjectivity. I will then clarify a doxical-intellectualistic facet of Husserl’s phenomenology,
which betrays a crucial possibility of the phenomenological method, and, simultaneously, the fatal
limits of it. At the edge of Husserlian phenomenology, both the possibility and the impossibility of
his phenomenological method constitute the radical kernel of Levinas’s own phenomenology,
which provides the methodological approach to “phenomenology of death” of this dissertation.

1. Transcendental Subjectivity: Rückfrage into the Locus of Sinngebung
Phenomenology literally means a logic or science of phenomena. In order to understand
Husserl’s phenomenology, it is necessary to examine exactly what he means by both “logic” and
“phenomena.” According to Husserl, logic is an a priori science that investigates the ideal,
essential, or eidetic structures of phenomena prior to all kinds of empirical facts, and thus seeks to
establish a solid foundation of scientific knowledge by “apodictic inner evidence.”21 By contrast,
psychology is an a posteriori science that considers our mental states in terms of “induction”22 and
therefore leads to a kind of epistemological skepticism or relativism always dependent upon
contingent conditions. As Levinas puts it, a psychological knowledge becomes a matter of a
subjective “feeling of evidence” devoid of any “objective value” that can confer certainty on
knowledge. 23 For Husserl, psychology cannot produce “the apodictically evident, and so
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metempirical and absolutely exact laws which form the core of all logic.”24 Psychologism attempts
to reduce logic to psychology and thereby misses the a priori ideality and apodictcity that can
provide the certain condition of knowledge or the foundation of logic. To identify the
“phenomenological founding of logic,” 25 Husserl’s phenomenology begins with the departure
from psychologism, which is not only the central task of his early work—the Prolegomena to
Logical Investigations—but also underlies his entire philosophical work.
In the first volume of Logical Investigations (1900), Husserl proposes the principal slogan
of phenomenology: “We will go back to the ‘things themselves’ [Wir wollen auf die ‘Sachen selbst’
zurückgehen].”26 When Husserl speaks of the return to the things themselves, he does not mean
the return to the things in themselves (noumena), behind phenomena in the Kantian sense of the
term, but the return to the “phenomena” that present themselves to consciousness. Levinas states
that the underlying task of phenomenology is not to elevate “phenomena into things in themselves,”
but to bring them to the “horizon of their appearing, that of their phenomenality.”27 Phenomena
are not indifferently given in themselves regardless of our cognitive activities but appear to our
consciousness as the objects of intuition, while our intuition as the theoretical act of consciousness
makes them appear to us and makes sense of them. Levinas points out that the groundbreaking
achievement of Logical Investigations is the “affirmation of what appears to us”; thus, the true
return to things themselves is the “return to the acts in which the intuitive presence of things is
unveiled.”28 Insofar as any object has a phenomenological sense or meaning [Sinn or sens] in our

24
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conscious life, both an object and consciousness are intentional or aim at each other. The basic
principle of phenomenology, therefore, begins with departing from a daily belief, based on the
“natural attitude,” 29 in the existence of a mind-independent object, to turn attention to the
givenness or appearance of the object to consciousness.
The key concept of “intentionality” 30 in phenomenology exhibits the fundamental
characteristics of the intentional structure; simply put, consciousness is always consciousness of
an object while an object is already the object for consciousness. However, this does not mean that
the intentional object is really contained within the intentional act. While the intentional object
does not shape an immanent part of consciousness that apprehends it, the intentional act is not an
immanent part of the object that presents itself to consciousness. The 1907 lectures, published as
The Idea of Phenomenology, introduce the term “transcendence,” which continues to play a crucial
role in Husserl’s mature works, to clarify the intentional relationship between the act of
consciousness and its object. On the one hand, consciousness transcends itself toward something
other than itself, that is, its own intended object; on the other hand, the object presents itself in
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such a way that consciousness intends it. As Levinas puts it, “Intentionality is, for Husserl, an act
of the genuine transcendence and the very prototype of any transcendence.”31
In Ideas I (1913), Husserl explains this intentional structure of consciousness by employing
more technical terms: “noesis” as the subjective pole and “noema” as the objective pole.32 While
the noema is the meaning-given in the conscious act, the noesis is the meaning-giving element in
this act. All phenomenological meaning then takes place in the correlation between the intentional
act (noesis) and its correlated object (noema); the intentional act cognizes its own intentional object
rather than the actual object out there. As Levinas points out, hence, intentionality is essentially an
“act of bestowing a meaning (the Sinngebung).” 33 Phenomenologically speaking, there is no
difference between the intentional object and the actual object since both appear to consciousness
as the same, not as two different objects. In consciousness, the object of the intention “is and means”
what is intended, that is, the intentional object as a noema of a noesis; thus, Husserl argues that “it
is a serious error to draw a real distinction”34 between the two. Husserl pays little attention to any
objectivistic interpretations of an ontological property or status of an object because the problem
of “whether or not the object really exists apart from our conscious life” is irrelevant to the
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phenomenological task. Instead, he attempts to describe a priori, ideal, and eidetic structures and
laws of phenomena in order to exhibit how all the phenomenological meanings are constituted in
and for consciousness. Consequently, Husserl defines phenomenology, in a purest sense, “not as a
science of matter of facts [Tatsachenwissenschaft], but instead as a science of essences
[Wesenswissenschaft] (as an “eidetic science”,” 35 that is, “theory of the essences of ‘pure
phenomena,’ the phenomena of a ‘pure consciousness’ or of a ‘pure ego’.”36
In order to focus on the intentional structure of our conscious experience, according to
Husserl, it is necessary to suspend our acceptance of the natural attitude that would simply
presuppose the existence of the world and all things in it independent of our consciousness. It is
the epoché that not only suspends or brackets off all kinds of dogmatism of the natural attitude,
but also offers the condition for various forms of “reduction,” such as phenomenological, eidetic,
transcendental, and primordial reductions. The reduction here refers to a leading back from a naïve
consciousness based upon the natural attitude, which takes an object as an autonomous thing out
there in the mundane, empirical, or real world, to a transcendental consciousness based upon the
phenomenological attitude, which constitutes the object as its own correlate. This reduction, which
can “‘purify’ the psychological phenomena of what lends them reality…in the real ‘world’,”
thereby allow the ego to experience an object in the transcendental realm where the correlation
between the transcendental consciousness and its intended object takes place. According to Husserl,
what the ego experiences are “irrealites [Irrealitäten],” which refer to “all transcendentally purified
experiences.”37 The ego does not simply experience any object out there in the real, mundane, or
empirical world, but what presents itself in the cognitive process. It is the lived experience
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[Erlebnis] that the phenomenological ego undergoes under the phenomenological reduction. The
primary task of the Ideas I is to investigate “the most general structure of this pure consciousness”
in terms of the phenomenological reduction that renders “the transcendentally purified
consciousness and its essential correlates visible and accessible to us.”38 In Ideas I, Husserl calls
the outcome of the phenomenological reduction the pure ego—it is a “phenomenological
residuum,”39 to which “no reduction can do anything.”40
Hence, instead of living naively in experience and theoretically investigating what is
experienced (transcendent nature), we carry out the ‘phenomenological reduction’…What
is sought is, accordingly, what remains as the ‘phenomenological residue,’ what remains,
despite the fact that we have ‘suspended’ the entire world with all the things, animate beings,
human beings, ourselves included. We have actually lost nothing, but acquired the
complete, absolute being that, correctly understood, contains every instance of worldly
transcendence in itself, ‘constituting’ them in itself.41
After the phenomenological reduction through which the existence of the mundane-empirical
world is parenthesized, the ego remains a pure, absolute, and transcendental residuum in the flow
of every possible and actual change of experience in terms of time and space, as the Kantian
formula indicates: “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations.”42 In spite of
the fact that objects in the world are, of course, transcendent to consciousness, their transcendences
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are constituted as correlates of the transcendental residuum by way of suspending the entire world.
In the performance of the reduction, “Everything transcendent, insofar as it is given in a way that
conforms to consciousness,” Husserl states, “is an object of phenomenological investigation”; he
immediately adds, “all of that is correlative to absolute consciousness.”43 In this context, the pure
ego is the phenomenological locus to be conceived as “transcendence in immanence,”44 in which
an old dichotomy of a subject-object relation is suspended, and then a transcendent world comes
to be constituted in the pure ego’s immanence. To the pure ego, the world no longer appears as a
raw, neutral, or natural world as the natural attitude envisages, but as its own correlated world as
the phenomenological attitude conceives. The shift from the natural to the phenomenological
attitude enacted by the phenomenological reduction is first required in the phenomenological or
logical investigations.
In Cartesian Meditations (1931), 45 the strategy of the phenomenological reduction
becomes more radical when the ego takes itself as its own cogitatum in its “transcendental
reflection.”46 The ego here is no longer an exceptional residuum as the pure ego that looks at its
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Ideas-I, 137. Husserl also says: “by the phenomenological reduction that disengages the existence of nature,
we gain the field of the pure stream of consciousness,” Edmund Husserl, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology:
From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-1911, trans. Ingo Farin and James G. Hart (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 75.
Levinas states that phenomenology itself begins with the phenomenological reduction, which entails “the purification
of concrete life from any naturalistic interpretation of its existence,” TIHP, 93; TIPH, 140. See also DEH, 70-5; DEHH,
48-57.
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phenomenology “proceeds in immanence and uncovers…how transcendence happens, as it were, how a transcendent
world comes to be constituted in immanence.” Dermont Moran, “Dasein as Transcendence in Heidegger and the
Critique of Husserl,” in Heidegger in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Tziovanis Georgakis and Paul J. Ennis
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 35.
45
Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology is based on Husserl’s lectures delivered at the
Sorbonne in 1929. It was first translated into French by Emmanuel Levinas and Gabrielle Peiffer and published under
the title Méditations cartésiennes: Introduction à la phénoménologie. It is then published in German in 1950 as the
first volume of Husserliana, along with the Pariser Vorträge, and translated into English in 1960 by Dorion Cairns
who also refers to the “Transcript C” which Husserl designated for him.
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CM, 33. Husserl here states: “The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadened by
adding one more member. Each ego…bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum.”
In The Paris Lectures, Husserl makes a similar remark: “The expression ego cogito must be expanded by one term.
Every cogito contains a meaning: its cogitatum.” Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, trans. Peter Koestenbaum (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 12. David Carr expresses the overall scheme of Husserl’s phenomenological
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correlated world, but the all-embracing cogitatum as the transcendental Ego that looks at itself
looking at what it sees. In its reflection, the ego becomes its own cogitatum whose transcendental
experience consists in “looking at and describing the particular transcendentally reduced ego.”47
There is a unity within the “dual topic, cogito — cogitatum,” through which a phenomenological
description is possible in terms of the two correlative sides: “noematic” and its counterpart, “noetic
description.”48 In this two-fold correlative moment of the ego and cogitatum, Jean-Luc Marion
notices that the phenomenological reduction entails “schizophrenia within the I,” in which the ego
is exiled from itself and then “includes within itself its necessary other, the cogitatum.”49
However, the ego’s schizophrenia is not an incurable illness in “unhappy consciousness”
but can be readily—more precisely, already from the outset—cured in terms of the Hegelian
dialectical movement. In other words, the ego does not simply remain a pure ego in its naïve
naturalness or abstraction but posits its other as the cogitatum by means of the reduction, and
finally returns to itself as the transcendental Ego in its reflection. The reflective movement of the

investigation as “ego-cogito-cogitatum-qua-cogitatum.” David Carr, Phenomenology and the Problem of History
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009), 88.
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CM, 34. In The Paris Lectures, Husserl writes: “The transcendental spectator places himself above himself,
watches himself, and sees himself also as the previously world immersed ego. In other words, he discovers that he, as
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the Cartesian ego cogito is not transcendental enough since it still belongs to the world. While Husserl acknowledges
Descartes’s groundbreaking—the so-called “modern”—discovery of the ego who works out a radical doubt in order
to ensure a certain knowledge in terms of a clear and distinct perception, he does not accept this ego when Descartes
states: “At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a
thing that thinks [Nihil nunc admitto nisi quod necessario sit verum; sum igitur praecise tantum res cogitans]. René
Descartes, The Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Relies. A Latin-English
Edition. ed. and trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 36-37. According to Husserl,
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as its own cogitatum within the transcendental sphere; it is only a thinking thing or substance within the world as a
“piece of the world.” CM, 26. Therefore, the Cartesian ego cogito fails to ensure the level of certainty within itself.
This is why Descartes requires the existence of the perfect, non-deceptive God who guarantees the certainty in what
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CM, 36.
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Jean-Luc Marion, Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999), 99, 98, respectively. This schizophrenia reminds us of Husserl’s earlier consideration of the split-consciousness
as noema and noesis, which already assumes its recuperation by means of a correlation or adequation between the two.
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phenomenological reduction already presupposes the “happy” 50 moment of consciousness.
Husserl characterizes the happy status of the transcendental Ego as follows: “It is a synthesis that,
as a unitary consciousness embracing these separated processes, gives rise to the consciousness of
identity, and thereby makes any knowing of identity possible.”51 Likewise, in arguing that the
phenomenological reduction alters the natural ego into the “splitting of the Ego [Ichspaltung]”52
who might provisionally suffer from its ineluctable schizophrenia, Husserl already assumes the
“ego’s marvelous being-for-itself,” whose conscious life consists in the “form of reflective
intentional relatedness to itself.” 53 In the course of the back-and-forth play between ego and
cogitatum, the ego’s reflection on itself is self-consciousness, which explains Husserl’s “first
universal scheme”54: the ego cogito cogitatum that does no longer suffer from its schizophrenia.
As seen so far, according to Husserl, there are three stages of the ego as follows: 1) the
natural ego “as naturally immersed in the world” on the basis of the natural attitude, 2) the pure
ego as the ego cogito based on the phenomenological attitude, and 3) the transcendental Ego as
the ego cogito cogitatum in its transcendental reflection.55 Nevertheless, one might doubt whether
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CM, 42. Given that the unhappy consciousness results from the development of self-consciousness which
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is either “a naïve consciousness,” which is not yet aware of its unhappiness and “its misfortune,” or a mature
consciousness that overcomes “its duality” by sublating its all the unhappy moments of separation or division into a
higher unity. Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and
John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 190. It seems to me that, according to the logic of
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consciousness in order to overcome its ongoing immediacy and abstraction.
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CM, 42.
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CM, 43.
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CM, 50.
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CM, 35.
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the Husserlian formula of the ego cogito cogitatum falls into a circular movement of an infinite
regress, which requires an infinite number of propositions to support the first proposition insofar
as the ego takes itself as its own cogitatum. In this infinite circle of the conscious structure, the
ego qua the pure ego schematically becomes the transcendental ego that sees what the pure ego
sees, and then the trans-transcendental ego that sees what the transcendental ego sees what the pure
ego sees, ad infinitum. However, Husserl seems to conceive of the transcendental Ego as the allencompassing and final disinterested spectator who looks at what is seen in its own
phenomenological eyes, which can see the world as the harmonious and unified unfolding of a
stream of consciousness; thus, the conclusive self-constitution of the transcendental Ego is the
“universal theme of the description.”56 The transcendental Ego becomes the sole theme to describe
in the phenomenological investigation, which works out “the all-embracing task of uncovering
[the Ego].”57 This is what he calls a “monad”58 borrowed from Leibniz. In the phenomenological
thematization, there is nothing left exterior or transcendent, without any residuum, to this monadic
Ego which is the ultimately constitutive source of all objective knowledge. On the one hand, if
there were something exterior to the Ego, it would be meaningless [sinnlos] in a phenomenological
sense. On the other hand, if there were something transcendent to the Ego in a naturalist sense, the
phenomenological reduction would not be sufficiently performed. After the proper exercise of the
phenomenological reduction, Husserl continues to say:
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CM, 38. In this context, this transcendental Ego, like the Cartesian ego, is apodictic since the locus of the
certainty is no other than the Ego itself. Levinas writes: “This whole consideration is extremely close to the theory of
Cartesian doubt. It is a matter of going back to the cogito which remains as the sole certainty, on the basis of which
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[O]ne recognizes that all that exists for the pure Ego becomes constituted in him himself;
furthermore, that every kind of being—including every kind characterized as, in any sense,
“transcendent”—has its own particular constitution. Transcendence in every form is an
immanent character of being, constituted within the Ego. Every conceivable sense, every
conceivable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the
domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being.59
This crucial passage explicates not only how a vulgar, naturalist, or dualistic conception of
transcendence and immanence is overcome by the phenomenological concept of “transcendence
(constituted) in immanence”60 as the Ideas I already indicates, but also in what sense transcendence
is re-constituted in the realm of transcendental subjectivity as “immanent transcendence.”61 For
Husserl, thus, transcendence is not something beyond, above, or outside the transcendental Ego,
but re-constituted in the lived experience of the Ego as transcendental subjectivity, which is the
constitutive ground of the phenomenological being and sense. By means of the phenomenological
reduction, transcendence gains its transcendental validity in the domain of immanence. In this
regard, Husserlian phenomenology based on the constitution of the transcendental Ego culminates
in transcendental subjectivity, by which all transcendental grounding of knowledge can be secured.
Hence, phenomenology itself is nothing but a “self-explication [Selbstauslegung]” 62 of the
transcendental Ego that is the sole, ultimate, and final locus of a meaning-bestowal [Sinngebung].
Husserl’s phenomenological method is fundamentally based on a “regressive question [Rückfrage]”
to return to the source of knowledge or “the path back to what is ultimate in all knowledge”63;
therefore, it is the way back to the constitution of transcendental subjectivity.
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For Levinas, however, this transcendental structure of the ego relies on the self-enclosed,
tautological, and so vicious circle of “transcendental subjectivism,” since the ego posits, finds, reposits, and re-finds itself, ad infinitum. In doing so, it becomes the transcendental Ego whose
subjective life consists in being itself in the course of “losing itself and finding itself again so as
to possess itself by showing itself, proposing itself as a theme, exposing itself in truth.”64 The
Ego—either the pure ego in Ideas or the transcendental Ego in Cartesian Meditations—firmly
maintains its own transcendental and unified identity through phenomenological reduction or
reflection, which makes it possible for the Ego to filter off all naturalist, contingent, or empirical
assumptions and prejudices, and thereby ensures the transcendental process of its selfidentification. Husserl thus depicts a “law of essence of the pure Ego” in such a way that “[t]he
one pure ego is constituted as a unity in relation to this unity of stream [that is, a unity of endless
immanent time]; this means that it can find itself as identical in its course.”65 In its self-possession
and self-identification, the transcendental Ego makes the world intentionally cognizable and
meaningful [sinnvoll] in and for itself alone by way of appropriating everything that appears to
itself in the work of Sinngebung. For Levinas, the transcendental work of Sinngebung signifies
that the transcendent alterity of the Other is utterly suffocated in the solipsistic sovereignty of the
transcendental Same. Levinas’s critical stance on Husserlian methodology springs from its
transcendental, idealistic, and solipsistic position at the heart of phenomenology, which claims the
primacy of transcendental subjectivity at the expense of the transcendent alterity of the Other.
As seen so far, Husserl’s phenomenology would inevitably lead to a “transcendental
solipsism”66 since all the phenomenological meaning and validity originate from the constitutive
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accomplishments of subjectivity. However, Ricoeur argues that transcendental solipsism is not an
“impasse” that Husserlian phenomenology eventually reaches but a “strait through which
philosophy must pass.”67 Being well aware of this solipsistic problem embedded in his theory of
transcendental subjectivity, Husserl claims that transcendental subjectivity is not a final word for
his phenomenology; it is only a “subordinate stage philosophically.”68 In order to overcome his
solipsistic position, Husserl delves further into the issues of intersubjectivity in Cartesian
Meditations and other later texts. Consequently, the later Husserl argues that “The full and proper
sense of phenomenological transcendental ‘idealism’ becomes understandable to us for the first
time,”69 only when the theory of intersubjectivity is carefully taken into account. Before moving
on to examine Husserl’s later texts, it is necessary to consider—albeit briefly—his relatively early
works that touch upon the issue of the experiences of others in terms of the notion of empathy
[Einfühlung], which offers an overarching clue to the mature theory of intersubjectivity elaborated
in his later works.

2. Transcendental Turn from Subjectivity to Intersubjectivity
In the opening chapter of Idea I, Husserl makes a distinction between one’s own
experiences in terms of perception [Wahrnehmung] and presentation [Gegenwärtigung] on the one
hand, and those of others in terms of apperception [Apperzeption] and appresentation
[Appräsentation] (or presentification [Vergegenwärtigung]) on the other hand: “we have
experience, in the originary sense, of ourselves and the states of our consciousness in so-called

psychologistic immanence with the genuine phenomenological immanence.” Husserl, The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology, 47.
67
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inner or self-perception, but we do not have it of others and their experiences in ‘empathy’.”70
Whereas I can have a direct or “original” experience of myself, I can only have a “derived” or
“mediated” experience of others by means of empathy.71 On the one hand, others are not directly
presented to me as I am presented to myself; rather, they are appresented in terms of an analogy
with my own experience. On the other hand, I can neither directly perceive others in my inner
perception, nor “attain” their experiences in terms of my inner life. Instead, I can apperceive them
as other subjects in empathy. Therefore, empathy is an “act belonging to the largest group of
presentifications [Vergegenwärtigungen]”72—it is an empathic correlation of appresentation on the
noematic side of consciousness and apperception on the noetic side. There is no possible way to
lead directly from my experience to those of others; otherwise, their experiences are no longer
70
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their own, but my own.73 My indirect apperception of the appresentation of others in empathy
indicates that I, others, and the world belong together at the level of intersubjectivity, as Husserl
already states in passing in the last chapter of Ideas I: “The intersubjective world is the correlate
of intersubjective experience, i.e., the experience ‘mediated by empathy’.”74
In his later writings, especially in the Fifth Meditation of Cartesian Meditations and The
Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl elaborates a theory of
“transcendental intersubjectivity,” through which he tries to overcome a solipsistic position of
transcendental subjectivity.75 In The Paris Lectures, Husserl remarks that the problem of the other
ego is the “only truly unsettling thought”76 in the formulation of transcendental phenomenology.
Ricoeur describes this problem as “one of the great difficulties of Husserlian phenomenology” by
misleadingly arguing that “The constitution of the Other plays the same role in Husserl that the
existence of God does in Descartes,”77 and by rightly asking “How will the genuine objectivity of
the world common to all of us be constituted?”78 Since the ego here, for the first time, confronts
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something other than itself for its cogitatum, the transcendental Ego as the ego cogito cogitatum
comes to suffer from a more serious version of schizophrenia: “the objectivity of the world, insofar
as it is the object of a plurality of subjects.”79 As will be seen, the Fifth Meditation is fully dedicated
to resolving a difficult dilemma between the constitutive primacy of transcendental Ego and the
originality of the Other by means of elaborating the theory of intersubjectivity.
In the beginning of the Fifth Meditation, Husserl proposes a sort of a second reduction or
what he calls “a peculiar kind of thematic epoché [eine eigentümliche Art thematischer ἐποχή]” or
“peculiar primordial reduction [eigentümliche primordinale Reduktion]”80 which aims to identify
the primordial or original sphere of transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This
primordial sphere is the “foundation or the motivational ground for empathy,”81 which makes it
possible to further develop the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Provided that
everything has been reduced to the transcendental realm through the first transcendental reduction
performed by the transcendental Ego and possibly other egos, this transcendental realm is not
simply valid for the Ego alone but also for all others, since there are other egos who also carry out
the transcendental reduction. In order to “delimit the total nexus of intentionality…in which the
Ego constitutes within itself a peculiar sphere,” Husserl here becomes more radical by means of
performing the second reduction, which aims to “disregard all constitutional achievements of
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intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity.”82 In the second reduction,
the transcendental Ego exclusively preserves its transcendental status that grants itself “the
transcendental right,” 83 by which the transcendental status and realm of all other egos are
subsumed under the original sphere or sphere of ownness [Einheitssphäre] of this Ego. 84 The
radicality of the second reduction consists in reducing all transcendental experiences, including
those of other egos, to the primordial sphere of ownness. Therefore, the outcome of performing
the second reduction displays the radical—ironically, far more solipsistic than in the case of the
first reduction—fact that every transcendental experience is reduced to the primordial sphere
where other egos appear to the transcendental Ego not as other in their own transcendental sphere,
but as altered in the Ego’s primordial sphere.
In Husserl’s own phenomenological conviction, the most fundamental and perplexing
question of the Fifth Meditation is not whether the other really exists, but how the other is
appresented to the apperception of the Ego. In the performance of the transcendental and
primordial reduction, a natural, psychic, or mundane I becomes the transcendental Ego who
constitutes not only the objective world as a “universe of being that is other than [my]self,” but
also the other, at the rudimentary level, as the mode of “alter ego.” 85 As seen above, I as the
transcendental Ego does not directly have access to this alter ego: “The character of the existent
‘other’ has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible.”86
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The other can be neither merely accessible nor inaccessible, but only accessible in the mode of
inaccessibility. It is because of this accessibility that the inaccessible other can come to appear to
me as an alter ego; it is also because of this inaccessibility that the appresentation of the other
cannot be fully presented as a presence, which is an object of my perception. In the mode of an
inaccessible accessibility, the other is appresented as a “modificatum” that I do not perceive merely
as “duplicate of myself” 87 but apperceive as an alter ego analogous to—rather than identical
with—myself. In this regard, I as the ego and the other ego are given in an “original pairing
[Paarung],” which Husserl designates not as an identification but as an “association.”88 In the
pairing association, “That which is primordially incompatible, in simultaneously coexistence,
becomes compatible.”89 Although there could be no fulfillment by perception and presentation, I
apperceive the appresentation of the other in a higher or harmonious intentional constitution, which
leads to an “open community of monads”90 as transcendental intersubjectivity. However, this does
not imply that there can be a plurality of worlds in accordance with monads. According to a “system
of a priori incompatibility,” Husserl argues that there can be only a single universal community as
a “closed ‘world of monads’”91 since two worlds or more at once are incompatible with each other.
It is the objective or monadic world that corresponds to transcendental intersubjectivity whose full
concreteness is deeply rooted in the “lifeworld” for all monads, which Husserl investigates further
in his next work.
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In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936), Husserl
interprets the crisis of sciences—especially modern European sciences—as “the loss of [their]
meaning for life.” 92 It is no accident that Husserl concludes Cartesian Meditations with the
Delphic motto that “‘Know thyself!’ has gained a new signification.” 93 Insofar as modern or
positive sciences are lost in the world, they lose a subjectivity that investigates the very world;
finally, they lose the subjectivity and the world altogether. According to Husserl, the modern
sciences cannot address phenomenological questions concerning subjectivity because they ignore
the Rückfrage, that is, the regressive inquiry into the “original bestowal of meaning
[Sinngebung]”94 that underlies all scientific inquiries. Instead, they simply attempt to attain a mere
“objectivist” or naturalist account of the world independent of subjectivity. Insofar as the sciences
separate a subject from its object and regard the world as the object given independently of the
subject, they would remain caught in the natural attitude and unavoidably miss the ultimate source
of Sinngebung. Husserl asserts that the crisis of the modern European sciences on the basis of the
natural attitude comes from their oblivion of the “lifeworld [Lebenswelt]” on which they are
founded.
Whereas objects are given in the world, the world itself is not merely given, but already
pre-given as the “horizon [Horizont]” or “ground [Boden]” 95 where the objects can be given
accordingly. This pre-given world is in no way a solipsistic one; rather, it is the “lifeworld” that all
others and I experience at communal and historical levels. For the later Husserl, “I” qua the
transcendental Ego is no longer a solipsistic “I” isolated from others and the world, but the “I”
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who finds myself in the lifeworld which provides the pre-theoretical background for my intentional
acts. The lifeworld is a “universal field, fixed in advance”96 where I am given to the Other in the
same way as the Other is given to me; thus, I can be an alter ego for the Other, just as this Other
can be it for me. In the lifeworld, according to Husserl, the ego experiences “the Other as
phenomenologically a ‘modification’ of [itself]”97 by means of an analogical apprehension. Thanks
to this “analogical grasp” of the Other as an alter ego, Ricoeur states, “solipsism should be
overcome without the sacrifice of egology.”98 Therefore, the analysis of transcendental subjectivity
leads to a discovery of transcendental intersubjectivity or “we-subjectivity,” 99 which probably
overcomes the solipsism of transcendental subjectivity.
However, one might ask whether the transition from subjectivity to intersubjectivity
suggests an inconsistency in the core of Husserlian phenomenology. How can Husserl’s emphasis
on the singularity of the transcendental Ego be comparable with the transcendental structure of
intersubjectivity?100 On the one hand, Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity seems to presuppose
the constitution of the transcendental Ego as the constitutive foundation of intersubjectivity in the
sense that he continues to confirm the absolute primacy of the transcendental Ego; hence, he insists
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on the necessity to justify “the absolute singularity of the ego and its central position in all
constitution.”101 This is why the second reduction is required to establish the sphere of ownness
[Einheitssphäre], which is the most primordial and original sphere. According to Gadamer, this
absolute singular ego is “the Ur-Ich and not ‘an I’” so that Husserl can recognize in his
transcendental phenomenology “the true meaning of [generative] idealism for the first time.”102
Gadamer goes on to argue that the primal I is the “source of all objectifications” even for whom
“the basis of the pregiven world is superseded.” 103 As Husserl himself notes, all objective
consideration of the life-world is no other than “the systematic and purely internal consideration
of the subjectivity which externalizes [äußernden] itself in the exterior.”104 In this context, Dermot
Moran states that the lifeworld is no other than a “correlate pole” of the primal Ego, who sees the
world not only as “the harmonious unfolding of a stream of subjective appearances,” but also as
“the outcome of the process of constitution by the transcendental ego.”105 Despite the shift from
subjectivity to intersubjectivity in Husserlian phenomenology, the primal Ego remains the supreme
locus of the Sinngebung that amounts to the primordial and constitutive ground of the
intersubjective structure wherein “the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of the
transcendental ego.”106
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On the other hand, Husserl endorses the constitutive role of intersubjectivity prior to the
constitution of subjectivity when he says that “the intersubjectively identical lifeworld-for-all
serves as an intentional ‘index’…through which all ego-subjects are oriented toward a common
world.”107 Zahavi also does not hesitate to appreciate the primacy of intersubjectivity in arguing
that Husserl’s consideration of “constituting intersubjectivity” should not be subsumed under the
shadow of his analysis of “constituted intersubjectivity.” 108 Against Schutz who considers
intersubjectivity as a datum [Gegebenheit] for the sake of elaborating an ontology of the lifeworld
which is evidently based on the natural attitude, Zahavi contends that the transcendental Ego
remains transcendentally intersubjective from the beginning.109 In a similar vein, Fink insists that
the transcendental constitution of intersubjectivity cannot be properly explained on the basis of the
egological constitution of subjectivity since what remains after the performance of the reduction
is not merely the transcendental Ego, but a “universe of monads co-existing in the present.”110 It
is the “co-existent transcendental intersubjectivity” that embraces “I, as transcendental ego, and
the transcendental ‘others’ that are demonstrated and attested to in my experience of someone
else.”111 In this context, “the full unfolding of co-constituting intersubjectivity,” Fink states, “is
implied in the transcendental ego.” 112 David Carr also indicates that Husserl’s theory of
intersubjectivity is not an investigation of how another individual ego is given to an individual ego,
but “the ‘intersubjective phenomenology’ that takes transcendental intersubjectivity, instead of
individual subjectivity, as the point of departure for a constitutive theory.” 113 Although the
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constitution of intersubjectivity does not annul subjectivity’s constitutive role, “subjectivity is what
it is,” Husserl himself eventually asserts, “only within intersubjectivity.”114
Insofar as the objectivity of the transcendent world is the accomplishment of the communal
intersubjectivity, and as long as the meaning of a shared common world emerges from the
achievement of the harmonious community of monads, transcendental subjectivity should be
thoroughly intersubjective from the outset. Intersubjectivity is not a mere collection of
subjectivities, in which the concrete experiences of the subjects are given indifferently and in
which there is no inter-relationship among them. Rather, it is a co-subjectivity or “we-subjectivity”
by which every subject not only presents itself as the co-subject in the life-world, but also shares,
in some manner, a common or communal experience; thus, there is “an aporetic universal structure
of intersubjectivity predelineated in every ego whatsoever.” 115 Janet Donohoe explicates how
Husserl incorporates “instinct,” at this predelineated level of subjectivity, into his investigation of
intersubjectivity; that is, the instinctive intersubjectivity already suggests an inherent or preconstitutive “connectedness between the ego and the Other at a most primal level.”116 In the third
volume of the Intersubjective Texts, Husserl contends that “transcendental subjectivity expands to
intersubjectivity or rather, strictly speaking, it does not expand but merely understands itself
better.”117 Consequently, whether the constitutive foundation is subjectivity or intersubjectivity,
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the intersubjective turn or transition should not be understood as an inconsistency or contradiction,
but, rather, a development or broadening of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology. However, is
it not the case that this consistency displays that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of
intersubjectivity remains, to a certain extent, caught in the solipsism of transcendental subjectivism?
In the methodological evolution of Husserl’s phenomenology, is there a genuine turn or shift,
which liberates Husserl’s phenomenological method from solipsism? What is at stake here is
whether Husserl truly overcomes his solipsistic approach to phenomenological methodology by
means of his theory of intersubjectivity.

3. Transcendental Subjectivity Re-confirmed
In Zahavi’s insightful and informative study of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity,
Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity, which rigorously examines Husserl’s unpublished
manuscripts, three untranslated volumes entitled Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität as
well as his later works, he defends Husserl’s ultimate insight that “transcendental intersubjective
sociality is the basis in which all truth and all true being have their intentional source”118 in order
to save Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology from solipsistic suspicions. In this intersubjective
sociality, the Other qua the alter ego is no longer a mere cogitatum as the intended or constituted
object [Gegenstand], but a cogitatum cogitans as the constituting subject [Gegensubjekt] or
Thou.119 However, this does not mean that the alter ego fully absolves itself from the intentional
horizon of the transcendental Ego and then reveals itself as it is. Zahavi accepts that Husserl’s
phenomenological interest does not lie in “investigating the Other for its own sake” but only in
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“making objectivity, transcendence, and reality transcendentally understandable.” 120 To make
sense of the Other as a co-constituting ego phenomenologically, Husserl retains a transcendental
status of the transcendental Ego in his theory of intersubjectivity. Every constituting ego in
transcendental intersubjectivity is thus conducive to “mutually corresponding and harmonious
constitutive system.”121 Zahavi at last insists that the transcendental foundation of intersubjectivity
makes it possible for Husserlian phenomenology to demonstrate the “untenability of a solipsistic
position” even “prior to my concrete encounter with the Other.”122 This is where Zahavi’s defense
of Husserl confronts a Levinasian challenge as to whether transcendental intersubjectivity can truly
overcome solipsism of transcendental subjectivity.
From the Levinasian perspective, Husserl’s solipsistic problem becomes even more violent
or imperialistic in his consideration of intersubjectivity. The ego here is not simply solipsistic in
its own reflection, but, rather, totalitarian not only because it requires other egos to be the
transcendental Ego in the lifeworld as the co-horizon shared by all egos, but also because every
ego becomes neutralized in the name of a higher, open, harmonious, and unified co-community. Is
this ego not a mere member of the “anonymous they [das Man]” in Heidegger’s language? In this
peaceful community, the Other’s command, “You shalt not kill,” resonates in vain like the “idle
talk [Gerede],” which removes the sense of the responsibility from the Same. Husserl’s account
for intersubjectivity does not concern itself with how the Other calls into question a peaceful,
tranquil, and self-possessed identity of the Same. Rather, by means of the Rückfrage into the
ultimate origin of the Sinngebung, its main concern is to clarify how the Other appears—whether
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presents or appresents—to the transcendental—whether perceptional or apperceptional—horizon
of the Same in its neutral, imperialistic, totalizing, and violent serenity.
Zahavi’s insightful interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity ends up revealing
why his endeavor to defend Husserl against the Levinasian attack can be hardly tenable. Zahavi’s
argument shows, indeed, why Levinas has to depart from Husserlian phenomenology, as Zahavi
himself concludes with regard to the theory of intersubjectivity that “The absolute difference
between self and Other disappears,”123 and that “Husserl advocates a strong symmetrical relation
between the ego and the Other.” 124 As soon as the absolute difference vanishes over the cointentional horizon of intersubjectivity, and insofar as an alterity of the Other is normalized,
domesticated, or neutralized in transcendental intersubjectivity, any relation between the ego and
the Other necessarily relies on a symmetrical, harmonious, reciprocal, or “intentional
interpenetration [Ineinander].”125 While Husserl’s methodological attitude remains solipsistic in
the transcendental subjectivity, its solipsistic position becomes serious and imperialistic in the
transcendental intersubjectivity. Therefore, Husserlian phenomenology itself cannot be immune to
solipsistic suspicions in that his solipsistic stance becomes even more unyielding rather than
attenuated in the development of the intersubjective theory.

4. The Hither Side of the Husserlian Method
Levinas’s critique of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology for its solipsism does not
lead Levinas to entirely divorce himself from Husserl’s phenomenological method insofar as the
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fundamental principle of intentionality prepares the ground for Levinas’s own phenomenology. As
Levinas puts it, “To do phenomenology is to denounce the direct vision of the object as naïve.”126
For Levinas, however, the transcendental vision based on the intentional correlation of noesisnoema still remains naïve so that it cannot properly discern an ethical moment of the relation
between the Same and the Other. Because the Other is neither an object like a datum that can be
analyzed by scientific eyes nor a noema that is correlated with noesis, the appearance of the Other
is not a plain phenomenon that is given to consciousness in an unequivocal manner. Levinas
ceaselessly claims that the manifestation of the Other is not a mere phenomenon among others but
a phenomenon par excellence that can be neither deduced from nor reduced into others; it is “the
principle of phenomena”127 that signifies the infinite in the finite, the more in the less, and the
Other in the Same. The infinity is not a sheer noema that can be captured by noesis; rather, it is an
exceptional ideatum that always overflows the idea. The infinite manifests itself as a surplus or
excess by disrupting the idea that thinks of it. Likewise, the Other transcends, surpasses, and
exceeds the intentional horizon, which phenomenologically reduces the alterity of the Other into
the Sinngebung of the Same.
For Levinas, Husserl’s phenomenology based on the Rückfrage fails to identify the
primordial signification of the idea of the infinity, which signifies the asymmetric relation between
the Same and the Other. As will be seen in Chapter Four, Levinas’s phenomenology begins with
an “intentionality of a wholly different type,” which always presupposes an asymmetry, proximity,
transcendence, distance, and non-correlation between the Same and the Other, which can be
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reducible neither “to knowledge of the Other by the Same, nor even to the revelation of the Other
to the Same.”128 Consequently, in order to elaborate on his own phenomenology, Levinas, along
with Husserl, does not accept the natural or psychological attitude that conceives of an object with
a naïve vision while he, against Husserl, delves into a more primordial dimension of
consciousness—or what he calls “psyche”—that cannot be exhaustedly encapsulated by the
intentional—whether subjective or intersubjective—structures.
Against this phenomenological backdrop, Levinas attempts to describe an ethical
dimension in which the alterity of the Other suspends the sovereign autonomy of the Same and its
solipsistic world. Levinas appreciates the achievement of Husserl’s phenomenology, which
underlies the reduction of the naïveté of the natural attitude in favor of the reconstruction of the
given by way of the “return to the neglected concreteness of its mise-en-scene that offers up the
meaning of the given.”129 Nevertheless, Levinas asks whether the given can transparently present
itself in intuition and whether the Husserlian phenomenological method can exhaustively capture
the meaning of the given. In a similar vein, Jean-Luc Marion also points out Husserl’s naïve
understanding of the given as a “flat phenomenon,” by committing “the reduction of the
phenomenon to presence.”130 Out of the way of taking the natural attitude, Husserl goes into the
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logical, theoretical, transcendental, and phenomenological way, which is, for Levinas, too naïve,
intellectualistic, or doxical to appreciate the meaning of phenomena as they are.
It is important to note that, contrary to Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s intellectualism,
Dermot Moran advocates that Husserl is not exclusively interested in theoretical knowledge; rather,
“[Husserl] includes all forms of knowing-how and emotional states wherein something can be
intuited and fulfilled—for example, what it means to be in love.”131 By the same token, in the
reading of the First Meditation of Cartesian Meditations, Ricoeur endorses that Husserl’s
philosophy of “sense [sens]” in a broadest sense goes “much beyond any narrow intellectualism,”
because it contains “perceived sense, imagined sense, willed sense…and logical sense.”132 Ricoeur
and Moran, however, seem to rely on a dichotomy of sense and intellect, which even Husserl would
not accept with respect to intentionality; in other words, both sense and intellect, insofar as they
are based on the lived experience, are intentional rather than indifferent or natural. When it comes
to Husserlian phenomenology, one can ask whether “sense,” narrowly speaking, is nothing other
than intellect, or conversely, whether intellect in a broad sense is nothing but sense. Is not the
dualistic attitude “natural” rather than transcendental? From the Levinasian viewpoint, whether
intellect or sense, Husserlian phenomenology of “sense [sens or Sinn]” rests on its intellectualism
in which any place of the alterity of the Other is displaced—or phenomenologically suspended and
bracketed—by the constitution of the transcendental Ego, which is the ultimate locus of all the
phenomenological sense and validity. In his reading of the Fifth Meditation, eventually, Ricoeur
himself acknowledges that “phenomenology becomes a description of an ongoing totalization,”133
131
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which is in accord with Husserl’s phenomenological method of the Rückfrage into the Sinngebung,
that is, the regressive way back to “the secret nostalgia of all modern philosophy.”134 Ricoeur’s
defense of Husserlian phenomenology would not only ironically betray [trahir] Husserl’s
transcendental-phenomenological principle, but also unintentionally betray [traduire] the radical
core of Levinas’s phenomenology situated in his suspicion on an intellectualistic hubris of
Husserlian phenomenology.
Levinas’s attack on intellectualism of Husserlian phenomenology comes from the doxical
conception of knowledge in which “an opinion, in the normal sense of a belief, has been confirmed
or attested.” 135 Against a definite opposition between doxa (δόξα: a mere opinion, belief, or
everyday knowledge) and episteme (ἐπιστήμη: justified or rational knowledge), Husserl argues that
“the disparaged δόξα…claims the dignity of a foundation for science” in favor of devoting a
“theoretical interest to the ‘life-world’ as the general ‘ground’ of human world-life.”136 In his later
lecture, moreover, Husserl insists on “the transformation from original theōria, the fully
disinterested seeing the world…to the theōria of genuine science, the two being mediated through
the contrast of δόξα and ἐπιστήμη.”137 Moran here recognizes an “inbuilt possibility of a radical
shift of perspective…towards the purely contemplative or theoretical, what Husserl calls the doxictheoretical (Ideas II §2). This shift in perspective, for Husserl, is what enables scientific
understanding.”138 In Husserlian phenomenology, thus, doxa is not a sheer opinion as opposed to
attested knowledge, but a ground of theoretical or logical knowledge. The target of Levinas’s
condemnation is this doxical conception of knowledge in that, due to the intertwinement of doxa
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and episteme, “everything can always be transformable into knowledge.” 139 The doxicalintellectualistic facets of Husserlian phenomenology render phenomena “flat” and so transparent
to consciousness that Levinas attempts to overcome by means of his own phenomenology.
As soon as Levinas’s phenomenology fundamentally departs from Husserl’s
intellectualistic phenomenology, it comes to confront a kind of “failure of phenomenology.”140
However, this does not mean that Levinas leaves phenomenology behind as Colin Davis might
hold. On the contrary, the beginning of phenomenology on which Levinas keeps his eye—
especially when it comes to death—is the very “failure point” of Husserlian phenomenology. It is
the paradox of Levinas’s phenomenology of death that phenomenology should fail in order to be
phenomenology itself. The failure of phenomenology, I claim, culminates in phenomenology of
death since death is neither a plain or flat phenomenon that transparently appears to consciousness
nor a sheer non-phenomenon irrelevant to all phenomenological investigations, but rather an extraordinary or overflowing phenomenon—I will say a “para-phenomenon” 141 —that cannot be
captured by phenomenology itself. Levinas argues that death “resists all appearing, all phenomenal
aspects, as if emotion passed by way of the question, without encountering the slightest quiddity,
toward that acuity of death, and instituted an unknown that is not purely negative but rather in
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GDT, 187; DMT, 219. Levinas also maintains that “[e]very act of consciousness, as knowledge, is belief
and position or doxa,” GDT, 113; DMT, 129.
140
Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1999), 24. Colin Davis argues
that because of “[phenomenology’s] inability to envisage an encounter with the Other” (24), Levinas abandoned
phenomenology in order to develop his own “post-phenomenological ethics” (8) and then articulated in Totality and
Infinity “a distinctive way out of the ethical impasse of phenomenology” (33). Much later on, Davis goes on to mention
Philippe Nemo’s question about Levinas’s phenomenology of the face: “Levinas suggests that in response that
phenomenology may be the wrong word, since phenomenology describes what appears” (133). In the original
conversation, however, Levinas himself says with a less nuanced tone: “I do not know if one can speak of a
‘phenomenology’ of the face, since phenomenology describes what appears,” EI, 85; EeI, 79.
141
In order to avoid the naïveté of the natural attitude toward the given, I employ the term “paraphenomenon,” which also can avoid a logic of Hegelian negativity that Levinas rejects. For now, it is sufficient to say
that death as a para-phenomenon belongs neither exclusively to the noumenal realm nor to the phenomenal one; rather,
it shakes the very strict distinction. As will be seen in Chapter Four, this para-phenomenality of death is related to the
para-doxical notion of what Levinas calls religion, that is, “relation without relation.”
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proximity without knowledge.”142 For Levinas, death reveals itself in the failure moment in which
phenomenology faces what it cannot thematize; thus, the manifestation of death surfaces on the
hither side of all doxical, intentional, or phenomenological thematizations. As far as death qua a
para-phenomenon is concerned, phenomenology remains at a loss. The para-phenomenality of
death heralds a tragic and yet auspicious fate of phenomenology, that is, the inevitable failure of
phenomenology that leads Levinas to develop his own phenomenology by means of breaching the
all-embracing, intellectualistic, and doxical lucidity of Husserlian phenomenology.
The paradox of phenomenology of death qua a para-phenomenon signifies that
phenomenology itself in no way exhausts the meaning of death and so discloses its own “built-in”
limits. At the margin of Husserlian phenomenology, I claim, Levinas’s phenomenology recognizes
both the possibility and the impossibility of phenomenology in terms of the para-phenomenality
of death. The methodological challenge of this dissertation lies in the paradoxical peculiarity of
Levinas’s phenomenology; that is, his pungent criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology comes from
Levinas’s own unintended intention that, following the phenomenological slogan “zu den Sachen
selbst,” he remains more Husserlian than Husserl himself in his methodological approach to the
theme of death. In order to address this paradoxical challenge, this dissertation will demonstrate
that Levinas’s phenomenological methodology uncovers why Husserl, as the founder of
phenomenology, is not Husserlian enough and, in doing so, further reveal how Levinas does his
own phenomenology by way of considering the para-phenomenality of death. The following
chapters will disclose that the ethical signification of death emerges from the primordiality of the
para-doxical meaning of death beyond or on the hither side of the doxical thematization of death.
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GDT, 17-8; DMT, 26-7. In a similar vein, Etienne Feron depicts death as a phenomenon insofar as it
“carries in itself its own withdrawal from the realm of manifestation.” Etienne Feron, Phénoménologie de la mort:
Sur les traces de Levinas (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 43 (henceforth my translation).
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Chapter II
Heidegger’s Ontological Thematization of Death

During his scholarly life, Levinas never loses his interest in the problem of death, which is
the subject of his early and later published works.143 His consideration of death is conducted via
confronting the “fundamental ontology” of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), mainly discussed in
Being and Time (1927).144 As far as the theme of death is concerned, most Levinasian scholars deal
with Levinas’s ethical reflections on the death of the Other in relation to the ontological
interpretation of Dasein’s death.145 In order to find a place for alterity, transcendence, or infinity
of the Other where an ethical meaning takes place, Levinas asserts the responsibility for the death
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Both works are comprised of a series of lectures. On the one hand, among four lectures delivered at the
Philosophical College in 1946-47, the third lecture discusses “the proximity of death and the other,” which is later
developed in Totality and Infinity. Those lectures first appeared in a collection entitled Le Choix, le Monde, l’Existence
(Paris: Arthaud, 1947) and are later published as Emmanuel Levinas, Le temp et l’autre (Montpellier: Fata Morgana,
1979); in English, Time and the Other and Additional Essays, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1987). On the other hand, one of two lecture courses delivered at the Sorbonne University in the
academic year 1975-76 deals with “Death and Time” and is published as Emmanuel Levinas, La mort et le temps
(Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 1991). It was reprinted along with the other lecture, “God and Onto-theo-logy,” in
Emmanuel Levinas, Dieu, la mort et le temps, Le Livre de Poche (Paris: Grasset, 1993); in English, God, Death, and
Time, trans. Berttina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). Derrida also states that Levinas’s ongoing
interest lies in the issue of death: “[A]ll of Levinas’s thought, from the beginning to the end, was a meditation on
death.” AEE, 120; AE, 206.
144
Levinas notes that his “admiration for Heidegger is above all an admiration for Sein und Zeit”; indeed, he
does not pay much attention to Heidegger’s later texts since “the later work of Heidegger…is much less convincing.”
EI, 37-38, 41; EeI, 28, 32, respectively. In Totality and Infinity, he criticizes Heidegger’s later work for its “faint
materialism” because it is dominated by the “Logos,” i.e., the Being of beings, which is “the word of no one.” TI, 299;
TeI, 275. Thus, the ontological logos cannot be the call, command, speech, or language starting from the Other. By
contrast, Derrida depicts Levinas’s language employed in Totality and Infinity as a “language without phrase,” which
is not a real language, since it can “say nothing, offer to the Other.” WD, 147; ED, 217. I will elaborate on this issue
in Chapter Five.
145
Etienne Feron’s Phénoménologie de la mort: Sur les traces de Levinas (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1999) is one of the most comprehensive studies of Levinas on death in comparison with Heidegger’s
ontological account of death. For a feminist approach to Levinas’s understanding of death in relation to Heidegger’s,
see Tina Chanter, Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
On an analysis of Levinas’s conception of death in strong opposition to Heidegger’s, see Richard A. Cohen, “Levinas:
Thinking Least about Death – Contra Heidegger,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 60:1 (2006): 2139. From the Heideggerian perspective, Iain Thompson views Levinas as a post-Heideggerian thinker and investigates
how profoundly Heidegger’s thanatology influences Levinas’s ethical interpretation of death. Iain Thompson,
“Rethinking Levinas on Heidegger on Death,” The Harvard Review of Philosophy 14 (2009): 23-43.
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of the Other as opposed especially to the mineness [Jemeinigkeit] of death in Heidegger’s
fundamental ontology. In order to recognize Levinas’s treatment of death, therefore, it is necessary
to first examine Heidegger’s thanatology, which paves the way for Levinas’s own ethical
consideration of the death of the Other.
The aim of this chapter is to revisit Heidegger’s ontological-existential account of death,
which provides the thematic approach to the topic of this dissertation: the theme of death. This
chapter will begin by drawing upon the question of Being [Seinsfrage] through which Heidegger
elaborates the existential analytic of Dasein in Being and Time (Division One) and then the
temporal structure of the ontological understanding of Dasein’s death (Division Two). Heidegger
poses the question of the meaning of Being [Sein] that has been neglected in the long history of
metaphysical tradition and probes into the “deep” or “authentic” dimension of the existentialontological meaning of Dasein’s death. According to Heidegger’s ontological thematization of
death, Dasein understands the impossibility of its own existence as the most authentic possibility,
by which the doxical-ontological meaning of death is unconcealed. However, by means of
unveiling the enigmatic feature of death—or what I call a “para-phenomenality,” Levinas
discredits the doxical transparency of the ontological thematization of death in which the ethical
meaning of death has been concealed. This chapter claims that, despite the depth of the existential
analytic of Dasein, Heidegger’s thanatology thematically repeats the doxical naiveté of Husserlian
phenomenology in the sense that it takes death to be a “flat” phenomenon that Dasein understands
as its own possibility par excellence. This dissertation argues that the Levinasian question puts
Heidegger’s thanato-logy into question and lays bare its doxical characters, which suppress the
para-doxical signification of death. At the margin of the thematization of death, the paraphenomenality of death as a question, which exhibits both the possibility and the impossibility of
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Heideggerian thanatology, offers this dissertation the thematical approach to Levinas’s
“phenomenology of death.”
1. The Seinsfrage: Departure from Husserlian Phenomenology
When Husserl as a phenomenologist loses everything in order to regain it in the
transcendental realm by performing the transcendental reduction in the self-reflection, Heidegger
as his most outstanding and yet doubtful student, who also remains a phenomenologist, attempts
to retrieve what has been lost or bracketed from the transcendental realm through the existential
analytic of Dasein. According to Heidegger in Being and Time,146 Dasein exists within the world
before theorizing, reflecting, contemplating, and so constituting it in a transcendental way, and
therefore the world is not a correlated or reduced world as the product of the transcendental Ego’s
self-reflection, but the world whereinto Dasein is already thrown [geworfen] in the first place. Prior
to the theoretical, reflective, and transcendental consciousness that objectifies the world as its
correlate, there is a more basic and fundamental dimension in human life—it is what Heidegger
calls “facticity [Faktizität]”147 that signifies the way in which Dasein exists in the world. In his
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There are two standard English translations by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson and Joan Stambaugh.
I will refer to both and freely modify them along with the German edition. For a general introduction to Heidegger’s
thought, see Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999). For an influential
commentary on Being and Time, see Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being
and Time, Division I (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991). For a lucid interpretation of Heidegger’s
analysis of death in terms of time, see, with the “Foreword” by Hubert L. Dreyfus, which is also a great achievement,
Carol J. White, Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2005). For a
genesis and evolution of Heidegger on death from his early works via Being and Time to his later works, see Cristian
Ciocan, Heidegger et le problème de la mort: Existentialité, authenticité, temporalité (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).
This work includes the comprehensive and updated lists of the works on Heidegger’s interpretation of death since
1930.
147
SZ, 135. “Facticity is not the factuality [Tatsächlichkeit] of the factum brutum of something present-athand, but a characteristic of Dasein’s Being.” Heidegger also states: “The concept of facticity implies that an
‘innerworldly’ being has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’
with Being of those beings which it encounters within its own world,” SZ, 56. He goes on to say that “the subject’s
inside and its ‘inner sphere’ is certainly not to be thought as a kind of a ‘box’ or ‘cabinet’.” SZ, 60. As Cristian Ciocan
puts it, “Heidegger proposes the concept of Dasein as an alternative to the traditional concept of subjectivity. It is a
factical ‘subjectivity’ that is situated in the world from the outset, and not in an oppositional relation to the world, like
a ‘box’ from which it would then escape in order to reach the ‘object’ which remains in front of itself and in standing
against itself.” Ciocan, Heidegger et le problème de la mort, 73 (henceforth my translation). In this context, the relation
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letter to Husserl, Heidegger expresses how the transcendental constitution takes place only on the
basis of the facticity of Dasein:
Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the ek-sistence of the factical self.
This factical self, the concrete human being, is as such—as a being—never a “worldly real
fact,” because the human being is never merely present-at-hand but rather ek-sists. And the
element of “wonder” lies in the fact that the eksistence-structure of Dasein makes possible
the transcendental constitution of every posited being.148
All theoretical, intellectual, or intentional activity of a conscious life is already founded upon the
factical fact that human life is born into the world, practically comports [verhält] itself toward
other beings, and is limited [begrenzt] by its own death. Since Aristotle, according to Heidegger,
the subject matter of metaphysics has been determined by the “predominance of an empty and
thereby fantastic idea of certainty and evidence,”149 without considering in what way the human

between human beings and the world is not the same as the relation between subject and object (SZ, 60). Much later
on, Heidegger argues against Husserl that “The that of facticity is never to be found by intuiting it [Das Daß der
Faktizität wird in einem Anschauen nie vorfindlich].” SZ, 135 (italics added).
148
Martin Heidegger, “Letter to Husserl, October 22, 1927, with Appendices,” in Psychological and
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1931), eds. and trans. Thomas Sheehan
and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 138 (translation slightly modified and italics
added).
149
Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2005), 33. In his interpretation of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl, Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Herrmann, who was assistant to Heidegger for the last ten years of Heidegger’ life, argues that our practical life fully
engaged within the world fundamentally underlies our disinterested activity of conscious life. Thus, he presents
Heidegger’s “hermeneutic phenomenology” whose “understanding looking” focuses on the pre-theoretical facticity
of the practical life within the world in contrast to Husserl’s “reflective phenomenology” whose “theoretical knowing”
misses the fundamental aspects of our practical life by reducing them into the theoretical, epistemological, or
transcendental domain. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on
the Concept of Phenomenology, trans. Kenneth Maly (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2013), 16-29. By the same
token, Mark Okrent argues that Heidegger’s conception of intentionality is always “practical rather than cognitive,”
so that “the primary form of intending is doing something for a purpose rather than being conscious of something.”
Mark Okrent, Heidegger’s Pragmatism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 10. In this context, Dagfinn Føllesdal
acknowledges that Heidegger’s primary contribution to philosophy consists in rejecting a traditional idea that
“practical activity presupposes theoretical understanding of the world” and thus recognizing “our practical ways of
dealing with the world as more basic than the theoretical.” Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Husserl and Heidegger on the Role of
Actions in the Constitution of the World,” in Essays in Honor of Jaakko Hintikka: On the Occasion of His Fiftieth
Birthday on January 12, eds. Esa Saarinen et al. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 371. However,
Hubert L. Dreyfus insists that too much emphasis on Heidegger’s criticism of the priority of theory over practice
would overlook his most original insight, that is, the “understanding of Being…more basic than either practice or
theory.” Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Heidegger’s Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality,” Social Research
60/1 (1993), 38. Dreyfus then concludes that Heidegger’s contribution to Western philosophical tradition is “the
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being factically is within the world. Heidegger’s main target here is Husserl’s theory of intuition,
which deprives the facticity of Dasein, its Being, and its world—in short, its Being-in-the-world,
in which an intentional life is fundamentally grounded. Heidegger writes: “Knowing is a mode of
Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus, Being-in-the-world, as a fundamental constitution,
must be interpreted beforehand.”150 Dasein is able to be itself, not because it is self-consciousness
[Selbstbewusstssein], but because it is itself [Selbstsein]. Moreover, Heidegger raises a radical
question of intentionality in terms of Dasein’s transcendence. When it comes to the problem of
transcendence, the question of “what makes it possible for beings to be encountered within the
world” should not be reduced to that of “how does a subject get outside to an object.” 151 If
Husserl’s concept of “immanent transcendence” characterizes an intentional relation of noemanoesis or the transcendental Ego and its correlated object, Heidegger considers the ontological
condition for immanent transcendence that renders intentionality possible: “intentionality is
possible on the grounds of transcendence.”152 What is urgent to Heidegger’s phenomenology is to
begin with what is the most fundamental and ultimate regarding its subject matter, which serves
as “the ground and soil” to nourish and support not simply the root qua metaphysic but also the

discovery of the primacy of this understanding of Being, not of the primacy of practical activity” (38). However,
against most Heideggerian scholars, including Dreyfus, who endorse that Heidegger overcomes Husserlian
epistemological or representational approach to intentionality or “Husserl’s intellectualism,” Moran maintains that
they consider scientific cognition as a “deficient form of practice” and underemphasize the significance of “the
disinterested, theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge.” Dermot Moran, “Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and
Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality,” Inquiry 43 (2000), 39. The problem of whether Heidegger’s criticism of
Husserl’s intellectual attitude is fair or not goes beyond the scope of this chapter whose primary purpose is to show
how much they remain similar to rather than different from each other. And their affinity becomes apparent when the
peculiarity of Levinas’s phenomenological method is taken into consideration.
150
SZ, 62. Levinas describes Heidegger’s departure from Husserl as “the abandonment of the traditional
notion of consciousness as the point of departure, with the decision to seek for the basis of consciousness itself in a
more fundamental notion of being: the existence of Dasein,” MHO, 405-06 (henceforth my translation). The original
version of “Martin Heidegger et l’ontologie” was published in Revue Philosophique de la France et de Étranger in
1932, and then its abridged version, with some modifications, was republished in DEHH. I will refer to the former.
151
SZ, 366.
152
PA, 106; WE, 135.
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entire tree qua philosophy.153 The proper subject of Heidegger’s phenomenology is the Being of
beings, which is the very ground and soil for metaphysics and philosophy; thus, phenomenology
itself is “the science of the Being of beings—ontology.”154
Although the question of being has long been examined under the rubric of “metaphysics,”
according to Heidegger, it has never been taken seriously as a “thematic question of actual
investigation”155 in the metaphysical tradition. When metaphysics asks what it means to be, it has
never conceived of Being [Sein] in an authentic way, but only in terms of something present-athand [Vorhandenheit]. In Being and Time, thus, Heidegger argues that it is necessary to ask the
question of the meaning of Being [die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein] through “‘repeating or
retrieving’ this question [»Wiederholung« dieser Frage].”156 However, this does not mean that
Heidegger first settles upon a clear and distinct definition of Being and then uses it to demonstrate
his own dogmatic claims about it. Instead, he provides a vague or everyday [alltäglich]
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Descartes metaphorically explicates the nature of philosophy as follows: “the whole of philosophy is like
a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other
sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics, and morals.” René Descartes,
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume I, trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 186. Citing Descartes’s metaphor of philosophy as a tree, whose root is metaphysics that buttresses its
own branches including ethics, Heidegger asks: “Out of what ground do the roots, and thereby the whole tree, receive
their nourishing juices and strength?” He delves further into a more fundamental ground, which can sustain the root
as metaphysics by asking “What is metaphysics?” PA, 287; WE, 277. For Heidegger, what Descartes’s radical doubt
fails to doubt is the way of the Being of the ego cogito: that is, “the meaning of the Being of the ‘sum’” (SZ, 24), which
serves as the fundamental ground or soil of the very ego cogito. Hence, Heidegger would reverse Descartes’s axiom
“Cogito ergo sum” as “Sum ergo cogito.” Only when the ontological question of the Being of the sum is determined,
then “the manner of the cogitationes becomes comprehensible” (SZ, 46). In this context, Ricoeur states: “The term
‘Being-in-the-world’ expresses better the primacy of care over the gaze, and the horizonal character of that to which
we are bound. It is indeed Being-in-the-world which precedes reflection.” Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human
Science: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 106.
154
SZ, 37. Heidegger also says: “Phenomenology is the way of access to, and the demonstrative manner of
determination of, that which is to become the theme of ontology. Ontology is possible only as phenomenology” (SZ,
35).
155
SZ, 2.
156
SZ, 26. The term “Wiederholung” can be literally translated as “repeating” or “holding again.” Macquarrie
and Robinson translate this technical term as “restating,” which cannot convey the literal meaning and Heidegger’s
own. Stambaugh’s translation as “retrieval” might be more appropriate. This term plays a significant role in the
Seinsfrage since the Seinsfrage explicates the temporality of Dasein in a repetition or retrieval of its historical
possibilities.

53

understanding of Being that we already pre-understand in some ways; then, he constantly
reinterprets it during the entire course of his investigation. In this regard, Heidegger’s project in
Being and Time rests on a circular structure of interpretation, called the “hermeneutic circle.”157
This circular process of interpretation is neither tautological nor vicious, but rather spiral because
each turn around the circle goes into a deeper or more authentic dimension of the meaning of Being
and thereby makes an implicit understanding of Being more and more explicit. Accordingly, an
everyday understanding of Being leads to an everyday interpretation, which in turn makes possible
a deeper understanding that yields a deeper interpretation, and so forth; there is no final
understanding and interpretation of Being since the Being itself is historical [geschichtlich]. In the
investigation of the meaning of Being, therefore, the Seinsfrage is the starting point by which we
are “not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way.”158
In order to make clear the right way of raising the Seinsfrage, Heidegger begins Being and
Time by presenting what Being is not: “Being [Sein] of beings is not a being [Seiende]” nor an
“origin [Herkunft]” (like God) of beings having a “character of some possible being [möglichen
Seienden].” 159 This initial account of Being anticipates the significance of the “ontological
difference” between Being and a being, which plays a pivotal role in Heidegger’s entire thought
in the sense that the oblivion of Being in the metaphysical tradition is due to its lack of the
consideration of the ontological difference. For Heidegger, the neglect of this difference partly
stems from a grammatical ambiguity of “to be [sein]” in Western languages; grammatically, “to
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SZ, 153, 315.
SZ, 153. By opposing hermeneutics not to phenomenology itself but to Husserlian idealism, Ricoeur
points out the latter’s disadvantage with regard to Heideggerian hermeneutical ontology. “The ideal of scientificity,
construed by Husserlian idealism as ultimate justification, encounters its fundamental limit in the ontological condition
of understanding.” Then, he immediately adds: “The Husserlian demand for the return to intuition is countered by the
necessity for all understanding to be mediated by an interpretation.” Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Science,
105.
159
SZ, 6.
158
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be” can designate either a being [Seiende] in a substantive sense or Being [Sein] in a verbal sense.
Because of this grammatical ambiguity of “to be” that entails the ontological indifference,
traditional metaphysics remains onto-theo-logical and thereby fails to recognize the right way of
questioning. On the one hand, metaphysics is onto-logical in considering Being of beings as “the
ground-giving unity of what is most general [der ergründenden Einheit des Allgemeinsten]”
common to all beings; onto-logically, Being is understood as the “ultima ratio,” which serves to
give the ground to all beings.160 On the other hand, metaphysics is theo-logical in considering
Being as “the founding unity of the allness [der begründenden Einheit der Allheit]” antecedent to
all beings; theo-logically, Being is considered as the “causa prima,” which reinforces its
foundational role to give a genetic cause to all beings.161 Onto-theo-logically, metaphysics has
never thought of Being per se, but always has reduced it to a variation of beings as “the grounding
ground,”162 which functions as the timeless, eternal, and unchangeable foundation of all beings.
Consequently, the metaphysical tradition establishes the ahistorical or non-historical
[geschichtslos] conception of Being by reducing it to the most general and highest being, which
accordingly leads to the oblivion of Being as such throughout the history [Geschichte] of Being.
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ID, 58, 60, respectively.
ID, 58, 60, respectively (translation modified). In Introduction to Metaphysics, which begins with the
fundamental question, “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” Heidegger asserts that any theological
proclamation—like “In the beginning, God created heaven and earth”—cannot be the answer to the question since
this why question is not about the origin or cause of beings “on the same level as beings themselves,” but about “the
domains that lie ‘at the ground,’ even pressing into the ultimate, to the limit.” IM, 1, 8, 3, respectively. See also PA,
287; WE, 207. Iain Thomson explicates the onto-theo-logical features of metaphysics as both “a bottom-up, groundgiving or establishing” and “a top-down, theological founding or justification.” Iain Thomson, Heidegger on
Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 18.
162
ID, 58. This grounding ground is the “metaphysical concept of God” as causa sui whose existence
traditional metaphysics attempts to prove in various ways (60). As will be seen, Sein by itself can never exist, but only
a Seiende exists. For Heidegger, the proof of God’s existence leads to a contamination of Sein by God through reducing
Sein to a supreme Seiende; hence, there is no place for Sein itself in onto-theo-logy. In “Introduction to ‘What is
Metaphysics?’,” Heidegger also states: “In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being,
for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question, for it thinks Being only by representing beings
as beings. It names beings as whole, although it speaks of Being. It names Being and means beings as beings. From
its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion
of beings and Being.” PA, 281; WE, 199-200.
161
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Furthermore, an onto-theological understanding of Being entails a misunderstanding of the
nature of (human) beings. Traditional anthropology defines human beings either as the animal
rationale in a philosophical sense or the imago Dei in a theological sense. Heidegger attacks both
approaches because they see human beings in terms of the Being-present-at-hand [Vorhandenseins]
rather than of their own Being.163 What the onto-theological tradition of metaphysics has long
failed to recognize is “a way of Being [eine Weise des Seins]”—or what Heidegger calls “existence
[Existenz]”164—which concerns human beings’ relation or comportment [Verhalten] to their own
Being at its most basic and primordial level, by means of reducing the human way of Being or the
facticity of human existence to presence-at-hand or objective presence [Vorhandenheit]. Human
beings are not simply out there in the mode of presence-at-hand among other objects, but they
exist such a way to comport themselves to beings, as Heidegger puts it: “The being that is in the
way of existence [Existenz] is the human being. The human being alone exists. Rocks are, but they
do not exist.”165 Insofar as metaphysics strives for the Being qua the foundation or origin, which
all beings share ontologically, and, from which all beings issue theologically, what is taken for
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SZ, 48-49. According to Heidegger, beings manifest themselves in three different modes: 1) as presenceat-hand or objective presence [Vorhandenheit], which refers to the bare fact that a being is present—rather than
absent—to a theoretical, disinterested, or contemplative gaze, 2) as readiness-to-hand or handiness [Zuhandenheit], in
which a being reveals itself to Dasein as a useful, practical set of equipment, and 3) as human Dasein, who reveals
itself to itself and has temporal existence, alone exists in the world. Roughly speaking, Heidegger’s great achievement
in Being and Time consists of explicating a practical—primordially antecedent to theoretical—relation between
Zuhandenheit and Dasein’s Being in terms of care [Sorge] (Division One) and an existential relation of Dasein to itself
in terms of temporality—and especially its own death (Division Two). In his interpretation of Heidegger’s ontology,
Levinas states: “Precisely, Being revealed to Dasein is revealed not under the form of a theoretical concept that one
contemplates, but a care [souci] that Dasein has for its very existence…To understand Being is to exist in such a way
that one takes care of one’s own existence.” MHO, 407. Levinas points out Heidegger’s critique of traditional
philosophy for its intellectualist understanding of human existence: “All intellectualist philosophy—empiricist or
rationalist—seeks to know human beings, but it means to do so through the concept of human beings, leaving aside
the effectivity of human existence and the meaning of this effectivity.” MHO, 430.
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SZ, 135. See also PA, 283; WE, 202. Levinas writes: “It is the abandonment of the traditional concept of
consciousness as the point of departure, along with the decision to seek for the basis of consciousness itself in a more
fundamental notion of Being—a notion of the existence of Dasein,” MHO, 405-6. Human existence is thus the
condition for the conscious life, and not vice versa.
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“Das Seiende, das in der Weise der Existenz ist, ist der Mensch. Der Mensch allein existiert. Der Fels ist,
aber er existiert nicht.” PA, 284; WE, 204 (translation modified).
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granted is the very Being; hence, the Being, i.e., the way of human existence, has remained
unquestioned and overlooked in the history of metaphysics.
Heidegger goes on to provide what Being is in the broadest sense that challenges the ontotheological foundationalism: “Being is always the Being of beings.”166 As seen above, the Being
is not any kind of a primal origin or foundation prior to all beings; rather, it is only in and through
beings—though Heidegger becomes more conscious of an independent status of Being in his later
works.167 As soon as a being is thrown into the world, it is already interrogated, though not yet
conceptually or authentically, but vaguely or preliminarily, with regard to its own Being. The way
of the Seinsfrage is always already predetermined by the questioner’s preliminary understanding
of his own Being. This predetermination of the Seinsfrage by the questioner’s pre-understanding
of Being implies the right way of the Seinsfrage that Heidegger envisions. In order to formulate
the Seinsfrage in the right way, Heidegger takes Dasein as an “exemplary being [das exemplarische
Seiende]”168 who can work out its own Seinsfrage; Da-sein is a name for a being who is [sein]
there [da]. Basically, he designates Dasein not only as the being who is able to interrogate its own
Being (the “Gefragte” or what is being asked about: Being) but also as the being who is
interrogated (the “Befragte” or what is interrogated: Dasein), for the sake of the authentic meaning
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SZ, 9.
Generally speaking, after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes his famous turn [das
Kehr] in the course of retrieving the Seinsfrage, a shift from Being on the basis of Dasein to Dasein on the basis of
Being. In Being and Time, Heidegger articulates the question of Being by means of the fundamental ontology, i.e, the
existential analytic of Dasein. The central task for the later Heidegger is no longer to develop the fundamental
ontology—indeed, he abandons it; instead, his primary focus is on the thinking of Being itself. However, Levinas
believes that Heidegger promotes under the name “Kehr” what is not worthy of the name since he is still—even
more— obsessed with the problem of Being itself [das Sein selbst] or Beyng [das Seyn]. This is why Levinas pays
less attention to Heidegger’s later works. For Heidegger’s lifelong engagement in the question of Being, see Richard
Capobianco, Engaging Heidegger (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). The detailed discussion of
Heidegger’s Kehre will be presented in Chapter Four.
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SZ, 7. Unlike Husserl, who follows Kant and Scholasticism that designate “Dasein” whose way of Being
is “natural things” in the mode of “Vorhandenheit,” Heidegger assigns Dasein to the specific way of Being that we
exist: “We are at every moment a Dasein.” Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, trans. Albert
Hofstadter (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 28.
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of Being (the “Erfragte” or what is to be obtained: the meaning of Being for Dasein). The threefold
structure of Dasein’s questioning—or what Heidegger calls “the formal structure of the question
of Being” 169 —can be epitomized as the “Dasein-in-the-question,” 170 which conveys the
ontological-existential structure of Dasein’s entanglement with its own Seinsfrage.
Unlike beings in the mode of Vorhandenheit, Dasein alone places its own Being in question.
It is through the Seinsfrage that Dasein transparently understands its own Being as thrown into the
da where, accordingly, Dasein opens itself up to a disclosure [Erschlossenheit] of its Being in such
a way that it understands its own Being. From the ground of Dasein’s understanding of Being, all
kinds of theoretical activities of its conscious life emerges hereafter. It is the significance of the
Seinsfrage that separates Heidegger from traditional philosophy—in particular, his scholarly
mentor Husserl, to whom Being and Time is dedicated. Whereas the Heideggerian Dasein qua a
questioner is always already involved—rather than detached from—in its ontological-existential
questions, the Husserlian Ego qua the transcendental onlooker disinterestedly observes its
contemplative questions outside and above them. It is “the ontological groundlessness of
transcendental subjectivity,”171 for which Heidegger criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology, and that
he attempts to overcome through reviving the forgotten Seinsfrage in the right way.
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See SZ, § 2. “Thus to work out the question of Being means to make a being—one who questions—
transparent in its Being. Asking the question, as a mode of Being of a being, is itself essentially determined by what
is asked about in it—Being. This being, which we ourselves in each case are and which includes inquiry among the
possibilities of its Being, we formulate terminologically as Dasein” (SZ, 7).
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In “What is Metaphysics?,” Heidegger also states: “[E]very metaphysical question can be asked only in
such a way that the questioner as such is also there within the question, that is, is placed in question….We are question,
here and now, for ourselves.” PA, 82; WE, 103 (italics added).
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Gadamer, Truth and Method, 257. However, Gadamer admits that “Heidegger’s project in Being and Time
does not completely escape the problematic of transcendental reflection.” What Heidegger attempts to show in Being
and Time is a “new dimension within transcendental phenomenology…in terms of the temporality and historicity of
Dasein” (256). Furthermore, Dreyfus even argues that in taking over Husserl’s phenomenology whose concept of
intentionality “gives rise to more problems than it solves,” Heidegger makes his own phenomenology “exactly the
opposite of Husserl’s proposed method.” Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 51, 30, respectively.
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By means of raising its own Seinsfrage, Dasein does not simply understand and interpret
itself epistemologically in terms of its own Being, but Dasein itself is ontologically what it
understands and interprets its Being; simply put, Dasein exists by understanding its own Being.
Here the understanding [Verstehen] is not a cognitive faculty in the Kantian sense of the term,
which enables Dasein to know an object in terms of space and time; thus, it refuses the
epistemological structure of the knowing subject and the object known. According to Levinas, the
Heideggerian understanding is the very “dynamism” or “power [pouvoir]” that determines
Dasein’s way of Being, i.e., the mode of its existence.172 Although Being reveals itself in and
through beings, it is more than simply what it is to be revealed in Dasein since the basic mode of
Dasein’s Being is the temporal [zeitlich], historical [geschichtlich]—or “epochal” in Heidegger’s
later terminology—able-to-be. Being manifests and hides itself throughout the different epochs of
its history [Geschichte] in various manners, and what can be said about the history of Being
[Seinsgeschichte] is only that it is or happens [geschieht]. Heidegger states, “[O]ne cannot speak
of a ‘why.’ Only the ‘that’—that the history of Being is in such as way—can be said.”173 Any
attempt to finalize knowledge based on any theological origin or ontological ground should fail
because the Being itself is finite [endlich], historical, and epochal. 174 In Introduction to
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Levinas acknowledges that the “originality” of Heidegger’s conception of existence consists in rejecting
the traditional idea of consciousness and showing that the understanding has nothing to do with “theory” or “conscious
awareness.” MHO, 415. Rather, the understanding constitutes Dasein’s mode of existence upon which any cognitive,
contemplative activities are fundamentally founded.
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SD, 57.
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In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger comments that the aim of fundamental ontology is
first to ask about a “relationship between the understanding of Being and the finitude in human beings” (161) and then
to unveil the “finitude of Dasein as its fundament” (163). The finitude of human beings is not only “[what] is decisive
for purpose of making the understanding of Being possible” (163), but also “the constant, although mostly concealed,
shimmering of all that exists.” Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 167. Dreyfus appreciates the original achievement
of White’s interpretation of Heidegger’s thanatology as follows: “our inability to spell out the understanding of Being
in our background practices is one important aspect of what Heidegger means by human finitude.” Dreyfus,
“Foreword,” xiii. For her own discussion on the finitude of Being, see White, Time and Death, 18-23, 72-75, 143-47.
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Metaphysics, Heidegger contends that there is no such metaphysical ground, that is, a solid and
secure foundation that onto-theological thinking has long sought.
Why are there beings at all (rather than nothing)? Why—that is, what is the ground? From
what ground do beings come? On what ground do beings stand? To what ground do beings
do? The question does not ask this or that about beings…The questioning seeks the ground
for what is, insofar as it is in being. To seek the ground: this means to get to the bottom
[ergründen]….But because we are questioning, it remains an open question whether the
ground is a truly grounding, foundation-effecting, originary ground; whether the ground
refuses to provide a foundation, and so is an abyss [Ur-grund]; or whether the ground is
neither one nor the other, but merely offers the perhaps necessary illusion of a foundation
and is thus an unground [Un-grund].175
In this passage, which undoubtedly alludes to Schelling’s peculiar concept of the “non-ground
[Ungrund],”176 Heidegger explicates how the (onto-theological) ground is ungrounded from the
beginning. In the first edition of “On the Essence of Ground,” Heidegger also make a similar
remark: “Where does the necessity lies for grounding? In abyss and in unground. And where is
this? In Da-sein.” 177 Once the Seinsfrage is retrieved in the right way, and thereby once the
ontological difference between Being and beings is properly understood, the Being is not any kind
of a stable, established, or grounding ground but manifests itself in the horizon of time, as the title
Being and Time suggests.178 In this context, Heidegger’s criticism of onto-theology clearly shows
that the determination of Being does not rely on any kind of trans-epochal foundationalism or
casual determinism, which might unexceptionally operate throughout the epochs of the history of

175

IM, 3.
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human
Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 68. After
stating that the ground of God is not identical with God, but found in God, Schelling claims: “anarchy still lies in the
ground…as if initial anarchy had been brought to order. This is the incomprehensible base of reality in things” (29).
This anarchy is what he calls the “indivisible remainder” (29) or the “original ground or non-ground” (68), which is
never assimilated into the ground while remaining “eternally in the ground” (29).
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PA, 100; WE, 127 (translation slightly modified).
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In the Introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger describes time as “the horizon of the understanding of
Being in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein which understands Being,” SZ, 17.
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Being; rather, the manifestation of Being is essentially temporal, historical, and epochal. Therefore,
what the ongoing change of “the epochal transformations of Being”179 exposes is the fact that there
is no eternal, unchangeable, or ahistorical ground which guarantees a transcendental or
metaphysical foundation that the onto-theological tradition seeks. Heidegger’s attack of the ontotheological understanding of Being culminates in his ontological interpretation of Dasein’s death,
which discloses the temporality, historicity, and finitude of Dasein’s Being.

2. Death Thematized
2-1. The Peculiar Modes of Dasein: Authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and Totality [Ganzheit]
As seen above, the essence [Wesen] of Dasein does not rely on something other than itself,
such as the most general foundation or highest origin in terms of the Platonic participation, the
Aristotelian causality, or the Thomistic analogy that synthesizes these two principles; 180 for
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SD, 57.
Regarding the Thomistic synthesis, John D. Caputo states as follows: “It is clear then that one cannot
separate the doctrine of participation from the principle of causality. Participation has a causal sense. Participated esse
depends on unparticipated esse as an effect does upon its cause.” John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay
on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 142. According to Anselm K. Min,
Aquinas would not accept the Heideggerian notion that “God and things ‘are’ but that human beings ‘exist’” since “all
finite beings are equal; they are beings by participation, not by essence, beings by grace, not by merit.” Anselm K.
Min, Paths to the Triune God: An Encounter between Aquinas and Recent Theologies (Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2005), 46-47. When Aquinas speaks of existence, his focus is on the ultimate, profound, and intimate act
of existing [esse], which cannot be reduced to essence. By means of participation in the creative esse of God qua the
ultimate cause, all beings qua His effects come into existence [esse]. Aquinas says: “all beings apart from God are not
their own esse but esse by participation.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English
Dominican Province (Notre Dame: Christian Classics, 1981), I, 44, 1. According to Aquinas, finite beings are finite
precisely because they do not have in themselves the ground of their existence [esse]. Thus, they depend on the divine
esse of God as the “ipsum esse per se subsistens” (I, 44, 1) in which they participate; in God alone, “His essence is
His existence” (I, 3, 4). However, as will be seen, Heidegger argues that the peculiarity of Dasein, which differentiates
the mode of Dasein from Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit, consists in the fact that its essence is no other than its
existence. Finally, Min’s statements show why Heidegger criticizes Thomism for its ontotheological stance.
“Important as a human being is in the hierarchy of beings, a human being is still fundamentally one being among
others, to whom Aquinas applies exactly the same ontological categories…that he does to everything else.” Min, Paths
to the Triune God, 47. If Aquinas’s primary interest lies in distinguishing between the Creator as the Cause and all
other creatures as its effects and thereby exhibiting the absolute, total, and unilateral relationship between God as
“esse by essence” and creature as “esse by participation,” Heidegger’s is to show the distinction between human beings
who exist (existence) and other things that are (Vorhandenheit or Zuhandenheit). For Heidegger, thus, the Thomistic
conception of God in terms of participation and causality exemplarily remains ontotheological.
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Heidegger, they all fall under the ontotheological tradition. Heidegger here asserts that “the
‘essence [Wesen]’ of Dasein lies in its existence [Existenz].”181 Levinas appreciates Heidegger’s
contribution to the phenomenological tradition, which marks a “new phase” of the
phenomenological movement, when he argues that Dasein is distinguished from things not by its
essence or property, but by “the existence, the very way of being-there [être-là].”182 In the endnote
to Sein und Zeit, Heidegger provides an etymological account of existence in terms of “Ek-sistenz,”
which means “standing-out into the openness of the there.”183 Dasein does not simply remain a
static entity as a being-given-out-there, but always stands out of itself as a being-thrown-into-thethere. In this context, Dasein never fully actualizes its own Being at its end, but always remains
ecstatic on the way toward its end; thus, it is already an ahead-of-itself [Sich-vorweg-sein] and, at
the same time, always a not-yet-itself [Noch-nicht-sein]. 184
The peculiarity of Dasein’s existence consists in its “transcendence” in such a way that
Dasein transcends its ontic mode of a presence-at-hand and thereby exists or ek-sists in the
ontological mode of Being-in-the-world. Dasein as an ecstatic being transcends itself toward the
world into which it is thrown as the not-yet-self and toward which it projects itself as the aheadof-itself. Transcendence characterizes the ecstatic mode of Dasein’s Being as a thrown-projection
[geworfener Entwurf], as Heidegger states: “And, as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the mode of
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SZ, 42. White succinctly depicts the term existence as follows: “Dasein is as an understanding able-to-be
which in its Being makes an issue of this Being.” White, Time and Death, 72.
182
MHO, 395, 397, respectively. According to Levinas, the fundamental point of Heidegger’s philosophy is
that “the essence of human is simultaneously his existence.” In other words, “That which human is is at the very same
its way of Being, its way of Being-there, its way of ‘temporalizing’ itself” (405). The concept of the existence, which
marks the difference between human subjects and other things, shows the distinction between “the gnoseological
attitude that foregrounds the theory of knowledge” and “the ontological attitude” that underlies the former (397).
183
SZ, 442. The original note reads: “Dasein existiert und nur es; somit Existenz das Aus- und Hinaus-stehen
in die Offenheit des Da: Ek-sistenz.”
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As soon as Dasein is thrown into the world, and as long as it is there, “Dasein is always already its notyet [Noch-nicht]” (SZ, 244), and “the ‘ahead-of-itself [Sich-vorweg]’ presented itself as a ‘not-yet [Noch-nicht]’” (SZ,
317). Even in death, “Dasein is neither fulfilled nor does it simply disappear; it has not become finished or completely
at its disposal as something at hand [Zuhandenes]” (SZ, 245).
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Being of projecting.”185 Insofar as Dasein transcends toward the world into which it is thrown, and
as long as Dasein remains in the world into which it projects, the transcendence of Dasein’s Being
should be understood in terms of finitude [Endlichkeit] rather than of infinitude [Unendlichkeit].
In other words, the world is not only the there [da] that allows Dasein to transcend itself toward
the openness of Being, but also the horizonal end [Ende] that de-limits or circum-scribes its
possibility of existing in its thrown projection; thus, the world releases Dasein’s Being as “finite
[endlich] transcendence.”186 In invoking Dasein’s ecstatic mode of Being, Heidegger elucidates
how finite transcendence constitutes Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world in the sense that it
belongs to “Dasein as the fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs prior to all
comportment.”187 In its finite transcendence, as will be seen in Heidegger’s ontological exposition
of death, Dasein finds its own fundamental finitude in which Dasein’s peculiar modes of
authenticity and totality are clarified.
As opposed to the mode of the presence-at-hand that is present objectively out there,
Heidegger insists, the existence of Dasein points to the peculiar way of Being in such a way that
Dasein within the world exists temporally [zeitlich], historically [geschichtlich], and thus finitely
[endlich]. Dasein’s Being must be understood on the basis of time; time is “the horizon of every
understanding and interpretation of Being,” and thus the meaning of Dasein’s Being can be found
in its “temporality [Zeitlichkeit].”188 The existential way of Dasein’s Being in terms of time is the
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SZ, 145.
In explicating that transcendence belongs to the essence of Dasein and thus constitutes Dasein’s Being,
Moran claims that transcendence is the “indicator of Dasein’s finitude.” Dermot Moran, “What Does Heidegger Mean
by the Transcendence of Dasein?,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22/4 (2014): 499.
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PA, 108; WE, 137.
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SZ, 17. Much later on, Heidegger says: “The primordial ontological ground of the existentiality of Dasein
is temporality. The articulated structural totality of the Being of Dasein as care first becomes existentially intelligible
in terms of temporality” (SZ, 234). In this context, Levinas states: “Now all of Heidegger’s work tends to demonstrate
that time is not a frame where human existence—or such and such other acts of the understanding of Being—is situated,
but that the ‘temporalization [Zeitigung]’ of time, in its authentic form, is this understanding of Being itself.” MHO,
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most fundamental subject matter of ontology in the first place. Ontology should begin with what
Heidegger calls “the fundamental ontology,” inspired by the Seinsfrage, which investigates the
possibility [Möglichkeit] of the factical-existential way of Dasein’s Being. This fundamental
ontology discerns an “a priori condition for the possibility,” 189 the condition for all other
ontologies that consider Being of such and such beings and, in turn, for ontic inquiries that concern
themselves with the actuality [Wirklichheit] of these beings in the mode of Vorhandenheit. In
opposition to categories applied to “the actuality of the thing as the fundamental stratum,” 190
existentials are applied solely to the possibility of Dasein’s Being. Thus, insofar as the fundamental
ontology of Dasein is concerned, Heidegger notes, “Higher than actuality stands possibility.”191
Dasein is essentially its own possibility—rather than actuality—to be able to be or to be a potential
for its Being [Seinkönnen]. 192 With regard to Dasein’s possibility, Heidegger introduces two
distinctive yet interconnected modes of Being: authenticity and inauthenticity.
Dasein is always its possibility. It ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a mere property of
presence-at-hand. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can
‘choose’ itself in its Being and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only
‘seem’ to do so. But only provided that Dasein is essentially something possible as
authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. The
two modes of Being, authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit]—
are based on the fact that Dasein is in general determined by mineness [Jemeinigkeit].193
It is clear from this passage that, in and as its own possibility, Dasein can choose [wahlen] to be
either authentic or inauthentic and then individualizes itself in this choice. The problem of whether
Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic depends on its own extreme possibility—or what Heidegger
404. For a detailed discussion on the temporality of Dasein, See White, Time and Death, 93-126; Ciocan, Heidegger
et le problème de la mort, 149-56.
189
SZ, 11.
190
SZ, 99. For a distinction between categories and existentials, see SZ, 143-44.
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SZ, 38.
192
SZ, 143-44.
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SZ, 42-43.
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calls “the possibility of the impossibility of existence”194—that is, Dasein’s Being toward its own
death. If Division One of Being and Time is dedicated to explicating the ontological structure of
various ontic-inauthentic possibilities of Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world through the
fundamental ontology or analytic of Dasein, Division Two focuses on the temporality of Dasein,
which determines the primordial mode of the authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and totality [Ganzheit]
of Dasein as Being-toward-death [Sein zum Tode]. In the beginning of Division Two, Heidegger
clearly states that the existential analytic of Dasein hitherto concerns only “the inauthentic Being
of Dasein and of Dasein as less than total [das uneigentliche Sein des Daseins und dieses als
unganzes].”195 The entire Division One of Being and Time is thus incomplete since it does not take
into consideration the primordial and authentic totality of Dasein. Therefore, the phenomenon of
death marks a “transitional consideration”196 which reads off as the thematic development of the
phenomenological investigation elaborated in Being and Time. Unless the ontological analysis of
death is properly considered, the existential analytic of Dasein cannot be fully accomplished.
The theme of a totality [Ganzheit] in terms of Dasein’s end delimits the scope of the
analytic of Dasein. As seen above in his critique of ontotheology, Heidegger is interested neither
in the origin of Dasein (before its birth or not-yet-being-there) nor in its afterlife (after its death or
no-longer-being-there); rather, his phenomenological interest lies in the way of Being-in-the-world
(being-there), that is, the way that Dasein ek-sists within the world. Thus, the end of Dasein
[Daseinsende] is not only its death but also its beginning, i.e., its birth; it is the existential end to
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SZ, 233. Ciocan writes: “the validity of the ontological task regarding Being of Dasein essentially depends
on the achievement of this original and authentic totality.” Ciocan, Heidegger et le problème de la mort, 158. See also
Piotr Hoffman, “Death, Time, History: Division II of Being and Time,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger,
ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 222-23.
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enclose or circumscribe [eingrenzen] the totality of Dasein [Daseinsganzheit].197 The existential
mode of Dasein’s Being can be characterized in such a way that it is dying as soon as it is born;
thus, the fact that Dasein is there means that Dasein is born into death. In this context, birth and
death are “the same phenomenon,”198 which marks not only the Existenz of Dasein as Being-inthe-world but also the Ganzheit of Dasein’s Being-toward-death.
Given that Dasein always remains a not-yet-itself as well as an ahead-of-itself, why does
the issue of totality matter in the thematic investigation of Dasein’s death? At a glance, Heidegger’s
answer seems to be not fundamental enough or even somewhat misleading; the lack of totality in
Dasein’s Being is due to the fact that “there is still something outstanding [Ausstand] in its-ableto-be.”199 Following this initial answer, the totality of Dasein can be understood only after fully
paying all outstanding debts, namely, ending its life or actualizing all its possibilities. However,
Heidegger rejects his initial account since it is proper to Vorhandenheit, not to Dasein itself: “Death
is not something not yet present-at-hand nor the last outstanding element reduced to a minimum,
but an imminence [Bevorstand].” 200 For Dasein, death is not an event at which everything
outstanding in its Being can be finally solved, the moment at which Dasein transforms its not-yetbeing to its full-blown-being by means of finalizing or completing its own Being. Rather, death is
an impending end which constantly stands before Dasein and thereby toward which Dasein
projects itself in its ahead-of-itself and comports itself in its not-yet-being; it remains its own
possibility from the beginning to the end—that is, the possibility in its totality. Consequently, death
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as the end of Dasein determines the totality of Dasein’s Being as Being-toward-the-end [Sein zum
Ende], which is distinct from Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein] in the mode of Vorhandenheit.
What the totality of Dasein in terms of its end signifies is the existential fact that Dasein
individualizes itself in its authenticity; hence, death is always a matter of Dasein itself. According
to Heidegger, the ontical fact of the death of others, taken as “a substitute theme for the analysis
of totality,” blurs the boundary of the totality of Dasein and distracts Dasein itself from the
ontological fact that death is always an “existential phenomenon of Dasein which is in each case
its own.”201 The problem of the death of others thus obscures an ontological meaning of Dasein’s
death. Only the thematization of death as the totality of Dasein discloses the way Dasein exists
authentically, the way Dasein opens itself to its authentic Being as Being-toward-death. In this
regard, the thematic investigation of death brings to light the authentic Being of Dasein in its
totality and thus takes the central place in the architectonic structure of the existential analytic of
Dasein.202 The totality of Dasein’s Being does not mean a mere sum of all possibilities, but the
possibility par excellence to be able to be in its primordiality [Ursprünglichkeit] by which Dasein
discloses itself as authentic and total. Therefore, death is an a priori and primordial possibility that
characterizes Dasein’s Existenz as the able-to-be-as-total [Ganzseinkönnen] underlying all other
possibilities; it remains the possibility proper from the beginning to the end. As will be seen below,

201

SZ, 240.
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most misinterpretations of Heidegger’s ontological description of death—especially, that of Paul
Edwards—are largely generated by their failure to recognize this a priori characteristic of the
possibility of the impossibility, which determines Dasein’s authenticity and totality, prior to all
possibilities.

2-2. Ontological Thematization of Death as the Possibility Proper
It seems to phenomenologists that any description of death is an impossible or absurd task
since one cannot experience one’s own death, as the Epicurean paradox shows: “When we are,
death is not, while when death is, we are not.”203 However, Heidegger qua a phenomenologist
takes death as a phenomenon and attempts to describe how Dasein understands its own death in
an ontological way. This ontological description of Dasein’s death enables Heidegger to get out of
the Epicurean pitfalls and to seek the ontological meaning of death. In order to describe death as a
thematic phenomenon, Heidegger first makes a distinction between perishing [Verenden],
demising [Ableben], and dying [Sterben]. Dying does not refer to a way of Being-at-an-end [ZuEnde-sein], the end at which Dasein stops existing, but a way of Being-toward-the-end [Sein zum
Ende], the end toward which Dasein is thrown. Thus, the way of Being-toward-the-end is “the way
of Being in which Dasein is toward its own death [Tod],”204 which should be distinguished from
perishing, the end of “what is alive [Lebendigen],”205 and from demising, the collapse of our
intelligible world that leads to “the gateway to heaven or hell, the beginning of the next cycle of
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karma, or the cessation of consciousness.” 206 If something present-at-hand [zuhanden] that is
merely perishes, Dasein who exists alone dies. Whereas perishing and demising signify a kind of
an event that occurs at a particular moment, dying is “a way to be [eine Weise zu sein]”207 in which
Dasein is toward its death and thereby undertakes as its own possibility, as soon as it has been
thrown into the world, and as long as it is there [da]. For Heidegger, therefore, death is not a “oneshot” event or occurrence to abruptly happen to Dasein, but the “phenomenon of life”208 to be
understood ontologically by Dasein in its authenticity and totality.
Heidegger defines the ontological-existential conception of death by employing five quite
simple yet somewhat perplexing terms: the most authentic [eigenste], non-relational
[unbezügliche], insuperable [unüberholbare], indefinite [unbestimmte], and certain [gewisse]
possibility.209 Firstly, death is the “most authentic [eigenste]” possibility of Dasein. Dasein does
not simply understand its death as the impossibility of its existence, but as the possibility of the
impossibility of its existence, that is, the possibility of “no-longer-being-able-to-be-there [Nichtmehr-dasein-könnens].”210 In its ecstatic temporality, Dasein as a being-ahead-of-itself foreruns
into its end [Vorlaufen] and projects itself into the nothingness of its existence [Entwurf], from
which it could never run away. Just as death is always Dasein’s own and so not external to its

206

White, Death and Time, 70.
SZ, 245. Heidegger says: “In such Being-toward-its-end, Dasein exists in a way which is authentically
whole as that being which it can be when ‘thrown into death.’ This being does not have an end at which it just stops,
but it exists finitely.” SZ, 329.
208
SZ, 246. Heidegger also states: “Dying is not an event [Begebenheit] at all; it is a phenomenon to be
understood existentially.” SZ, 240. Thus, death is neither an event which has not happened yet to Dasein, nor an end
which is something not yet objectively present. Rather, death is always already immanent for Dasein since Dasein
exists in such a way that its not-yet belongs to itself: “As thrown being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already
delivered over its death.” SZ, 259.
209
SZ, 258-59. “The full existential and ontological concept of death can now be defined as follows: as the
end of Dasein, death is the most authentic [eigenste], non-relational [unbezügliche], certain [gewisse], and as such,
indefinite [unbestimmte] and insuperable [unüberholbare] possibility of Dasein.”
210
SZ, 250.
207

69

Being, “No one take the other’s dying away from him.”211 In his interpretation of Dasein’s death,
Derrida points out that “one has to give [death] to oneself by taking it upon oneself.”212 In the
course of giving and taking its own death, Dasein transparently understands its death as its
irreplaceable mineness [Jemeinigkeit] that it alone must undertake. Ontologically understood,
death belongs solely and exclusively to Dasein itself, insofar as it is there. Heidegger states: “With
death, Dasein stands before itself in its most authentic able-to-be [eigensten Seinkönnen]….[and]
is completely thrown back upon its most authentic able-to-be.”213 In its “anticipatory resoluteness
[vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit],” 214 paradoxically, Dasein understands the impossibility of its
own existence as its most authentic possibility, and thereby discloses itself as an able-to-be-there
in its authenticity and totality. Dasein’s Seinkönnen becomes “authentic and transparent
[durchsichtig] in the understanding Being-toward-death as its most authentic possibility.”215
Paul Edwards’s (in)famous polemic against Heidegger ignites an extensive debate on the
ontological interpretation of death in the Heideggerian scholarship. 216 According to Edwards,
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Heidegger’s interpretation of death is at least found to be false and at best a “platitude and not a
deep and original insight.”217 However, Edwards’s criticism relies on his own confusion of the
ontic-categorial and the ontological-existential notions of death, which renders Heidegger’s
thanatology ridiculous.218 Although Heidegger does not reject the ontic aspects of Dasein’s death,
his primary interest lies in the ontological death as the most authentic possibility that can disclose
Dasein’s Being in its authenticity and totality. As Heidegger puts it, “Dasein’s disclosure
[Erschlossenheit] is the most primordial phenomenon of truth,”219 in which the discoveredness
[Entdecktheit] of other inner-worldly beings is grounded. In this regard, the totality of Dasein’s
Being is at issue on account of its own death as the most authentic possibility. Therefore, death for
Dasein is not merely an ontic possibility among others but rather the ontological possibility proper
that underlies all other possibilities and makes them possible.
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Secondly, death is the “non-relational [unbezügliche]” possibility, by which Dasein finds
its own authentic individuality. Provided that the anonymous they [das Man] continuously justifies
and proliferates “the temptation of covering up from oneself one’s most authentic Being-towarddeath,”220 the non-relational possibility of death individualizes Dasein down to its own Being as
Being-thrown into there [da], in which it reveals itself as its able-to-be in total isolation from the
they. Death is precisely “the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself
toward anything, of every way of existing.”221 In the anticipation [Vorlaufen] of death that releases
Dasein from the temptations, tranquilizations, or “illusions of the they,”222 all relations other than
Dasein’s own relation with itself are broken down and meaningless, and thereby Dasein can
confront its authentic Being in its totality. Heidegger thus notes: “Anticipation utterly
individualizes Dasein and allows it to become certain of the totality of its able-to-be.”223 Michael
Zimmerman here provides a moralist interpretation of death in terms of authenticity and
inauthenticity. According to him, in an inauthentic mode of Being, Dasein remains its “egological
attachment to unexamined ways of living” and manipulates something ready-for-hand “for selfish
purpose”; then, he concludes, “If I accept that death is always possible, the complacency of egoism
disappears.”224 However, inauthenticity does not convey any vulgar conception of morality, such
as something bad, wrong, or deficient—or in Heidegger’s own language, “a bad and deplorable
ontical property.”225 What is at stake in terms of authenticity is that death individualizes Dasein
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not as what it simply is in the mode of the presence-at-hand, but as what it is able-to-be in the
temporal-ecstatic mode of existence. The non-relational possibility of death is not any ontic matter
of whether “some people do [or] some people do not die alone,”226 as Edwards conceives. Rather,
it signifies that death is always already a matter of mineness that Dasein alone undertakes, as
Heidegger states: “Every Dasein itself must take dying upon itself in every instance.”227
When it comes to the non-relational possibility of death, White points out that most
interpreters, including Edwards, confuse Heidegger’s concept of individualization with that of
personalization when they inattentively consider Dasein as a particular or individual person. As
seen above, Heidegger does not designate Dasein as a particular person who has a unique
personality or character in nature, thereby making itself different from other Daseins, but, rather,
as an exemplary being who puts its own Being into question. “Again,” Heidegger says, “we are
here suggesting, methodologically, an extreme existential-ontological model.” 228 According to
White, Heidegger’s focus here is on the Being in general or the Being of beings, which distances
the mode of Dasein’s existence from those of Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit, rather than on
what makes “me me and not you.”229 Moreover, this individuality [Vereinzelug] of an authentic
‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity,’ which we used in a provisional fashion, do not imply a moral-existententiell or an
‘anthropological’ distinction but rather a relation which, because it has been hitherto concealed from philosophy, has
yet to be thought for the first time, an ‘ecstatic’ relation of the essence of man to the truth of Being.” BW, 236.
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Dasein does not give rise to a harmonious fulfillment, completion, or consummation of its own
life, as Charles Guignon might hold. Guignon rightly states that death does not refer to “some
future event but to the essential finitude of our Being,” through which an authentic Dasein
recognizes “the gravity of the task” in taking full responsibility for its own Being.230 In other words,
it is only through its own mortality that Dasein can be responsible for its Being. However, he
misleadingly argues that Dasein’s life is “lived as a unified flow characterized by cumulativeness
and direction” or “lived as a coherent story.”231 According to Guignon’s view, the entire meaning
of Dasein’s life is accomplished and consummated only at the end of its life. But this at-the-end is
the mode proper to Zuhandenheit rather than to Dasein, as Heidegger unambiguously states: “In
death, Dasein is neither fulfilled nor does it simply disappear; it has not become finished or
completely available as something ready-to-hand [Zuhandenes].” 232 From the ontologicalexistential perspective, Dasein cannot entertain such a self-narrative or autobiographical
perspective on its entire life since—as long as Dasein is there—Dasein is always on the way toward
its end and thus remains always as a not-yet-being that never accomplishes its full life by
actualizing all its possibilities and, at last, death as its most authentic possibility of the impossibility
of its existence. According to Heidegger, death is not an end at which the accumulated culmination
of Dasein’s life is retrospectively evaluated, judged, or assessed in light of its whole life, but “an
end beyond all completion or fulfillment, a limit beyond all limits.” 233 Ontologically, Dasein
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experiences its own death as the possibility of the impossibility rather than as its actualization of
this impossible possibility.
Thirdly, death is the “insuperable [unüberholbare]” possibility of Dasein in the sense that
it cannot be overcome by or reduced into any other possibilities. This insuperable possibility has
nothing to do with any ontic possibility that Dasein can actualize, bypass, postpone, or avoid;
moreover, it is not a theological possibility that enables Dasein to conceive of any kind of an
“other-worldly speculation.” 234 Rather, this possibility only has to do with the ontological
possibility that Dasein lives through as it is thrown into the this-world—more exactly, the thereworld [da-Welt]. However, the insuperable possibility of death internal to Dasein’s existence does
not allude to a pessimistic view on Dasein’s authentic Being, as Hubert L. Dreyfus maintains. In
opposition to Guignon’s optimistic account of the coherent or harmonious consummation at the
end of the Dasein’s life, Dreyfus notices that there is “an unsatisfactory structure” 235 even in
Dasein’s authentic way of Being. He is quite right insofar as this structure is understood as what
Heidegger calls the “ontological guilt.” Ontologically—not morally, emotionally, or ontically—
understood, this guilt signals the factical fact that Dasein is already thrown into the there, from
which it cannot escape, and thus in which Dasein alone has to take responsibility for its own Being.
Dasein here can never overcome or outstrip [unüberholen] the facticity of existence, thrownness,
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being-guilty, and responsibility since there is no metaphysical ground or origin for Dasein’s Being
and its world. Therefore, Dasein is in no way causa sui.
However, Dreyfus might be wrong in arguing that due to Dasein’s unsatisfactory structure,
“there is something wrong with Dasein,” and thereby “Dasein has no possibilities of its own
and…it can never acquire any” in the face of anxiety.236 It is at the end that Dasein may not have
any possibility at all due to its mental or physical conditions, as Dreyfus holds. As seen above, this
is exactly what Heidegger means by the ontical end, which signifies the mode of Vorhandenheit’s
Being-at-the-end. Death as the ontological end is not the end of the possibilities, but the very
possibility of the end that cannot be superable and concluded even at its end. From the ontological
perspective, Dasein is thrown toward its death that remains its own insuperable possibility. As
Levinas points out, “what makes the possibility always remains possibility, even at the moment
when it is exhausted, is death.” 237 According to Heidegger’s ontological viewpoint, what the
insuperable possibility signifies is not an “unsatisfactory” or “wrong” fate of Dasein who has no
possibility at all in anxiety; rather, it discloses the ontological finitude of Dasein’s Being as Beingtoward-death.
Fourthly, death is the “indefinite [unbestimmte] possibility” of Dasein. As long as Dasein
is the there, it is always exposed to a “constant threat arising from its own there.”238 William
Blattner claims that authentic Dasein must be “prepared for the attendant anxiety” 239 because
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“anxiety may strike at any time.”240 For Dasein already thrown into the world, however, death is
not a sudden or unexpected attack, for which Dasein can or cannot be ready. According to
Heidegger, unlike “fear [Furcht]” 241 whose object is a definitive thing, the object of “anxiety
[Angst]”242 is not a thing that can be defined as a definite thing; it is the nothing [Nichts]. Due to
this essential indetermination, Dasein feels “uncanny [unheimlich]” or “not-being-at-home [Nichtzuhause-sein]”243 and faces its own Being in the pure nothingness of its own existence; hence, the
entire mundane or ontic world becomes meaningless and irrelevant to Dasein itself. Thus,
Heidegger writes: “Ontologically, however, the world belongs essentially to Dasein’s Being as
Being-in-the-world. So if what anxiety is about exposes the nothing—that is, the world as such—
this means that that about which anxiety is anxious is Being-in-the-world itself.”244 Nothing alone
matters to Dasein in anxiety; it is the nothing of which Dasein makes sense since there is nothing
to make sense of. Dasein might be able to be ready for fear, but not for anxiety since Dasein is
anxious about nothing that cannot be determined as a definite thing—it is the no-thing that is not
a thing at its own disposal. The successful preparation for anxiety then would lead to the reduction
of ontological anxiety to ontic fear. In the haunting anxiety, Dasein confronts its own death as the
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possibility of the impossibility of its existence, which thereby lets Dasein find its bare Being as
the able-to-be to hold open to this indefinite possibility of death without making sense of it.
Lastly, death is the “certain [gewisse]” possibility of Dasein. Death is empirically—or
ontically—a certain possibility since it will undoubtedly take place at some time, whereas it is
ontologically a certain possibility in that “I” as Dasein can embrace it as my own authentic
possibility so as to be “able to be” toward death. As Being-toward-death, I am always already
ahead of myself, able-to-be what I am not yet: “in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself in its
Being.”245 The idle talk [Gerede] of the anonymous they prompts me to reduce the ontological
certainty to the ontico-empirical one that everyone dies for sure, but not me and not this time. In
this idle talk, death is no longer a matter of mineness, but only, Levinas says, of a “neutral public
event,”246 which pacifies me as if I were an exception to this event right now. Heidegger thus
remarks: “The ‘they’ does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death.”247 In this
context, Taylor Carman’s interpretation of dying as “the constant closing down of possibilities”248
rests on an ontic-empirical analysis. It might be true ontically that, as he notes, “To say that we are
always dying is to say that our possibilities are constantly closing down around us.” 249
Ontologically understood, however, death is neither an empirical possibility that comes to an end
when Dasein is dead, nor a vaporable possibility that becomes lesser and lesser in the course of
dying. Rather, death remains the certain possibility as “the possibility of the measureless [maßlosen]
impossibility of existence” that cannot be measured or calculated; Heidegger clearly argues, “In
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the anticipation of this possibility, it becomes ‘greater and greater’…Being-toward-death, as
anticipation of possibility, is what first makes this possibility possible, and sets it free as
possibility.”250 Thus, the certain possibility has nothing to do with any certainty of an onticoempirical possibility, but only with the inescapable certainty of death, into which Dasein is simply
thrown.
What Dasein’s Being-toward-death ultimately means is the ontological-existential finitude
of Being. Whereas the Husserlian Ego is a conscious subject that is the self-sufficient source of
Sinngebung, the Heideggerian Dasein does not take “the place of the term ‘consciousness’” in the
first place; rather, it names “that which is first of all to be experienced, and subsequently thought
accordingly [dann entsprechend gedacht], as a place—namely, as the locality of the truth of
Being.”251 Heidegger thus rejects the traditional conception of truth as an adequation between our
judgment of a thing and the judged thing or a correlation between noema and noesis since it is not
fundamental enough. Instead, he argues that truth [aletheia] is a matter of revealing, letting-be,
opening-up, or unconcealing what shows itself as a phenomenon, which renders any adequation
or correlation possible. Levinas also appreciates that Heidegger recognizes “for the first time” that
the finitude of human existence can be the “foundation of the concept of the subject” in an
ontological sense and that “consciousness itself would be possible”252 only on the basis of this

250

SZ, 262.
PA, 283; WE, 202 (italics added). Heidegger does not accept Husserl’s transcendental presupposition that
designates the transcendental Ego as the locus of all meaning and validity that: “the point of departure from an initially
given ego and subject totally fails to see the phenomenal content of Dasein.” SZ, 46. Heidegger warns us not to read
Being and Time on the basis of the Cartesian-Husserlian tradition: “Any attempt, therefore, to rethink Being and Time
is thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation that, in this study, the term ‘being there’ is used in place of
‘consciousness’.” Martin Heidegger, “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics,” in Existentialism from
Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), 271.
252
MHO, 408.
251

79

finite existence. Consequently, Dasein—as soon as it is thrown there—is already always toward
its end [Ende], that is, death, from which it cannot escape; “it exists finitely [endlich].”253

3. The Hither Side of Heidegger’s Thanatology
For Heidegger, as seen so far, death is the most authentic, non-relational, insuperable,
certain, and indefinite possibility of Dasein. The primary purpose of his thematization of death as
the possibility of the impossibility is to describe the ontological-existential-authentic structure of
Dasein’s Being in terms of its ecstatic temporality. Ontologically, Dasein’s death is always a matter
of possibility rather than of actuality; otherwise, the ontological analysis of Being-toward-death is
reduced to an ontic interpretation of Being-at-the-end as perishing or demising. Nevertheless, it
might be true, as Dreyfus points out, that Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic and the
ontological, the authentic and the inauthentic, or demise and death is not always clear enough and
thus that a variety of misleading interpretations of Heidegger’s thanatology, to a certain extent,
might be somewhat understandable. 254 Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of death is so
delicate and sophisticated that it might resist becoming a text to be interpreted; by betraying the
hermeneutical principle, it seems not to be the text that does not permit any further interpretation.
However, just as Heidegger himself says that “The dialogue with Parmenides never comes to an
end…because what is said there continually deserves more thought,”255 Levinas would say that it
is necessary to reinterpret Heidegger’s interpretation of death again and again. For Heidegger, there
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is no Parmenides in himself, that is, the Parmenides that no longer requires interpretation; likewise,
there would be no Heidegger in himself, the Heidegger in which no further interpretation would
be possible. Despite the Heidegger whose ontological view of Being culminates in the existential
analysis of death, Levinas wants to become more Heideggerian than Heidegger himself when he
betrays the Heidegger by means of taking death as a question par excellence that calls into question
the Seinsfrage rather than as a theme to be intelligible in the Seinsfrage.
Levinas’s radical question is quite simple: whether an ontological grasp of death,
essentially entangled in the interplay of Being and nothingness, can exhaust the meaning of death
itself. Ontologically understood, the death of others is subordinated to the ontical moment that
covers up the ontological mineness of Dasein itself; thus, it is only a matter of the idle talk, which
keeps saying that “death of others is not my business.” Is not Heidegger’s conception of anxiety
already a form of indifference to the death of others? More directly and graphically speaking, does
the anxiety of dying trump the fear of killing? In my silent indifference or modest tolerance that
makes me endure, authorize, or even reinforce the killing of others, I become an accomplice in
murder, slaughter, massacre, genocide, and the Holocaust. This is why Levinas cites Pascal’s
aphorism in the epigraph appeared in Otherwise Than Being or beyond Essence: “‘That is my place
in the sun.’ Here is the beginning…of the usurpation of the whole world.”256 Likewise, does not
the Da of my Dasein refer to my taking the place of others? As will be seen in the following
chapters, Levinas recognizes in the death of others the ethical moment, which has been suppressed
by the ontological analysis of Dasein’s death.
In Heidegger’s ontological account of death, Dasein’s relationality radically shifts from all
the relations with others to its own relation with itself. In the face of death as the most authentic
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possibility of the impossibility, Dasein has no relation other than its own relation to itself since
Dasein by and for itself undertakes its own death in isolation. In the anticipation, Dasein confronts
its solitary finitude by turning even its own impossibility of existence into its authentic possibility,
which constitutes the temporal structure of its ontological conditions. Dasein, in its authentic
solitude, can stand upright in front of the possibility of the impossibility and “choose its hero” who
obtains the complete mastery of itself in its “anticipatory resoluteness.”257 Ironically, the heroic
Dasein understands the utter impossibility as its authentic possibility par excellence, so that death
is transparently comprehended and, in doing so, inevitably becomes a “flat” phenomenon.
Although, as mentioned above, Marion speaks of the depth of the Heideggerian phenomenon in
contrast to the flatness of Husserlian phenomenon, this dissertation will show that a deep or
unfathomable dimension of death is lost in the heroic capacity or power [pouvoir] of Dasein’s
transparent understanding [Verstehen] of death, into which an ethical meaning of the Other’s death
is crucially subordinated or reduced.
One can notice here a doxical aspect of Heidegger’s ontological analysis of death, as seen
in the case of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Against a disdainful account of doxa as
something merely “imaginary,” “subjective,” and so “false” in opposition to Sein as the locus of
aletheia, Heidegger expounds how doxa is fundamentally entangled with the Sein when he
translates the Greek word δόξα as Schein [seeming, appearing, or shining], which has multiple
meanings: glory, semblance, opinion, and so on.258 He focuses on a constitutive role of doxa in the
process of aletheia; thus, the multifold meaning of doxa can retain “the essential traits of Being in
the word.”259 He goes on at last to claim, “Seeming, doxa, is not something external to Being and
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unconcealment but instead belongs to unconcealment.”260 In this context, death is understood as a
doxical phenomenon to appear [scheinen] to Dasein as the most authentic possibility in its totality.
It is in and through the doxical characteristic of the ontological understanding of death that Dasein
interprets, grasps, and comprehends its own utter impossibility as the most authentic possibility in
which the doxical-ontological meaning of death is unconcealed.
In the place where Heidegger would say that “the anticipation of [its] own death renders
Dasein transparent to [it]self,” Jacques Taminiaux notes that Levinas instead detects one of the
“signs of a breach of [the] totality.”261 This dissertation claims that a Levinasian question paralyzes
the transparent heroism of the doxical-ontological thematization of death and prompts the heroic
and solitary Dasein to a more primordial—if not authentic—dimension of death, that is, the
vulnerable receptivity or passivity of the unfathomable death. Levinas takes death to be the
question that fundamentally disrupts the heroic, seamless, and architectonic regime of the selfenclosed solitude of Dasein; it marks “the end of the subject’s virility and heroism.”262 In the
solitary heroism of Dasein’s self-understanding of death, which reduces the mystery of death into
the mastery of death, according to Levinas, an ethical meaning of the Other’s death inevitably
disappears over the ontological horizon; it is ontologically secondary and even meaningless. In
this context, the lonely and heroic Dasein becomes merely another name for the transcendental
Ego. Levinas keeps a suspicious eye on the Western philosophical tradition in order to preserve an
ethical meaning of the death of the Other from ontological meaninglessness: the retrieval of the
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exigent priority of the death of the other from the authenticity of the mineness of Dasein’s death.
As he puts it, “prior to the plane of ontology, the ethical plane preexists.”263 For Levinas, therefore,
the priority of the death of the Other over Dasein’s death discloses how traditional philosophy in
the West has largely reduced the Other, alterity, transcendence, infinity, and ethics into the Same,
identity, immanence, totality, and ontology.264
When Levinas announces in Totality and Infinity, “The face of being that shows itself in
war is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy”265 as well as “Western
philosophy has most often [le plus souvent] been an ontology,”266 he never distracts his attention
from the unremitting suspicion of Western philosophy, despite the risk of any exaggeration of his
critique of totality and ontology. In the entire history of Western philosophy, for Levinas, the Other
has never taken its own, proper, or authentic place because its alterity is always subordinated to
the sameness of the Same by means of mediation of a “third or middle term [troisième terme],”267
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such as Form (Eidos), Idea, Being, Concept, Spirit, Logos, Light, and so forth—all of which
neutralize the alterity of the Other into the identity of the Same in the totalizing system for the sake
of shaping a solid, harmonious, and so heroic architecture, like Heidegger’s thanato-logy
meticulously articulated in Being and Time. By contrast, Levinas ceaselessly argues that no third
or intermediary term can necessarily nullify the essential distance between the Other and the Same
by smothering the shock of the vulnerable alterity with the spontaneous identity. The primary
purpose of this dissertation is not simply to verify or refute Levinas’s critique of traditional
philosophy, but, rather, to discover what he intends to achieve through his very critique with a
focus on the theme of death.
Levinas’s critical stance on the ontological understanding of death becomes more obvious
throughout his philosophical texts. In order not to miss what Levinas really intends to describe
about death, one must pay careful attention to the reason why he attacks ontology and to how he
thematically differentiates himself from the ontological approach to the theme of death. The fact
that Levinas’s idea of death is deeply rooted in his critical stance on ontology shows that the theme
of death in his ethical thought is formulated against the background of Heidegger’s ontological
interpretation of death. The thematic challenge of this dissertation hinges upon the sense in which
Heidegger repeats the doxical naïveté of Husserlian phenomenology in terms of the ontological
thematization of death, i.e., thanato-logy, which screens off an ethical meaning of death, and,
consequently, exposes an ethical exigency of the Levinasian question on the hither side of the
Heideggerian Seinsfrage. For Levinas, Dasein’s positing its own question to itself, that is, the
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Seinsfrage, “would never be possible unless the relationship with the Other and the question mark
of his face had come about.”268 But this does not mean that Levinas’s ethical interpretation of death
wholly rejects the ontological understanding of death and simply leaves it behind. When Levinas
challenges Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of death, as will be seen in the next chapter, his
aim is not to merely dismiss it but to disclose its hither side, from which an ethical meaning of
death emerges. For Levinas, “to be or not to be” is not the proper question to be asked in the first
place. He recognizes the more primordial question inscribed in the face of the Other who
commands: “Thou shalt not kill!” This interdiction is the question proper that has been suppressed
by the doxical-ontological comprehension of death; nevertheless, it ceaselessly arises on the hither
side of the ontological question.
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Chapter III
Zero: The An-archic Arche of Levinas’s Phenomenology of Death

The first two chapters have considered Husserl’s transcendental method of phenomenology
and Heidegger’s ontological thematization of death, which provide the methodological and
thematical backgrounds for this dissertation: Levinas’s phenomenology of death. Given that
Husserl’s phenomenological method of the Rückfrage is to inquire [fragen] into the way back
[zurück] to the ultimate source of the Sinngebung (Chapter One) and Heidegger’s ontological
thematization of death starting from retrieving the Seinsfrage uncovers Dasein’s transparent
understanding of its own death as the possibility of the impossibility (Chapter Two), Levinas’s
early phenomenology of death already reveals the limits of both Husserlian phenomenology and
the Heideggerian analysis of death. Nevertheless, these limits do not lead Levinas to leave them
behind but offer him the starting point for “what to look for” and “how to look at.” This does not
mean that Levinas looks at the same thing in the same way as they do; rather, he looks at “elsewhere”
in an other way that their questions largely overlook. Levinas’s term “the hither side [en deçà]”
describes this elsewhere when he takes his equivocal stance towards Husserl and Heidegger;
namely, Levinas’s own question departs with and from both the Husserlian Rückfrage and the
Heideggerian Seinsfrage. Although Levinas’s engagement with Husserl and Heidegger turns out
to be the basis of his sharp departure from their thoughts and thereby the launch of his own
articulation of ethics as first philosophy, Levinas never forgets his points of departure which
ceaselessly haunt throughout the gradual evolution of his philosophy.
This chapter explores how Levinas begins to formulate his own phenomenological method
by means of examining his peculiar concept of “there is [il y a]” as opposed to the Heideggerian
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“It gives [Es gibt]” which leads him to pay attention to the theme of death. Indeed, Heidegger’s
early view on the Es gibt suggested in Being and Time (1927) much inspires Levinas’s early
elaboration of the il y a. As Derrida rightly points out in his critical reading of Levinas, in order to
recognize the peculiar notion of the il y a developed in Levinas’s early texts—such as Existence
and Existents (1947) and Time and the Other (1947)—it is important to attend to its “systematic
confrontation with Heidegger’s allusions to the ‘es gibt’ (Being and Time, Letter on
Humanism).”269 Unfortunately, Derrida does not delve deeper into this significant confrontation
but simply mentions it in passing. One of the tasks of this chapter is to elucidate Derrida’s
intimation. In doing so, this chapter claims that Levinas’s initial critique of the Es gibt already
disrupts, suspends, or overturns Heidegger’s mature idea of it, as fully articulated in On Time and
Being (1962-64), before this later work was even published—as if the early Levinas would already
anticipate the appearance of the later Heidegger, as if he would not endorse the so-called Kehre in
Heidegger’s philosophical evolution. Accordingly, Levinas’s early critique of the Es gibt in favor
of the il y a discloses in what sense Heidegger, despite the Kehre, remains consistent in his thinking
of Being and, on that account, why the later Heidegger remains of little interest to Levinas.
Although the concept of the il y a emerges, albeit not exclusively, from the inchoate background
of the Es gibt in Being and Time, its philosophical seriousness and consequence become clearer
and more distinct in the context of Heidegger’s later works—On Time and Being, in particular—
where the Es gibt takes the full-fledged shape. In order to make clear the philosophical contexts
from which Levinas’s early conception of the il y a comes, the first section of this chapter considers
how the later Heidegger develops the concept of the Es gibt in various ways.
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The second section discusses the dawn of Levinas’s question, which aims to unveil the
most brutal and naked facet of être, that is, existence without existents or the il y a, by which
Levinas interrogates and, more properly, radicalizes Heidegger’s Seinsfrage. Levinas’s early
critique of Heidegger does not result from his refutation of Heidegger’s ontology to invent another
ontology for the sake of investigating the meaning, truth, happening, or thinking of Being, but
from his rigorous endeavor to reveal what precedes the Being to be thought or the thinking of
Being [Seinsdenken]. This chapter brings the early Levinas face to face with the later Heidegger—
although Levinas himself does not do so in an explicit or systematic way—in order to lay bare the
brutal nakedness of être, i.e., the an-archic il y a prior to Sein and even to the Es gibt. In doing so,
Levinas’s early formulation of the il y a discloses that Heidegger himself remains not Heideggerian
enough whether or not there is any Kehre in his philosophy. Therefore, the peculiarity of Levinas’s
radical question does not consist in his successful, justified, or legitimate criticism of Heidegger
to simply dismiss ontology, but in the fact that he becomes even more Heideggerian than Heidegger
himself by means of exposing the hither side of ontology that the Seinsfrage fails to tackle. The
central purpose of this chapter is to take account of Levinas’s early view of the an-archic il y a
against the backdrop of Heidegger’s later consideration of the Es gibt which lays the groundwork
of his ethical consideration of death in his mature works.

1. Kehre Matters?
As seen in Chapter Two, Levinas’s critical reading of Heidegger largely rests on the
fundamental ontology presented in Being and Time with no special attention to the later texts, as
if the ingenious and architectonic import of Being and Time could represent Heidegger’s entire
thought—namely, as if there would be no turn, change, reversal, or what is called das Kehre in his
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philosophy. In a retrospective interview in 1981, Levinas admits that his appreciation of Heidegger
comes from “above all an admiration for Sein und Zeit,” which awakens the “verbality” of the term
Being while disregarding the later works “much less convincing.” 270 Levinas’s almost exclusive
interest in Being and Time is more problematic since the magnum opus remains incomplete; indeed,
only a small portion of Heidegger’s bold project planned in the work is officially published under
the title of Sein und Zeit.271 With regard to Levinas’s polemic against Heidegger, some crucial
questions follow here: Can his critical view of Heidegger be justified in light of the later
Heidegger?; Why and in what sense does he complain about the later work of Heidegger?; Is it
possible to say that there is the Heidegger at all? All these questions lead Levinas to face the
conundrum that his critique of Heidegger may not sound convincing precisely because of his
neglect of the later Heidegger.272 The eventual question thus arises: Why does the later Heidegger
not matter to Levinas? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to revisit a much-discussed
issue: the so-called Kehre in Heidegger’s philosophy.
In the Résumé, prepared to be sent to Heidegger for his comments, William J. Richardson
traces a certain Kehre in Heidegger’s philosophy—it is the “reversal” that distinguishes the earlier
and later thought of Heidegger that Richardson names “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II,”
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respectively.273 In his complete published work entitled Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to
Thought, 274 Richardson further elaborates on the distinction between the two Heideggers by
arguing the “reversal” of Heidegger’s focal point from Dasein-centeredness in the Heidegger I to
Being-centeredness in the II: the Kehre from thinking of Being on the basis of Dasein to thinking
of Dasein on the basis of Being.275 Following Richardson’s view on the Kehre, Frederic A. Olafson
states that the significant turning in Heidegger’s thought took place during 1930s: “a Heidegger I
who preceded this ‘turning’ and a Heidegger II who followed it.”276 Theodore Kisiel also points
out that the genuine meaning of the Kehre is that “Heidegger returns to earlier insights left
unpursued” in order to envision the full “Story” of Being and Time. 277 By contrast, Thomas
Sheehan argues that the Kehre is not a matter of content but of method; thus, he describes it not as
the shift in the central theme from the fundamental ontology of Dasein to the history of Being, but
as the shift in the methodic treatment of the very theme: “the process from a transcendentalhorizonal to a seinsgeschichtlich approach.”278 In a similar vein, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann
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notes that through “the event-historical turn [die Ereignisgeschichtlichen Kehre],” Heidegger
enters his second path which differs from the first in Being and Time; thus, the Kehre refers to “the
transformed perspective [die gewandelte Blickstellung]” from transcendental questioning to the
event-historical questioning. 279 As far as Heidegger’s Kehre is concerned, consequently,
Richardson’s work inaugurates the classical paradigm in the Heideggerian scholarship in the sense
that his characterization of the Kehre as a decisive transformation, which divides Heidegger’s
thought into the Heidegger I and the II, is generally accepted among most Heideggerian
commentators.280
However, Sheehan goes on to contend that the Heideggerian scholarship is now “on the
verge of a paradigm shift,”281 due to the publications of Beitäge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(published in 1989) and its English translation Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)
(published in 1999), neither of which Richardson could refer to at the time (1963). 282 The
appearance of these texts requires a shift of the old paradigm, which has long missed exactly what
Heidegger means by the Kehre. Now, according to Sheehan, what is at issue regarding the Kehre
is no longer a matter of content or method, but rather of an actual meaning of the Kehre in
Heidegger’s thought, which is typically and yet cryptically presented in Contributions to
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Philosophy. This does not mean that Sheehan rejects the classical interpretations of the Kehre;
instead, he attempts to dig further into the genuine sense of the Kehre or what he calls “Kehre-1”
while stamping the classical view as “Kehre-2.”283 In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger is
no longer satisfied with the term Sein elaborated in Being and Time since it is contaminated by
metaphysical language. This is why he gives up writing the Division III of Part One of Being and
Time: “The division in question was held back because everything failed in the adequate saying of
this Kehre and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics.”284 The analyticmetaphysical language, in which Being and Time is involved, is not appropriate to articulate a premetaphysical, poetic, contemplative, or meditative thinking of Being. Heidegger thus demands a
sort of a paradigm shift to find a way out of a metaphysical thinking and to seek a new beginning
for the path of a meditative thinking: “Here everything is reversed.”285

1-1. Ontological Coverings: Seyn, Ereignis, Unterschied, and Austrag
With a close reference to Contributions to Philosophy, Sheehan reconsiders exactly what
Heidegger himself means by the Kehre, called the Kehre-1, in terms of Ereignis and Seyn. To
Sheehan, the basic problem concerning the term Kehre is not a matter of interpretation but of
translation in the first place; namely, Sheehan translates it as a “reciprocity” rather than interprets
it as a turn, shift, or reversal. The central theme that Heidegger never changes, shifts, or reverses,
Sheehan argues, is the very Kehre, that is, a reciprocal relation, bond, or link between Dasein and
Being. It is the internal “‘reciprocity’ [Gegenschwung] of Dasein’s need of Sein and Sein’s need
of Dasein” or “‘oscillation’ [Erzittern] between Dasein’s thrownness into and its sustaining of
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Sein”286 that is already presented—albeit without any reference to the proper noun of the Kehre—
in Being and Time. Following Sheehan’s view of Kehre-1, Richard Polt points out that the Kehre
does not mean a “stage in Heidegger’s own development,” but the reciprocal turn in which Dasein
and Being gain “the proper rapport that lets them flourish.”287 Rather than to the transformation of
Heidegger’s thought that happened during his academic journey in terms of either content or
method (Kehre-2), the Kehre refers above all to his ongoing interest in the vital, dynamic, and
turning relationship (Kehre-1) between Dasein and Sein in the event of appropriation [Ereignis],
as Heidegger himself says: “Die um Ereignis wesende Kehre.” 288 The Kerhre as the inner
movement of the Ereignis does not designate any metaphysical, static notion to analyze the formal
structure of the relation between Dasein and Being; rather, it is a relating relation, stripped of all
causal or ontotheological overtones, between Dasein and Being as appropriated to each other. The
later Heidegger struggles to disclose that the reciprocal, turning, or relating relation [die Kehre] is
itself more fundamental than what is related, i.e., Dasein and Being.

Seyn and Ereignis
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In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger employs an old-fashioned term for Sein—it is
“das Seyn”289 that refers to the happening [Geschehen] of the Kehre in the Ereignis in which Sein
primordially emerges. The Seyn as the happening of the Kehre is not determined by Dasein’s
understanding of Sein; rather, the Seyn essentially presents [west] as the event of appropriation,
which grounds the there [Da] where Dasein understands its own Being as Being-in-the-world and
projects its most authentic possibility as Being-toward-death, as Heidegger states: “Seyn west als
das Ereignis des Dagründung.”290 In Contributions to Philosophy, thus, Heidegger goes into a
more fundamental dimension in which the fundamental ontology elaborated in the published part
of Being and Time is grounded; now Heidegger conceives of what brings about Dasein’s Sein in
terms of “this reciprocity of needing and belonging [that] constitutes Seyn as Ereignis.” 291
Therefore, the original or primordial Seyn lets Sein manifest itself as meaningful in the event of
appropriation; the Seyn in the Ereignis is “the meaning-giving source of the meaning of the
meaningful”292 in such a way that Sein lets Dasein reveal itself to be meaningful.
Provided that Seyn in the Kehre is a more fundamental thing [die Sache selbst] to be thought
than Sein, Sheehan concludes that Heidegger’s main theme is neither Dasein nor even Sein itself,
but “what brings about being [Sein], namely, Ereignis—the opening of a clearing in which entities
can appear as this or that.” 293 Against this strong claim, Richard Capobianco also makes an
argument in an opposite way. According to Capobianco, Seyn in the Ereignis is “(only) another
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I will leave it untranslated in order to compare and contrast between Sein in the Heidegger I and Seyn in
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name for Being [Sein] itself,”294 as long as it is properly understood as one of the names that refers
to the fundamental thing to be thought. On the way to finding the fundamental path of Heidegger’s
thought, Sheehan and Capobianco take different approaches. On the one hand, Sheehan penetrates
deep into Seyn that primordially grounds Sein; thus, Seyn and Sein might appear to be situated in
the different “grounding-layers” for thought. On the other hand, Capobianco encounters Sein again
since there would be no such different layers but merely different names for Sein, such as Ereignis,
Kehre, and Seyn, insofar as they ultimately refer to die Sache selbst to be thought.

Untershied and Austrag
Whatever the case may be, however, the consideration of the Kehre with regard to the
turning relationship between Dasein and Being readily falls prey to metaphysical language in that
the “reciprocal” relation might convey an ontic relation that works between two different things at
the same level. The ontological difference [Die ontologisch Differenz] between Being and a being
here is not helpful to identify the distinctive feature of the turning relation because it signifies that
Being is—although it is not a being—only in and through a being; it still considers Being in terms
of a being. In Identity and Difference (1956-7), then, Heidegger claims that what has been forgotten
in the history of metaphysics is not merely the ontological difference itself but the primal “origin
[Herkunft]” or “essence [Wesen]”295 which opens up and holds fast the very difference between
Being and beings. It is the “differentiation [Underschid]” that underlies the Differenz. The oblivion
of Being stems from the forgetfulness of the “differentiation alone [that] grants and holds apart”296
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the ontological difference in such a way that Being comes over [überkommt] beings and beings
come in [ankommt] the Being. One of the main purposes of Identity and Difference is to show that
“the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics has its essential origin in the perdurance
[Austrag].”297 Therefore, it is the differentiation in the perdurance [Unterschied im Austrag] that
engenders historically [geschichitlich] the various ways of the coming of Being over beings
[Überkommnis] and the coming of beings in Being [Ankunft].
In the historical perdurance where the turning relationship between Being and beings
appears as the interplay between the coming-over (concealing in unconcealment) and the comingin (unconcealing in concealment), Being gains different names in the history of Being according
to the mode of the givenness of Being. “It gives/There is Being [Es gibt Sein] only in this or that
particular destined [geschicklichen] character: Physis, Logos, Hen, Idea, Energeia, Substantiality,
Objectivity, Subjectivity, the Will, the Will to Power, [and] the Will to Will.”298 What is then the
“It [Es]” that gives Being? Is “the It” the differentiation in the perdurance that sustains the
ontological difference? At the end of the text, however, Heidegger points out the essential difficulty
regarding a “what-is” question that Western languages cannot elude since they are more or less
marked by ontotheological metaphysics. The question of “What is the Es—whatever it is—of the
Es gibt Sein?” is already assaulted with the metaphysical language in the sense that “the little word
‘is,’ which speaks everywhere in our language and tells of Being”299 even before speaking about
the Es itself. When it comes to a “what-is” question, any definitive talk about “what” requires first
an ontological talk about “is,” that is, the mode of Being of “what,” since the question of defining
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“what” can be properly answered only after its way of Being is clarified or cleared [lichtet]; thus,
the definition-question about the Es is basically determined by the manner in which Es gibt Sein.
Heidegger then concludes: “Our facing this difficulty that stems from language should keep
us…from speaking right away about perdurance [Austrag].”300 The mystery of the “Es gibt” is
hidden in the question of what the perdurance, which holds fast and holds apart the turning relation
[Kehre] between Being and beings, is. Consequently, the problem of the Kehre finally leads to the
enigma of the Es gibt that remains forgotten in the history of metaphysics—and yet unexamined
in Heidegger’s thought.

1-2. Es Gibt as the Arche of Being
In On Time and Being (1972), Heidegger carries out a sort of a radical thinking-experiment
[Denkversuch] to undertake the difficult task to elaborate on the enigmatic notion of the Es gibt
and thus to speak about Being and time in a distinctive and cautious [vorsichtig] way; the thinkingexperiment is “the attempt to think Being without beings [Der Versuch, Sein ohne das Seiende zu
denken].”301 The radicality of this thinking-experiment is attributed to the fact that it does no longer
deal with Being in terms of beings; instead, it is the “step back [der Schritt zurück]”302 to the
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original source of Sein as the thing itself [Sache selbst] to be thought directly, not via any Seiende.
To think Being directly without reference to beings does not refer to answering the question of
“what Being is” but to thinking about the way in which Es gibt Sein. Although the history of
metaphysics is the history of answering the question “what Being is,” Heidegger argues, this whatis question cannot be applied to Being and time since they are not; to put it another way, they are
not something [etwas Seiendes] that can be found among other beings. “We say of beings
[Seienden]: they are….We do not say: Being is [Sein ist], time is [Zeit ist], but rather: it gives Being
[Es gibt Sein], and it gives time [Es gibt Zeit].”303 When it comes to Being and time in which “we
remains cautious [vorsichtig],”304 Heidegger says neither “It is Being or it is time [Es ist Sein oder
es ist Zeit]” nor “Being is or time is [Sein ist oder Zeit ist],” but only “It gives Being or it gives
time [Es gibt Sein oder es gibt Zeit].” It is the Es that gives both Being and time; hence, the Es
signifies the “ands” in On Time and Being as well as in Being and Time. Being is then no longer
considered with regard to beings but to time, as Caputo states that the Es is “the meaning of Being
in terms of time, and of time in terms of Being.”305
In Heidegger’s entire thought, the significance of the Es which Caputo calls the
“Archimedean point of every fundamental Heideggerian theme” entails a problematic question
again: What is the Es? Before considering the problem of the what-is question concerning the Es,
it is worthwhile to first recall Heidegger’s own answer as follows:

What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together, we
shall call: Ereignis….We have called both—Being and time—things [Sachen]. The “and”
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between them left their relation to each other indeterminate. We now see: What lets the two
things belong together, what brings the two into their own and, even more, maintains and
holds them in their belonging together—the way the two things comport as the matter at
stake [Sache-Verhalt]—is Ereignis….The matter at stake first appropriates [ereignet]
Being and time into their own [Eigenes] by virtue of their relation, and does so by the
appropriating that is concealed in destiny [Geschick] and in the clearing reaching
[lichtenden Reichen]. Accordingly, the It [Es] that gives in “It gives Being” and “It gives
time” proves to be the event of appropriation [Ereignis].306
It seems clear from this passage that Heidegger unequivocally answers the what-is question of the
Es; it is the Es gibt as the Ereignis that gives, grants, and sends Being and time. The French “Il y
a” and the English “There is” cannot properly translate the connotation of cautiousness that the
German “Es gibt” has. The cautious signification of the “Es gibt” involves a donation, generosity,
richness, or abundance of Being that both “il y a” and “there is” cannot properly convey. However,
Heidegger immediately adds that the above passage is “correct [richtig] and yet also untrue
[unwahr]: it conceals the matter at stake from us, for we inadvertently represented the Ereignis as
some present being [etwas Anwesendes].”307 On the one hand, it is correct insofar as it conveys
what Heidegger himself intends to cautiously say with regard to the Es gibt as Ereignis, which is
a persistent juncture [Austrag or Unterschied] that gives Being and time and brings them into their
belonging together. The giving here should be understood as the letting, opening, sending, or
clearing [Lichtung] that grants Being; accordingly, to say that Being is given by the Es is to say
that Being lets beings present by bringing them into the openness in which they reveal themselves.
On the other hand, however, it is untrue to say that the passage in question expresses
exhaustedly what the Es gibt is by means of incautiously resolving the enigma of the Es. Insofar
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as the giving of or as the Es is considered in terms of the ultimate cause or origin, it is reduced into
something present like a supreme being; the Es would then appear as an ontic cause that produces,
makes, or creates Being, and thereby the enigma of the Es disappears. In order not to fall back into
an ontotheological thought, that which gives, grants, sends, or opens up Being should thoroughly
remain a concealed mystery or what Heidegger calls “the enigmatic It.”308 In the midst of giving,
the Es withdraws itself for the sake of the manifestation of Being as the gift that it gives; thus, the
Es functions like an expletive, dummy, or pseudo subject like “It rains.”309 Just as there is no such
a thing that rains, there is no thing that gives Being. The Es itself remains impersonal, anonymous,
enigmatic, and thus withdrawn from the gift in the very moment of giving. This withdrawal or
holding back is the original meaning of the Greek word epoché [ἐποχή], which does not simply
imply a certain period of time in the chronological or calculable history [Historie], but rather “the
particular holding-back of the Es gibt in favor of the discernibility of the gift” in the epochal history
[Geschichite] of Being.310 In this epoché, the enigma of the Es gibt obscurely resides as the source
of the various transformations of Being throughout the epochal history. The epochal identification
of the Es gibt is determined by the step-back movement to the originary source from which the
metaphysical determinations of Being spring under different names; the Es gibt constitutes to the
history of metaphysics while the Es remains itself indeterminate, anonymous, and withdrawn in
its enigma, and so concealed in that history. Therefore, the giving of the Es gibt is sustained only
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on the basis of the enigmatic Es that can preserve the entire process of the giving from
ontotheological metaphysics, which would interpret the enigmatic source of Es as an ontic cause
or a supreme being. It is the indeterminate, anonymous, and enigmatic Es that safeguards the giving
itself.
So far, the Es gibt qua Ereignis has been brought into view in light of the giving. However,
does the source—albeit anonymous and enigmatic—that gives Being not still connotate, in a sense,
an ontotheological implication? Toward the end of “Time and Being,” Heidegger himself raises an
eventual question: “Was ist das Ereignis?”311 As seen above, this what-is question can be answered
after determining the way that the Ereignis is, namely, the mode of its Being; then, it leads back to
the Seinsfrage concerning the Ereignis, a question of “what demands its own determination: Being
in terms of time.”312 However, the question of “what is the Ereignis?” is misleading from the outset
since the Ereignis is neither a being to be asked “What is it?” nor Being to be said as “It gives it”;
it can be merely said “It gives Being [Es gibt Sein].” Here Heidegger cautiously says about the
Ereignis: “The Ereignis neither is, nor does it give the Ereignis.”313 He immediately adds: “What
remains to be said? Only this: Appropriation appropriates [Das Ereignis ereignet].”314 How, why,
or in what sense does the appropriation appropriate? Heidegger answers by citing Goethe’s saying:
How? When? and Where?—the gods remain silent!
You hold yourself to Because, and ask not Why?315
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Heidegger here steps back from the question of why—the why-question that readily leads the
thinking-experiment to a relapse into the invincible trap of metaphysic that searches for a ground,
origin, or reason in order to make sense of why appropriation appropriates or Es gibt. There is no
cause, reason, or why in the proposition of “Appropriation appropriates” because the appropriation
merely appropriates, due to the enigmatic Es that cannot be explained by a causality. In this context,
Heidegger’s radical thinking-experiment to think Being without beings does not really refer to an
attempt to think Being with no reference to beings; indeed, to think Being without beings does not
imply that “the relation to beings is inessential to Being, that we should disregard this relation.”316
What the thinking-experiment discloses is the fact that Being lets Dasein manifest itself in such a
way that the Es gibt or the appropriation appropriates without “why.” Consequently, the central
task of Heidegger’s thinking-experiment is to carry out a radical attempt to conceive of the
dynamic, internal, reciprocal, or turning relationship between Being and Dasein, which is more
fundamental than what is related, as his treatments of Kehre, Seyn, Astrag, Unterschied, and
Ereignis already show.
Although Being is neither an origin of human Dasein nor “the product of human Dasein,”317
the giving is itself possible only when there are a giver and a receiver. “If human Dasein were not
the constant receiver of the gift given by the Es gibt,” Heidegger says, “human Dasein would not
be human Dasein.” 318 Already in “Letter on Humanism” (1946-47), Heidegger notes that “the
human Dasein is the shepherd of Being” whose authentic dignity consists in responding to the call
for “the preservation of Being.”319 Later in the Four Seminars (1966-73), Heidegger spells out in
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a more explicit and unequivocal manner what is meant by the shepherd of Being: “the human
Dasein necessarily belongs to, and has its place in, the openness of Being. In order to open itself,
however, Being needs human Dasein as the there [Da] of its manifestations.”320 If Being and Time
conceives of Dasein as the leading hero of Being who exists in the world by understanding of its
own Being, now Da-sein appears as the supporting actor or the “place-keeper [der Platzhalter]”321
who keeps, sustains, and preserves the place [Da] in which Being manifests itself in such a way
that Es gibt Sein or Ereignis ereignet. Whatever the role of Dasein is in the manifestation of Being,
Heidegger’s radical statement “to think Being without beings” should not be literally understood
as “to think Being with no reference to beings”; rather, to think Being without beings means, as he
clearly states, “to think Being without reference to a grounding Being in terms of beings” or “to
think Being without reference to metaphysics.”322 The main purpose of the thinking-experiment is
undoubtedly consistent with his essential motivation of the Seinsfrage elaborated in Being and
Time, since both concern how not to think Being metaphysically—or onto-theologically—in
relation to beings.
For Heidegger and especially for the Heidegger II, the attempt to think of Being with regard
not to a grounding Being but to the Es gibt as the Ereignis that gives Being suggests a way of
describing metaphysics by means of a step back to the primal source from which all historical
determinations or transformations of Being emerge. The history of metaphysics is the history of
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the epochal determinations of Being in the manner that the Es gives Being, and accordingly, Being
lets Dasein essentially present itself in such a way that Being is given by the Es gibt without why.
Now, it can be said cautiously [vorsichtig], according to their distinctive modes, that Ereignis
ereignet; Es gibt Sein; Seiende ist; and Dasein existert. All these modes ultimately refer to a
concealed, withdrawn, or “without-why” source from which they arise. There is no why in the
proposition of “Appropriation appropriates” simply because it [Es] appropriates. Any logical,
causal, or metaphysical explanation to make sense of why such a giving or appropriating comes to
pass inevitably fails since the Es as the primordial source remains enigmatic. All propositional
statements to explain the Es give rise to explaining away the enigmatic feature of the Es and
thereby falling back into the ontotheological trap which seeks to find a cause or origin in order to
settle down the “why” by depriving the enigma from the Es. The inescapable risk of the thinkingexperiment of the lecture “Time and Being” delivered in the form of propositional statements lies
in the fact that it attempts to express what cannot be expressed in the propositional statements. Any
propositional clarification or explanation is not proper to saying about the enigmatic Es proper. It
can be only said that, as Caputo cautiously puts it, “Das Ereignis ereignet, weil das Ereignis.”323
It is the because [das Weil] that wards off the why-question to seek a reason or cause and that
forbids any further propositional elaborations. It is, therefore, no surprise to observe that
Heidegger’s lecture concludes with the self-defeating remarks: “The saying of Ereignis in the form
of a lecture remains itself an obstacle of this kind. The lecture has spoken merely in propositional
statements.”324

323
324

Caputo, “Time and Being in Heidegger,” 345.
SD, 25.

105

However, the real surprise that might undermine the overall consistency of Heidegger’s
thought can be noticed in the “Protokoll,”325 the summary of the seminar on the lecture “Time and
Being.” Heidegger here answers the question about “the possible end of the history of Being”326
with regard to the provocative notion of the Es gibt as Ereginis. As seen above, Ereignis is not
Being, and its peculiar mode is not reduced into the mode of Being; rather, it is that which gives,
grants, and sends Being—more properly, it appropriates what metaphysics has called Being across
the epochal determinations which constitute the history of metaphysics. Thus, the Es as Ereignis
gives, grants, and sends Being as finite [endlich], temporal [zeitlich], and historical [geschichtlich].
The above-question points back to the historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] concerning the primordial
source by which the history [Geschichte] of Being, and of metaphysics, comes to pass [geschieht].
It can be briefly expressed: Is the Ereiginis itself historical?—to put it more cautiously, does
appropriation appropriate historically? Heidegger here incautiously answers the former question
rather than the latter: “what sends as appropriation is itself unhistorical [ungeschichtlich], or more
precisely without destiny [geschicklos].”327 In the Four Seminars, he also makes an incautious
claim: “In Ereignis, the history of Being has not so much reached its end, as that it now appears as
history of Being. There is no destinal [geschicklich] epoch of Ereignis.”328 The radical thinkingexperiment suddenly stops in the confrontation with the non-historical and non-destinal source,
which allows the historical manifestations of Being; ironically, the thinking-experiment to
elaborate on the historicity of Being relies on the ahistorical thinking that eventually conceives of
a non-historical, onto-theological, or metaphysical source, that is, “arche [ἀρχή]” of Being.
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1-3. Heidegger’s Self-victimization of Metaphysics
Contrary to his own cautious declaration that the impersonal, anonymous, and enigmatic
Es sustains the entire process of the giving, Heidegger incautiously eradicates the enigma of the
Es by reducing it to a non-historical, non-temporal, or metaphysical arche which renders the
history of metaphysics possible. In this context, Jean-Luc Marion points out: “Heidegger
immediately lifts the anonymity of the ‘it’ and obfuscates the enigma. He violates his own
interdiction as soon as he formulates it by baptizing the ‘it’ with the name Ereignis.”329 On the way
to overcoming onto-theological metaphysics through retrieving the Seinsfrage, Heidegger
encounters the Ereignis as the metaphysical arche which makes the Seinsfrage relapse into what
he attempts to overcome. In this self-defeating gesture, Heidegger becomes, in Caputo’s words, a
“victim of metaphysics.”330 Heidegger could save the historicity of Being at the expense of falling
back into the metaphysical tradition, as if he would confess that his thinking of Being can never
be immune from metaphysics. In this regard, his thinking-experiment to think of Being directly
without reference to metaphysics halts—or probably fails—in the face of the metaphysical arche
of the Es. However, this failure does not mean that his thinking also fails to think of Being—at
least, he could save the historicity of Being. The abrupt suspension of his thinking-experiment
discloses how deeply obsessed Heidegger is with Being as the thing itself to be thought. What is
at stake to Heidegger is “not to listen to a series of propositions, but rather to follow the movement
of showing,”331 by virtue of his commitment to the phenomenological way zu den Sachen selbst
329
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to be thought. Consequently, the radical thinking-experiment brings all the different things, such
as Sein, Seyn, Austrag, Unterschied, Ereignis, and Kehre into the Denken in which they con-vey
the Sache selbst in various ways; it is das Sache selbst des Denken as the ultimate locus of the
Sinngebung, toward which these names are altogether oriented.
Whether or not Heidegger’s philosophy belongs to metaphysical tradition, and whatever
the Kehre—either a Kehre-1 or a Kehre-2—is in his philosophy, his ceaseless obsession with Being
is ineradicably placed in the heart of his thinking. Thus, the Kehre in Heidegger’s thought does not
lead to the two different Heideggers who think of different things but constitutes the historical—
not simply historisch but geschichitlich in Heidegger’s distinctive sense of the term—dynamism
of Heidegger who thinks of the same thing or the thing itself [die Sache selbst]. As well known,
Heidegger’s profound attentiveness zu den Sachen selbst, displaying his commitment to
phenomenology, is undoubtedly indicated in his response to Richardson’s Résumé—it is the Sache
selbst as Sein that manifests itself historically as it is given.332 Heidegger points out the most
fundamental aspect of phenomenology, which differentiates himself from his precursors:
[T]he meaning and scope of the principle of phenomenology, “to the thing itself” [zu den
Sachen selbst], became clear. As my familiarity with phenomenology grew…the question
about Being, aroused by Brentano’s work, nevertheless remained always in view. So it was
that doubt arose whether the “thing itself” was to be characterized as intentional
consciousness, or even as the transcendental Ego. If, indeed, phenomenology, as the
process of letting the thing manifest itself [das Sichzeigenlassen des Sache selbst], should
characterize the standard method of philosophy….Being [Sein] then had to remain the first
and last thing itself for thinking [die erste und letzt Sache selbst für Denken].333
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In opposition to Husserlian phenomenology, according to which the transcendental Ego considers
the thing itself as its own cogitatum in its transcendental reflection and, on that account, fails to
reflect the non-static, pre-theoretical, vital, or dynamic historicity [die Geschichtlichkeit] of Sein
and Denken altogether, Heidegger asserts that phenomenology as the philosophical method lets
the thing manifest itself in terms of the temporal, epochal, or historical co-responding of Sein and
Denken. The manifestation of the Sache selbst is always involved in the double interplay of the
Seinsdenken: the Being of thinking and the thinking of Being. Heidegger explicates this double
interplay as follows: “Being as such (Seyn) shows itself as that which is to be thought and, at the
same time, as that which wants the thinking corresponding to it.”334 It is Being as such that calls
forth thinking (the Being of thinking) and, simultaneously, that the thinking seeks (the thinking of
Being); thus, the thinking is a seeking that is always directed to what is sought, and yet it is already
guided by what it seeks. The basic task of the thinking is to determine that which concerns the
thinking in the first place, which is what is meant by the German term Sache: “Being—a thing,
presumably the thing of the thinking.” 335 In this context, this crucial passage illustrates in an
unequivocal manner that the later Heidegger still remains the early one who insists that “Ontology
is possible only as phenomenology.”336 For the later Heidegger as for the early one, ontology can

334
Heidegger, “Preface,” xvi-xvii. The original text reads: “das Sein als solches (das Seyn) sich zugleich als
jenes zu Denkende zeigt, was ein ihm entrprechendes Denken braucht.” Richardson translates “es braucht” to “there
is want of” and interprets Heidegger’s statement in question as: “Now Being ‘wants’ thought. By reason of its nature,
Being must itself be served, tended, guarded by thought, hence is ‘in want of thought’ in order to be itself.” Richardson,
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 597. The essential affinity between phenomenology and ontology
is enshrined in Heidegger’s Seinsdenken. In this regard, Sein is in want of Denken to be itself and manifests itself as
it is thought. He goes on to say that “the correlation between Being and thought comes to expression as a mutual wanting” (600) and finally concludes: “Thought, as gathering-together by which man (re-)collects Being, rests in the center
of man’s Being” (601).
335
SD, 4. The original reads: “Sein—eine Sache, vermutlich die Sache des Denkens.”
336
SZ, 35. He goes on to state: “When it comes to the subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the
Being of beings—ontology” (37). For Heidegger, ontology and phenomenology are conducive to philosophy itself in
terms of its object and its method; then, he defines philosophy as “universal phenomenological ontology” (38).

109

be itself through phenomenology while phenomenology should begin with ontology. When
phenomenology shows Heidegger “How to look at,” that is, the formal or methodological path
toward the thing itself, ontology ushers him to “what to look for,” that is, the most fundamental
thing to be thought. Phenomenology is then the ontological path per se zu den Sache selbst für
Denken, which is “the first and last thing itself for thinking” and so “the most proper thing of
thinking [der eigensten Sache des Denken].”337 In the course of the ontological-phenomenological
path, what remains the same thing [die Sache selbst], from the beginning to the end, is the very
Sein for Denken, although the proper noun of Sein would be a unsatisfactory name for the Sache
selbst des Denkens.338
The Kehre then can be reinterpreted in the context of Being and Time when Heidegger
continues to make a claim: “The thinking of the Kehre results from the fact that I stayed with the
thing to be thought in Being and Time.”339 This statement alludes to the fact that his ongoing
commitment to Sein entangled with the thinking of the Kehre is implicitly explored through the
Seinsfrage in Being and Time. Just as the Seinsfrage implies the essential feature of questioning
that Dasein as a questioner is already involved in its own question, epitomized not merely as the
question of Dasein but rather as “Dasein-in-the-question,” the Kehre essentially plays within the
thing itself: “the Kehre-in-the-thing-itself.” Rather than (re)visiting a (too) much discussed concept
of the Kehre, Heidegger then advises, “One would simply engage oneself in the thing mentioned”;
otherwise, one will merely attempt to demonstrate that “the Seinsfrage developed in Being and
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Time is unjustified, superfluous, and impossible.”340 Far from abandoning the Seinsfrage presented
in Being and Time in favor of the Kehre, Heidegger argues that the fundamental question of Being
is “decisively ful-filled [er-gänzt] in the thinking of the Kehre.” 341 In the midst of the
phenomenological-ontological way toward the thing itself, all different names for the Sache selbst,
such as Sein, Seyn, Kehre, Unterschied, Austrag, and Ereignis, cannot be properly understood apart
from the Seinsfrage, and vice versa. Despite the dynamism, complexity, and wide-ranging scope
of his philosophy with regard to the division of Heidegger I and II and the distinction of Kehre-1
and 2, consequently, the Seinsfrage remains the question par excellence for the Heidegger.

2. Il y a: Anarchic Arche of Es Gibt
Now it becomes obvious why Levinas pays little attention to the later Heidegger regardless
of whether there would be any Kehre in Heidegger’s philosophy; indeed, Levinas himself rarely
makes remarks about the Kehre in his critical consideration of Heidegger’s thinking of Being.
Whatever the Kehre might turn out to be Kehre-1 or 2, Levinas’s intentional neglect of Heidegger
II is largely due to the Kehre itself, which makes no difference to the Heidegger whose focus
fundamentally remains on the thinking of Being. As the view of Kehre-2 indicates that there
probably happens a turn, shift, or reversal from Dasein to Being with regard to a focus, theme, or
orientation, Levinas would recognize that the ontological obsession with Being becomes even
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more serious in the contemplative, meditative, or poetic work of Heidegger II.342 The Seinsfrage
does not allow elsewhere than Sein of beings in the sense that everything, including transcendence
in the first place, is brought into Denken by leveling it down to the reference to Sein; therefore, the
Seinsdenken at best thinks of another Being or Being otherwise, but never of elsewhere than Being
or otherwise than Being. As will be seen, Levinas attempts to delve further into a more fundamental
dimension of being and thus goes into an unexplored, unknown, or other way (than an ontological
one), from which Heidegger holds back in his thinking-experiment—it is the purely verbal être
without any substantive étants or what Levinas calls “il y a,” which appears as the ultimate locus
of transcendence.

2-1. The Locus of Transcendence: Être or Sein
In his very early work entitled On Escape (1935-36), Levinas argues that Western
philosophical tradition has been preoccupied with the problem of transcendence; Levinas himself
is no exception to this tradition.343 In spite of the fact that Levinas is well known as a philosopher
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of ethics, his early works mainly pay attention to the meaning of transcendence instead of ethics
itself. Indeed, in “Is Ontology Fundamental?” (1951), the essay published almost twenty years
after the publication of his dissertation entitled The Theory of Intuition of Husserl’s
Phenomenology (1930), Levinas for the first time explicitly employs the term “the ethical” in an
adjectival form to elaborate on the ethical signification of the other.344 As seen in the previous
chapters, the issue of transcendence is undoubtedly fundamental for Husserl and Heidegger who
share the common concern for the subjectivity of the subject under the different names, such as
the transcendental Ego and Dasein, respectively. On the one hand, Husserl insists on intentionality
by arguing that the intentional subject transcends toward the transcendent object and then makes
sense [Sinn] of it in the phenomenological realm; phenomenologically, all transcendence is
immanent to the transcendental Ego. At last, Husserl identifies the phenomenological validity and
meaning of the Sache selbst by means of intentionality as transcendence in immanence or
immanent transcendence.
On the other hand, Heidegger criticizes traditional philosophy and Husserl’s
phenomenology in particular for their treatments of transcendence, which remain not fundamental
enough, so that they fail to recognize the ontological characteristics of Being in terms of
transcendence. In opposition to the traditional—more properly, ontic—conception of
transcendence, Heidegger proposes “finite transcendence,” which characterizes the ontological-
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existential way of Dasein’s Being; transcendence is finite since “it belongs to human Dasein as the
fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs prior to all comportment.”345 According
to Levinas’s reading of Heidegger, it is the “leap [saut]” 346 beyond beings toward Being that
Heidegger basically designates as transcendence in the distinctive sense of the term. Heidegger’s
underlying criticism of Husserl consists in the fact that the intentional life can be properly
intelligible only after clarifying the transcendence of Dasein, which constitutes Dasein’s Being as
Being-in-the-world. The fundamental structure of the subjectivity of the subject is illuminated in
the finite transcendence that constitutes the ecstatic way of Dasein’s Being at the primordial level,
as Heidegger states: “to be a subject means to be a being in and as transcendence.”347
This is where Levinas’s own question begins; in other words, it asks whether Heidegger’s
(fundamental) ontology is fundamental enough with regard to “what it means to be.” However,
this does not mean that Levinas considers the Seinsfrage a misleading question, as if Heidegger
would raise a question about something that has nothing to do with “what it means to be.” Levinas
indeed acknowledges that Heidegger’s question deliberately confronts “the problem that has for
its object the meaning of the existence of Being.”348 In fact, the problem with the Seinsfrage that
Levinas has in mind is that the question fails to be itself sufficiently insofar as it considers Being
in terms of beings; in other words, Heidegger’s Seinsfrage always insinuates an inseparable
complicity of Being and beings, which is elaborated by the ontological difference in the Heidegger
I and by the Es gibt as Ereignis in the II. For Levinas, the Seinsfrage is not radical enough to
penetrate further into a more fundamental dimension of pure being, which is covered up by the
345
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ontological coverings, such as Sein, Seyn, Austrag, Unterschid, Kehre, Ereignis, and Es gibt. It is
the sheer being [être], prior to or without any existent [étant], that takes on a genuine meaning of
transcendence. Far from constituting the intentional subjectivity of the transcendental Ego
(immanent transcendence) or the ecstatic subjectivity of Dasein (finite transcendence), Levinas
argues, transcendence in a genuine sense calls for the need of exit, escape, or evasion from being.
In this context, Levinas’s question departs with/from Heidegger’s Seinsfrage in the sense that the
fundamental ontology remains not fundamental enough and so fails to capture the primordial depth
of pure being and transcendence altogether. When calling into question Heidegger’s philosophy,
ironically, Levinas becomes more Heideggerian than Heidegger himself by radicalizing the
Seinsfrage to conceive of l’être sans l’étant, that is, pure existence without existents that bears the
meaning of transcendence without being reduced into either a transcendental immanence or an
ontological finitude. As will be seen, the early Levinas employs a neologism “excendence,”349
which discloses the sheer nakedness of being by stripping off the ontological coverings
accumulated in the pure être per se, and thereby which invites an escape embedded in the
primordial depth of être. The main purpose of Levinas’s very early work On Escape is to elaborate
on the radical sense of transcendence in the name of excendence to pave the long way for otherwise
than being and for elsewhere than ontology.

2-2. Escape from Being and Being Riveted to Being
In On Escape, Levinas begins by defining Western philosophy as a “bourgeois” philosophy
which nourishes the conception of “the unity of I [moi]” that does not allow an “inner division,”
split, or schizophrenia and that remains in its self-contained sufficiency “to peace with itself [soi-
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même], achieve itself, enclose itself in itself, and rest on itself.”350 The identical unity of the moi
and the soi is conducive to the constitution of the bourgeois identity of being. However, the identity
of “I” with myself does not simply a tautological process in which I posit myself, find myself,
achieve myself, and remains myself in my reclusion; rather, it is the identification of the bourgeois
I, i.e., a mastery-process over “all that is unforeseeable,”351 which menaces to break up my secure,
tranquil, or serene place [chez-soi] of the present that I hold sway. The bourgeois philosophy
buttresses the conservative and yet valorous spirit whose spirituality consists in its “instinct for
possession,” which justifies an unremitting appropriation, integration, expansion, proliferation,
and imperialism for its own sake, just as “a restless and enterprising capitalism”352 thoroughly
forages for everything that can produce profits all around the world. In its essential instinct, the
identification of the I becomes the bourgeois identity, into which everything becomes appropriated
and absorbed, and to which nothing remains foreign and unknown. The bourgeois conception of
the identity of the moi with the soi indicates what Levinas briefly calls “Being is [L’être ist],” that
is, “the brutality of the fact of being [that] is absolutely sufficient and refers to nothing else.”353 In
the profound depth of pure being in its self-sufficiency, however, Levinas diagnoses a symptom of
an ontological claustrophobia that needs a breathing, exhalation, respiration, or transcendence. It
is transcendence as an aspiration for the need to exit, escape, and get out of being that Levinas
attempts to elaborate in the name of excendence in his early work.
When it comes to the bourgeois conceptions of transcendence, whether immanent or finite,
all of which lapse into a seamless and oppressive regime of Being, Levinas argues that
transcendence is a “search for refuge” somewhere within Being, which in turn receives, transposes,
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and conceals [recèle] itself; thus, bourgeois philosophy leaves “the stigma of being” 354 on
transcendence. Levinas explains that, for Heidegger, the movement of transcendence is a leavetaking movement that the moi leaves the soi to take it again in a more explicit and authentic way;
the movement never gets out of the ontological circle of the binary unity of the moi-soi since the
bourgeois identity of the I [moi] does not allow any place foreign to itself [soi-même].
Transcendence is then a movement from implicit to explicit or from inauthentic to authentic
understanding of Being. At the bottom of the identity of the moi and the soi that Western
philosophy seeks, however, Levinas finds that the brutal fact of being appears as a heavy burden
or unbearable suffering: namely, a sort of an ontological obesity which calls for a digestion and
excretion to get out of being through breaking up the shackle of the bourgeois identity of the moi
with the soi. What defines excendence qua transcendence is the urgent need to escape from the
smothering prison of being and go toward elsewhere unknown [insu] to being, and to ontology. It
is an indeterminate elsewhere on the hither side of being, i.e., an unknown place that “Western
philosophy, in effect, has never gone.”355 The most basic and fundamental task of On Escape is to
debunk the bourgeois conception of being, that is, “the fact that the moi is soi-même,”356 and
thereby uncover what the bourgeois philosophy has long covered up—the brutality of pure being
as the locus of excendence or transcendence. The brutal fact of pure being does not primordially
appear as an intentional achievement (Husserl) or a historical determination (Heidegger) but as an
inescapable enchainment, bondage, burden, and “imprisonment from which one must get out.”357
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This is why Levinas never leaves the Seinsfrage behind and attempts to “renew the ancient problem
of being qua being”358 to unveil the primordial dimension of pure being in a verbal sense, which
is exactly what Heidegger endeavors to seek, but fails to achieve.
Prior to the identification of being that buttresses the ongoing unity of the moi and the soi,
the need for escape embedded in the brutal fact of pure being discerns the radical feature of the
identity or what Levinas calls a “type of duality,”359 a dual, fractured, or schizophrenic identity
that signifies the inherent division of the moi and the soi. It is the inner split that entails the
irremissible predicament of the need for escape from being and, simultaneously, being riveted to
being. As the need for escape from being indicates, the moi no longer enjoys its comfortable,
luxurious, and restful peace of the en-soi, but suffers from a sort of a schizophrenia that does not
allow the moi to remain to be the soi in its self-sufficient identity. The experience of the
schizophrenia disrupts the bourgeois complacency of being as the peaceful unity of the moi and
the soi. The need for escape from being does not aim to search for somewhere in which any need
is no longer necessary, and thereby in which it is completely satisfied through achieving a
completion, complacency, richness, or abundance of being, as the Heideggerian Es gibt indicates.
The need for escape here should not be understood as any kind of lack or privation of being derived
from its finitude or limitation. Rather, Levinas contends that the need arises from the completion,
perfection, sufficiency, or plenitude of being, which calls for the exit from being: “at the root of
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need there is not a lack of being but, on the contrary, a plenitude of being. Need is not oriented
toward the complete fulfillment of a limited being, toward satisfaction, but toward release and
escape.”360 For Levinas, the need for escape is an incessant desire to get out of being and go out
into elsewhere than being, rather than a mastery-process toward the complete achievement of being.
However, the promise of the need cannot be kept but gives rise to the inescapable fact of being
riveted to being. It is not only because an elsewhere, at which the need to escape aims, remains
indefinite, unfixed, indeterminate, and unknown, but also because in the need of escape, being
appears as an irremissible burden that any satisfaction never completely dissolves. Levinas thus
states: “What gives the human condition all its importance is precisely this inadequacy of
satisfaction to need,”361 which becomes clear in the pre-theoretical, pre-reflective, and affective
phenomena, such as pleasure, shame, and nausea.

Pleasure
Levinas describes pleasure as an affective movement that knows nothing of satisfaction in
the sense that “pleasure appears as it develops.”362 Pleasure ceaselessly increases in intensity and
intoxication to the point of “an abandonment, a loss of oneself [soi-même], a getting out of oneself
[soi], an ecstasy,”363 that is, a total escape from the soi; thus, it is the promise of an evasion, escape,
transcendence, or excendence. Pleasure as an affective phenomenon appears as an unending
process that seeks its satisfaction. However, it always fails its accomplishment since it has no goal,
end, limit, or termination in which the I [moi] finds itself [soi-mêmen] in its sufficiency and
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complacency where the unity of the moi and the soi might be eventually achieved. The fact that
the promise contained in pleasure cannot be realized shows that the escape from being is a
“deceptive escape,”364 which always fails to leave the being itself behind. However, this deceptive
trait of escape does not refer to returning to the bourgeois concept of being that points to the solid
and unifying ground of the identity, but to revealing the peculiar ambivalence of enchainment and
transcendence that calls into question the bourgeois conception of being as the amalgamated unity
of the moi and soi. Therefore, the failure to satisfy the need brings to light the inherent duality
primordially inscribed in the bourgeois identity in terms of escape from being and being riveted to
being.

Shame
The disappointing moment of failure appears as “shame” by which the meaning of the
failure of escape is highlighted. Far from conveying moral connotations, shame for Levinas reveals
the brutal presence of being in the sheer nakedness. Shame is experienced as a failure of hiding,
concealing, and veiling what one wants to hide, conceal, and veil; thus, it appears as the failure of
covering up “the nakedness of an existence incapable of hiding oneself.”365 A shameful experience
drives one to confront its impotence, powerlessness, or impossibility of escaping from “the
irremissible presence of the moi to the soi-même.”366 In this context, the shameful presence of
being is not simply due to the incapability to conceal this nakedness, but to the inevitable return to
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oneself, i.e., being riveted to oneself. However, the failure of escape does not mean that the I [moi]
has to remain at home with itself [chez-soi] in the bourgeois identity where the I has nothing to
hide and thus has no sense of shame at all. By contrast, escape from being in terms of shame must
fail since the moi has to confront the soi without losing itself in the soi-identity; the failure then
reveals the pure nakedness of being, which is clarified in the materiality of the soi. In the shameful
experience, the soi is posited neither as identity with the moi nor as the very moi in which there is
no sense of shame; rather, it is a bodily, sensual, affective, and material exposure that never permits
the moi any complete evasion from being. The nakedness of being already alludes to sensibility,
affectivity, passivity, materiality, or vulnerability in terms of a bodily experience antecedent to
consciousness, comprehension, and reflection. Therefore, the materiality of the soi interrupts the
soi-contained, soi-sufficient, and soi-identical identity of the moi and opens the moi to be affected,
touched, exposed, accused, and so ashamed. “What shame discovers is the being [l’être] that
discovers itself,”367 that is, the brutal presence of being riveted to being in which the powerlessness
and impossibility of hiding, concealing, and fleeing oneself—the failure of escape—becomes clear.

Nausea
In the phenomenon of nausea as an extreme form of shame, Levinas recognizes the radical
dimension of pure being in its nakedness. “The state of nausea,” Levinas states, “encloses one on
all sides”368 without any issue or exit by which one could get out of oneself. In the experience of
nausea, despite its painful refusal to remain to be oneself, one cannot but undertake the untenable
and yet ineluctable burden of oneself. It is through the experience of nausea that one undergoes
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“its internal antagonism,”369 which denotes the primordial duality embedded in the identity, that is,
the twofold feature of being that the moi cannot be the soi and, simultaneously, that the moi cannot
not be the soi. Levinas points out: “In nausea—which amounts to an impossibility of being what
one is—we are at the same time riveted to ourselves, enclosed in a tight circle that smothers.”370
This antagonistic situation of nausea, with regard to the desperate escape that ends in failure,
characterizes “the very experience of pure being.”371 What the dual identity, which culminates in
the extreme experience of nausea, ultimately signifies is the fact that the moi and the soi are
essentially “out of joint” from the outset—it is the primordial disjointedness of the identity of the
moi and the soi that undermines the bourgeois conception of being which has long been
manipulated by Western philosophy. Thus, the identity of the moi is not something settled in the
chez-soi into which transcendence is absorbed in midst of the transcendental reflection (immanent
transcendence) or the thinking of Being (finite transcendence). For Levinas, rather, it is in the outof-joint moment that the brutality of pure being takes on the radical sense of excendence, whose
signification consists neither in simply leaving being behind nor in obtaining an explicit and
authentic comprehension of Being but in being riveted to being as the unbearable brutality of being,
which incites the desire for elsewhere than being and for otherwise than being.

2-3. An-arche of Il y a Prior to Arche of Es Gibt
In On Evasion, Levinas attempts to reveal the pure nudity of être, in which the moi is out
of joint with the soi, through the analysis of the affective phenomena. In the seminal text entitled
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“Il y a” (1946)372 mostly written in the Stalag and later incorporated into Existence and Existent
(1947),373 he becomes more radical in inquiring into the pure depth of being even prior to the
duality of the moi and the soi—it is anonymous existence without any existent: namely, there is [il
y a]. Generally speaking, the French il y a is a simple translation of the German Es gibt, and they
are translated as “there is” in English. But these translations overlook the different connotations of
the terms to which both Heidegger and Levinas try to give. From the Heideggerian perspective, as
seen above, the Es gibt can be translated neither as “there is” nor as “il y a” since they are the
idiomatic translations that cannot convey the essence of Being as donation, generosity, richness,
or abundance; instead, it should be literally translated as “it gives” in English or “cela donne” in
French.374 By contrast, Levinas does not accept the literal translation of il y a as “es gibt ” in
German or as “it gives” in English since his concept of il y a has no implications of donation and
generosity that presuppose a non-historical source or metaphysical arche. In Levinas’s distinctive
sense, the il y a conveys the verbal resonance of pure être, existence, or existing without any
substantive implication; it should be translated into “there is.” Therefore, the term il y a signifies
a sort of a “zero-zone” that preserves the impersonality, neutrality, and anonymity of pure existing
even prior to the metaphysical arche of the Heideggerian Es gibt that refers to the plenitude and
generosity of Being.
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The precedence of the il y a or existence without existents over the Es gibt still remains
problematic even when it comes to Heidegger’s thinking-experiment [Denkversuch] to think Being
without being. As seen above, however, Heidegger neither really means to think of Being without
beings nor succeeds in thinking of Being with no reference to metaphysics. Although Heidegger
speaks of Being without beings, his thinking continuously considers Being with regard to beings
in order not to think of Being metaphysically, as his analyses of Kehre, Austrag, Unterschid, and
Ereignis indicate. Moreover, his thinking-experiment fails to think of Being non-metaphysically
when he assumes an ahistorical, onto-theological, or metaphysical arche as the Es that gives, grants,
and sends Being. In Time and the Other, contemporary with Existence and Existents, Levinas
points out the profound banality of Heidegger’s thought when Heidegger distinguishes the verbal
Being and the substantive beings. Heidegger’s distinction between Being and beings only knows
of the distinctive relation between the two but never of a “separation”375 that unties the binding tie
between Being and beings. In his analysis of the turning relation [Kehre] between Being and
Dasein in the event of appropriation [Ereignis], the function of the “between” does not serve to
leave both Being and beings on their own but to appropriate [ereignen] each other, as Heidegger
himself states: “the ‘between’ of Da-sein overcomes the separation [χωρισμός]…by transforming
together, into the simultaneity, both Seyn and beings.”376 Levinas goes on to point out Heidegger’s
banality without explicitly indicating his name: “[E]xisting does not exit. It is the existent that
exists. And the fact of having recourse to what does not exist, in order to understand what does
exist, hardly constitutes a revolution in philosophy.”377 For Levinas, a genuine revolution begins
with the separation of Being from beings, the detachment of pure existence that does not exit from
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the existents that exist. Thus, Heidegger’s banality consists in the fact that he thinks of what does
not exist (Being) with reference to—rather than in its separation from—what does exist (beings):
“Existing is always grasped in the existent…[and] existing is always possessed by someone.”378
Although Heidegger profoundly explicates the ontological difference of Being from beings, he
fails to think of pure existing or il y a in a purely verbal sense, antecedent to the ontological
distinction between Being and beings and even to Ereignis, Kehre, Austrag, Unterschied, and Es
gibt that sustain the very distinction.
From this banal perspective, the idea of il y a is not acceptable since it is absurd to think of
Being without beings; hence, it is not the thing as such that can be thought [das Sache selbst des
Denken]. However, Levinas’s concept of il y a is not a mere phenomenon that is intentionally
constituted by the transcendental Ego or ontologically grasped by Dasein; indeed, it precedes all
subjects, all objects, and all phenomena. Levinas thus states: “I do not believe Heidegger can admit
an existing without existents, which to him would seem absurd.”379 But Levinas seems to detect
an absurd facet of Being without beings in Heidegger’s notion of thrownness [Geworhenheit]—
with no further consideration of it within the overall context of Being and Time: “One must
understand Geworfenheit as the ‘fact-of-being-thrown-in’…existence.”380 In other words, Dasein
is thrown into the world “as if the existent appeared only in an existence that precedes it, as if
existence were independent of the existent.”381 However, the ontological concept of thrownness
always assume both Dasein qua the existent who is thrown into and that into which it is thrown.
In Heidegger’s language, Dasein’s thrownness into its there indicates the fact that “Dasein is
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thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the there.”382 For Heidegger, existence is
not something independent of or separate from the existent; on the contrary, it signifies the way in
which Dasein is thrown into the there as Being-in-the-world.383 Therefore, the essential banality
of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference consists in the fact that this difference knows
nothing of a primordial separation between Being and beings or existence and existents.
Furthermore, Heidegger—in particular, Heidegger of Being and Time—does not pay much
attention to existence “before and after” Dasein, as his ontological view of death that concerns
only the totality [Ganzheit] of Dasein’s Being patently indicates. In an authentic [eigentlich] sense,
the scope of the analytic of Dasein is confined to the totality of Dasein’s Being as the “primordial
‘limit-situation’ [Grenzsituation] of Being-toward-death,” 384 which delimits the ontological
boundary of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. It is Dasein’s facticity [Faktizität] that denotes its inbetween modes of the as-soon-as-it-is-thrown-into-there and the as-long-as-it-is-there. Thus,
Heidegger’s ontological analysis of death considers neither before Dasein’s birth (not-yet-beingthere) nor after its death (no-longer-being-there), but only the existence of Dasein, i.e., the way of
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world (being-there: Da-sein). The basic leitmotif of the ontological
difference in terms of the distinctive and yet reciprocal relation between Being and beings persists
throughout Heidegger’s entire thought, as his later interview in 1969 confirms again the
simultaneity or synchronicity of Being and beings: “the fundamental thought of my thinking is
precisely that Being, or the manifestation of Being, needs human beings and that, vice versa,
human beings are only human beings if they are standing in the manifestation of Being.”385 For
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Heidegger, it is absurd to think Being without beings in that there is no Being without Dasein, and
vice versa. Consequently, the thinking-experiment abruptly stops in the confrontation of this
absurdity since it never conceives of the separation of Being from beings or of existence from
existents.

2-3-1. Imagination: Kant
Given that Heidegger’s thinking-experiment halts in front of this absurd endeavor to think
Being without beings, the perplexing problem remains: how to approach Being without beings,
existence without existents, or pure existing. Levinas abruptly begins to make a radical attempt,
probably called an imaginary-experiment [imaginaire-tentative], which exposes the thinkingexperiment to the bold risk of thinking what it cannot think: the il y a. Viewed from Heidegger’s
thinking of Being of beings, Levinas takes up an inconceivable venture to elaborate on the il y a
which conveys the absurd characteristic of existence without existents. In the beginning of
Existence and Existents, Levinas heralds “a profound need to leave the climate of Heidegger’s
philosophy…by the conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that would be preHeideggerian.”
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In order to approach existence without existent, Levinas’s imaginary-

experiment requires the desperate departure from Heidegger’s climate governed by the thinking of
Being in terms of beings. However, this deviation from the thinking-experiment does not mean the
return to any pre-Heideggerian philosophy that does not even think of the ontological difference;
rather, it is the radical attempt to specify the impersonal, anonymous, and an-archic il y a that
precedes the ontological difference and even the ultimate arche as the Es gibt. This imaginary-
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experiment regarding the il y a is markedly and exclusively presented in the early texts, Existence
and Existent and Time and the Other, as follows:
Let us imagine [Imaginons] the return of all beings, things and persons, to nothingness. It
is impossible to place this return to nothingness outside of all events. But what of this
nothingness itself? Something would happen, if only night and silence of nothingness. The
indeterminacy of “something is happening” is not the indeterminacy of a subject and does
not refer to a substantive. Like the third person pronoun in the impersonal form of a verb,
it designates not the uncertainly known author of the action, but the characteristic of this
action itself that somehow has no author, which is anonymous. This impersonal,
anonymous, and yet inextinguishable “consummation” of being, which murmurs in the
depth of nothingness itself we shall designate by the term il y a. The il y a, in its refusal to
take a personal form, is “being in general.”387
Again, Levinas makes some similar remarks on the il y a in a more explicit manner:
Let us imagine [Imaginons] the return of all beings, things and persons, to nothingness.
Will we encounter pure nothingness?388 What remains after this imaginary destruction of
everything is not something, but the fact that there is. The absence of everything returns as
a presence, as the place where the bottom has dropped out of everything, an atmospheric
density, a plenitude of the void, or the murmur of silence. There is, after this destruction of
things and beings, the impersonal “field of forces” of existing….The fact of existing
imposes itself when there is no longer anything. And it is anonymous: there is neither
anyone nor anything that takes this existence upon itself. It is impersonal like “it is raining”
or “it is hot.” Existing returns no matter with what negation one dismisses it. There is, as
the irremissibility of pure existing.389
Both passages open with the same sentence beginning with the same word, “Imaginons,” that gives
access to the il y a. Although these passages, at first glance, seem to depict a strange and quixotic
situation that one can merely imagine in one’s mind as in unrealistic or fantasy literature, what
Levinas intends to do with imagination is basically not to do literature and art in general, but to do
philosophy. Imagination is not simply a creative source of literary activities that exclusively
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belongs to the domain of literature. Levinas himself does not deny that his idea of the il y a based
on imagination is not irrelevant to literature, as he finds in Edgar A. Poe’s work the literary
indication of death that is “not dead enough” which alludes to “a very acute feeling of what we
call the il y a.”390 In the Preface (1978) later inserted to the second edition of De l’existence à
l’existent, Levinas retrospectively observes that being in a purely verbal sense refers to
“anonymous being [être] that any being [étant] cannot lay claim, being [être] without beings
[étants] or without beings [êtres], an incessant ‘commotion’ to take up again Blanchot’s metaphor
of an impersonal il y a as ‘it is raining’ or ‘it is dark.’ This term is fundamentally distinct from
Heidegger’s term of the ‘es gibt’.”391 In this regard, the provocative theme of the il y a Levinas
attempts to imagine instigates the controversial debate concerning the relation of philosophy to
literature in Levinas.392
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However, Levinas’s primary interest never lies in developing theories of literature itself but
in ethics, which recalls his constant hallmark that ethics is first philosophy not literature
whatsoever. From the literary works, nonetheless, Levinas retrieves insights, examples, or motifs
in order to elaborate on the il y a in the context of Western philosophy and Heidegger’s philosophy
in particular. In the Introduction to Existence and Existents, Levinas points out that this work is
“in large measure inspired by Heidegger’s philosophy where we finds the concept of ontology and
of the relationship that a human being sustains with Being.”393 However, the fact that Levinas does
not explicitly refer to the names of his philosophical precursors in the treatment of the il y a—as
in the cases of the above passages that contain heavy-loaded, toned, and philosophical
terminologies, such as imagination, nothing, and negation—readily eludes the fact that he does
philosophy in the form of literature, and not vice versa. In order not to miss the philosophical
significance of the il y a that provides the decisive key to recognizing Levinas’s early view on
death, the passages in question should be properly understood against the backdrop of the
philosophical tradition—especially, Heidegger’s philosophy and its critical confrontation with
German idealism.
If Heidegger considers Being of beings by means of the thinking-experiment, which
renders all beings thinkable with regard to Being, Levinas imagines what the thinking cannot think,
i.e., existence without existents, or il y a in a purely verbal sense. For Levinas, it is the power of
imagination that suspends all that is thinkable with reference to Being; thus, the imaginaryexperiment is the radical venture that disrupts the thinking of Being [Seinsdenken] by driving it to
the point of imagining existence without existents. This interrupting character of imagination on
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which Levinas focuses becomes more obvious in contrast with the Kantian faculty of imagination
in which Heidegger finds Kant’s peculiar achievement.394 For Kant, transcendental imagination is
the productive, formative, and synthetic root that underlies two stems of knowledge: sensation and
understanding. “The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the
imagination, prior to apperception, is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially
that of experience.”395 The transcendental apperception of the “I think,” which founds the unity of
knowledge in apperception, is rooted in the a priori imagination that projects and guides all the
acts of representation. At the bottom of apperception of the “I think” that makes experience
possible, therefore, the Kantian imagination is the a priori source that serves as the productive,
projective, and synthetic role.
In his reading of Kant’s concept of the productive imagination, Heidegger traces the latent
rudiments of the projective temporality upon which his magnum opus amplifies: “The forming of
imagination is in itself relative to time….The pure imagining forms its fabric [Gebilde] from out
of itself, as in itself relative to time, must first of all form time.”396 According to Heidegger’s view
of the Kantian imagination, the “I think” does not exist in its own but bases itself on the productive
imagination in relation to time as pure intuition, which does not simply refer to “what is intuited
in pure intuiting” but rather to “the forming of intuiting of what it intuits in one.”397 It is the one
that prefigures Dasein of Being and Time. One of Kant’s contributions is his seminal recognition
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of the temporal character of imagination that possibly anticipates the temporality of Dasein, as
Heidegger puts it: “the transcendental power of imagination allows time as sequence of nows to
spring forth, and as this letting-spring-forth it is therefore original time.”398 With a focus on this
prudent anticipation, Richard Kearney makes a somewhat strong argument that “what Kant and
the German idealist called transcendental imagination is in fact a prefiguration of Dasein.” 399
Although the Kantian imagination could not be itself an exact figuration of Dasein, Kearney
singles out the most rudimentary “kinship” running through both the Kantian “I think” and the
Heideggerian Dasein, that is, the projective and synthetic power of imagination; then, he concludes
that “imagination becomes another name for Dasein—or surplus being.”400
Given that imagination has been understood as the productive and synthetic power
possessed by a being, an existent, or Dasein, Levinas seeks to articulate pure existing without any
existent by means of the imaginary-experiment, by which he imagines what the synthetic power
of the Kantian imagination cannot imagine or what the thinking-experiment cannot think. Whereas
Heidegger envisages the projective temporality of imagination by recuperating the productive,
unifying, and synthetic power of the Kantian imagination, Levinas conceives of the disruption of
this productive and peaceful power of imagination by retrieving the Heideggerian difference not
as a mere distinction between Being and beings but as a fundamental separation. As Heidegger’s
interpretation of the Kantian imagination indicates that the productive imagination is the
fundamental basis for the temporal subjectivity of an existent—whether the “I think” or Dasein,
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the existence of the existent or Being of a being can be properly understood in terms of time. This
is what the essential argument of Being and Time, as the title implies that Being is considered in
terms of time. For Levinas, however, imagination is not a faculty or power that an existent has in
favor of the peaceful, undisturbed constitution of the existent; rather, it is the suspending power
that is indispensable for imagining the possibility of the separation between existence and the
existents by disturbing the productive and synthetic function of imagination. This disturbing power
of imagination releases both the Kantian imagination and Heidegger’s thinking-experiment from
their overloaded reflection on the ongoing attachment of Being to beings and opens them to the
barest status of being or existence in a purely verbal sense.
In the performance of his imaginary-experiment, Levinas’s description of il y a remains
quite apocalyptic, as he states, “what remains after this imaginary destruction of everything is not
something, but the fact that there is [il y a].”401 His apocalyptic voice with regard to the il y a is
already found in the opening of Existence and Existents, such as “a world in pieces,” “a world
turned upside down,” “the twilight of a world,” and “an end of the world.”402 For Levinas, these
expressions seem to be “banal,” but what they express is “authentic” nonetheless.403 On the one
hand, these expressions are banal, mythological, or even misleading when the il y a is understood
as an apocalyptic situation following the total destruction of the world, as if the complete
annihilation of a world produced the emergence of the il y a, as if the il y a followed in the aftermath
of the destruction of an existent world. However, this apocalyptic assumption of the preceding
world entails a metaphysical or ontotheological question regarding an origin, cause, or giver qua
an arche from which the world emerges. Is not the history of onto-theological metaphysics, for
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Levinas, the history of asking and answering this banal question in terms of causal pairs of causeeffect, creator-creature, giver-receiver, author-product, and so forth? If so, the il y a subsequent to
the preceding world cannot remain purely impersonal and anonymous since it is still entangled
with its author as the existent par excellence who might make the beginning or arche of the il y a.
On the other hand, these apocalyptic expressions disclose an authentic feature of the il y a
when they convey an etymological sense, “stripped of mythological overtones,”404 of apocalypse,
i.e., revealing, unveiling, or uncovering of the sheer fact of existing even before the advent of all
existents and their world—it is the uncovering of the precedent il y a that has been covered by the
subsequent world. In a genuine sense, the il y a does not refer to what follows after the destruction
of the world but rather to what precedes the transcendental or ontological construction of the world:
“it is antecedent to the world.”405 The aim of performing the imaginary-experiment is to strip off
all the ontological coverings in order to disclose the an-archic situation of the mere fact of the il y
a antecedent to the arche of Es gibt. Prior to the beginning of the world in which there is an author
who makes the very beginning, therefore, the anarchic dawn of the preceding il y a has neither the
Heideggerian Es that gives the il nor an ultimate origin, root, or arche from which everything else
appears; therefore, the imaginary-experiment Levinas attempts to design avoids metaphysical
questions that the thinking-experiment eventually could not avoid.
Unlike the Es of Es gibt that Heidegger deprives of its enigma by baptizing it with a
metaphysical source or ahistorical arche, the il of il y a preserves its anonymous enigma because
the il has no origin, cause, author, or arche that inaugurates its beginning. The arche of the
enigmatic il y a lies in its anarchy; it remains anarchic from the beginning so that it precedes all
beginning in which existents and their world come into being. This does not mean that there is
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“something” that precedes the beginning but that it is merely “there is” that has no beginning at
all: “The fact of existing imposes itself when there is no longer anything.”406 There is “there is”
beyond the end of Dasein’s Being or on the hither side of the totality of Being-in-the-world in
Heidegger’s distinctive sense. In the “there is,” there is nothing substantive that takes its existence
upon itself. When it comes to the Seinsfrage, Levinas, above all, does pay attention neither to the
way of something’s Being (Heidegger I) nor to what gives Being of something (Heidegger II), but
rather to the bare fact of being qua “there is” prior to “something,” into which Heidegger’s thinking
could not venture. Antecedent to the Heideggerian Es as the ahistorical arche that renders the
historicity of Being comprehensible, the Levinasian il lacks any arche to make sense of the very
il; thus, the anarchic enigma of the il y a stops Heidegger’s thinking and starts Levinas’s imagining.
What Levinas strives to imagine is not simply a literary, mythological, or apocalyptic destruction
of the world but the apocalyptic unveiling of the mere il y a whose anonymous, enigmatic, and
anarchic characteristics can be properly appreciated in contrast with the Kantian imagination and
the Heideggerian Es gibt.

2-3-2. Nothing: Heidegger
After imagining the destruction of all things, Levinas immediately asks: “Will we
encounter pure nothingness?”407 “But what of this nothingness itself?”408 The fact that there is no
longer anything means that there is nothing, that is, nothingness itself. What the nothingness
signifies is that there is nothing and nothing else: pure nothingness, which Levinas designates with
the il y a. After the return of all beings to nothingness or before the advent of all beings, what is
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still there is “there is,” pure nothingness, or “being [étre] in general,” which is neither derived from
nor grasped by any being [étant]. Levinas here seems to make a Hegelian gesture in the logical
consideration that pure being and pure nothing are the same. For Hegel, pure being is logically
thought to be pure nothing since they are the simplest categories that lack any distinction and
determination so that they are pure and empty in their immediacy: “Being, the indeterminate
immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.”409 The identity of being and
nothing entails or embraces a self-contradiction in the sense that being is being itself and, at the
same time, its own other, i.e., nothing. Formal logic simply dismisses this contradiction since it
does not deserve to be thought. However, the Hegelian logic based on the dialectical, conceptual,
and speculative thinking acknowledges that the truth of the identity of being and nothing does not
lie in the indeterminate immediacy but in the very contradiction, the ongoing impetus that negates,
transcends, and sublates this abstract immediacy. Due to the contradiction that does not allow both
being and nothing to leave in their abstract, immediate, or separate isolation, the thought of being
is thus logically in tandem with that of nothing.
The interplay of the first two categories, that is, being and nothing, stimulated by the
contradiction then requires a third category of “becoming,” a dialectical movement in which being
and nothing are distinguished from each other and dissolved into each other in the determinate
process of becoming: “Their truth is therefore this movement of the immediate vanishing of the
one into the other: becoming.”410 Hegel’s point is that pure being and pure nothing prove logically
to be the becoming, which Heidegger calls “the first being [das erste Seiende].”411 However, this
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does not mean that the indeterminate immediacy of being and nothing precedes or gives birth to
the determinate unity of the becoming as if the first Seiende came out of the antecedent Sein that
makes or creates it. Rather, the becoming of the being already embraces within itself pure being
and pure nothing as its own necessary moments to nourish, develop, and mature itself. For Hegel,
thus, the concept [Begriff] of being is not merely a substance in itself but the subject for itself in
that the concept is itself “what is alive,” that is, the spirit in the dialectical movement that posits
itself as it is (the moment of affirmation; the in-itself), differentiates itself from itself by actualizing
or determining itself in relation to the other (the moment of negation; the for-itself), and reconciles
its identity and its relation to the other (the moment of the negation of negation; the in-and-for
itself). Hegel’s peculiar concept of sublation [Aufhebung] illustrates this triadic structure of the
becoming movement in which the opposite categories of pure being and pure nothing negates their
abstract independence, isolation, or separation and thus become the indispensable moments of the
becoming of the being in the synthetic unity.
From the Hegelian perspective, Levinas’s concept of the il y a, allegedly described as pure
being or pure nothingness, is not the concept [Begriff] since it is merely presupposed without
further conceptualizing itself in and through the mediation of its other; hence, it remains abstract,
immediate, and empty. However, the essential point Levinas tries to make here is the very
indeterminate immediacy of the il y a even prior to pure being and pure nothing that “the first
being” takes as its own moments. Properly speaking, the il y a is prior to the binary distinction
between immediacy and mediation, indetermination and determination, abstraction and
concreteness, distinction and unity, and being and nothing; it would be the paradoxical concept
that resists all the logical categories to conceptualize, explicate, or describe it. When Levinas
speaks of the il y a in the names of pure being and pure nothingness, he never follows the Hegelian
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logic; contrarily, what these names intend to reveal is what remains anarchic and enigmatic to the
Hegelian logic—not to mention to formal or positivist logic: the anarchic and enigmatic il y a
antecedent to the synthetic unity of pure being and pure nothingness in the becoming of the being.
According to Heidegger’s reading of Hegel, the becoming of the first being is the
dialectical unity of Being and nothing so that the dialectical movement does not allow an abstract
separation—if not a difference—between Sein and (das erste) Seiende. In his reading of Hegel’s
Logic, what draws Heidegger’s critical attention is this “if not,” that is, the ontological difference
between Being and beings. In Hegel’s claim that there is no logical difference between being and
nothing, Heidegger recognizes that “what in Being and Time we called ‘ontological difference’
[Differenz]” or even “the all-grounding difference [Unterschied]” is still veiled in the sense that
“Being (in the broad sense) is conceived of with beings in mind, as the beingness [Seiendheit] of
beings.”412 By reducing or sublating indeterminate Being into a determinate beingness of beings
or into “the being that is most in being [das Seiendeste],”413 according to Heidegger, Hegel fails to
think of Sein as such; in other words, thinking for Hegel is the dialectical process of determining
beings, which provides the perspective within which pure Being and pure nothing are logically
thought. Due to its failure to think of Being or its oblivion of Being, Heidegger claims, “The Logic
too is still and indeed wants to be: metaphysics.”414
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Provided that the ontological difference remains obscure in the Hegelian logic, the main
target of Heidegger’s celebrated question “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”415 that
opens Introduction to Metaphysics and closes “What is Metaphysics?” is probably Hegel.
Nevertheless, it might be surprising that the beginning and the conclusion of Heidegger’s argument
seem to be basically Hegelian; in other words, Being and nothing are not beings so that they are
the same. However, Heidegger argues that Being and nothing belong together not because they are
indeterminate and immediate as Hegel holds, but because “Being itself is essentially finite and
manifests itself only in the transcendence of Dasein that is held out onto the nothing.” 416 For
Heidegger, Being—whether Sein or Seyn—is not a being and no thing; thus, Being is itself nothing, the nothing signifying the fact that the no-thingness of Being is differentiated from the beingness of beings. The nothing delimits [begrenzt] or circumscribes [eingrenzt] Being itself as a mode
of the no-thingness in which Being finds itself not as any being but as no-thing: “Being finds its
limit [Grenze] only at nothing.”417 In Being and Time, this limit of Being is exemplarily clarified
in anxiety that discloses the temporal finitude of Dasein in its authentic totality [Ganzheit]. For
Heidegger, anxiety allows Dasein access to the nothing which renders all beings indifferent,
meaningless, and irrelevant, by extracting Dasein from all relationships with beings, and then leads
it to its own, proper, or authentic Being. In anxiety, nothing alone matters to Dasein who,
accordingly, comprehends its authentic Being as temporal, historical, and finite; therefore, the
ontological constitution of Dasein as the temporal finitude depends on the dialectical interplay of
Being and nothing, as Levinas puts it: “The dialectic of Being and nothing continues to dominate
Heidegger’s ontology.”418
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However, the fact that anxiety arisen from nothing lets Dasein confront its authentic Being
by expelling all beings does not lead Heidegger to conceive of Being without beings.419 On the
contrary, the experience of anxiety makes sure that Being is the Being only in and through Dasein
as “the exemplary being [das exemplarische Seiende]”420 who faces the nothing as the possibility
of the impossibility of its existence; thus, the nothing allows Dasein and Being to come to their
own in such a way that Being is always the Being of Dasein. It is the Being of Dasein that amounts
to the ontological difference, which Hegel fails to recognize when he interprets Being as a (first)
being, that is, as the becoming of a being. Prior to the relation between Being and beings depicted
by either “as” (Hegel) or “of” (Heidegger) in terms of the dialectic of Being and nothing, Levinas
attempts to imagine being [être] without beings [étants] or pure existence, since Being and nothing
are merely “the phases of a more general state of existence,”421 which cannot be constituted by
either Being or nothing. When Levinas asks “But what of this nothingness itself?” his answer
should not be found in the dialectical interplay of Being and nothing, which works in and through
a substantive being—whether it is the becoming as the first being (Hegel) or Dasein as the
exemplary being (Heidegger). Rather, Levinas’s answer lies elsewhere than Being as/of beings; it
is existence without existents, i.e., the anonymous il y a as being in general devoid of any
substantive connotation that remains indifferent and antecedent to the ontological difference.

2-3-3. Negation: Hegel
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Strictly speaking, what Levinas imagines by means of the imaginary-experiment is not the
il y a as such, but the return [retour] of it: “The absence of everything returns as a presence.”422
The re-turn of the il y a explains why the il y a is not the outcome of the destruction of all beings;
indeed, there is already “there is” in its return, as Levinas maintains, “the event of being…returns
in the heart of every negation.”423 However, it is not the Hegelian return of the absolute being that
negates its determinations in the self-differentiation and returns to itself in the self-reconciliation.
For Hegel, negation is not simply the “abstract negation,”424 that is, the complete destruction or
removal of all determinations which entails the mere fact that pure being is tantamount to pure
nothing in the indeterminate immediacy. Rather, it is the “absolute negation”425 that includes the
affirming process by negating what is negated in the self-returning. In a spiritual, speculative,
dialectical, or conceptual [begrifflich] sense, negativity instigates the self-recovering movement
where all that is negated is preserved as sublated moments in the self-reconciliation; thus, it is “the
innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement,”426 which takes all these
determinations and distinctions as the necessary moments for the self-development. The Hegelian
negation as the negation of the negation is the subjective, not simply substantive, work in and for
itself that Levinas characterizes as the bourgeois identification of being. However, Levinas argues:
“The negation that would be absolute through negating all existents—even the existent who is the
effectual thought of this very negation—cannot put an end to the ‘scene’ always opened to being,
to being in a verbal sense.”427 The return of the il y a is not the outcome of the Hegelian negation,
always involved in the subjective movement; rather, it merely returns as the pure being in general
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on the hither side of all negations that might commence and terminate the scene of being, as
Levinas states, “Existing returns no matter with what negation one dismisses it.”428 Therefore,
what the return of the il y a signifies is the anarchical fact that being in general ceaselessly re-turns
beyond the reach of all-encompassing, substantive, or subjective power of negativity.

2-4. Anarchic Experience of Il y a
When there is nothing, there is still there is; the il y a returns—“whatever be the power of
negation applied to itself.”429 When it comes to the return of the il y a that dissolves all beings,
Levinas comes to face the fundamental limit of phenomenology because there is nothing in terms
of experience; in other words, there is neither something that is experienced nor anyone who
experiences. However, what Levinas attempts to describe through the imaginary-experiment is not
“something” that belongs to “anyone”; it is not lived experience [Erlebnis] of what presents itself
in cognitive processes430 but rather what this lived experience covers up, the anarchic experience
of the il y a. This is what Levinas later calls in Totality and Infinity a “forgotten experience.”431
The impersonal, neutral, and anonymous experience of the il y a remains inarticulate because it is
covered, hidden, and forgotten by the Erlebnis. The primordiality of the anarchic experience of the
il y a is dissimulated by the phenomenological, ontological constitution structured by “the subjectobject distinction by which we approach existents,”432 such as the cognitive distinction between
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noema and noesis or the ontological difference between Being and beings. The return of the il y a
is not a mere phenomenon that appears to consciousness, reflection, or thinking but a sort of a
para-phenomenon that transcendental phenomenology and fundamental ontology readily forget.
The para-phenomenality of the il y a provides a minimum or anarchic economy of being which
preserves the primordiality of the forgotten experience of the il y a from the phenomenological,
ontological coverings of the lived experience.
Probably, Levinas undergoes a sort of the forgotten experience of the il y a that remains
“never forgotten.” In the unforgettable moments during the internment camp that throws him into
the barest, bleakest, and darkest situation with no exit, no hope, and no light, Levinas goes through
or endures the tragic experience of the nocturnal being immobilized as the imprisonment,
confinement, bondage, and detention, from which he could not escape. The forgotten experience
Levinas never forgets is the horror of captivity in being: “the fatality of irremissibility of being.”433
In the prison notebooks posthumously edited and published as Œuvres complétes tome I: Carnets
de captivité et autres inédits (2009), Levinas sporadically sketches this forgotten experience of the
il y a in terms of the night of being: “Il y a = night of being, etc.”434; “The sense of a nightmare.
Immobile reality—absolute stranger. Night in broad daylight.”435; “In the black white vision—
being is black. The absence of light—being.” 436 Such initial, private, and existential—not
existentialist—reflections from the early notebooks prepare the way for the philosophical
meditation on the “night of being” in Existence and Existents and Time and Other.
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The forgotten experience of the il y a is not an experience of light, which already implies
a subject-object distinction, i.e., the distinction between that which illuminates and something that
is illuminated. In the light, all beings take their own forms, through which they are given and
become comprehensible: “That is the complete concept of form. A form is that by which a thing
shows itself and is graspable, what is illuminated in it and apprehendable and what holds it
together.”437 The light is then a phenomenological condition for all beings and their meanings since
it illuminates and makes sense of them; thus, the experience of the light belongs to the diurnal
realms of comprehension, intelligibility, luminosity, and meaningfulness. For Levinas, however,
the luminosity of the light sheds light on the surfaces of all beings to make them intelligible, visible,
and graspable according to their forms while veiling, concealing, or covering up the originary
event of being and so rendering it nocturnal, clandestine, and forgotten. Then, the pure nakedness
of being as the il y a resides not in the diurnal space in which all beings obtain their forms but in
the nocturnal space, i.e., the night where all the forms of beings are deformed. When all forms are
dissolved in the night, the darkness of the night invades as the formless, anonymous, and enigmatic
il y a, which evades the seamless inspection of the light; the nocturnality of the il y a remains
impervious to the luminosity of the light.
The forgotten experience of the il y a is the anonymous experience of the night, as Levinas
states: “the night is the very experience of the il y a, if the term experience were not inapplicable
to a situation which involves the total exclusion of light.”438 However, it is not “the night,” Hegel
says, “in which all cows are black,”439 which expresses his refutation of both Kant’s skepticism
and Shelling’s naivety with regard to the absolute knowledge. For Hegel, the absolute is neither
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simply impossible nor immediately posited in the intuition or feeling; rather, it is the ongoing
product of the spirit in the dialectical process of self-positing, self-differentiating, and selfreconciliating. Hegel’s position here can be summed up as follows: “everything turns on grasping
and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.”440 However, what Levinas
means by the night is more radical—or more skeptical than Kant and more naïve than Schelling—
in the sense that there is no longer substance, subject, or even any cow in it. It is in the other night
that Blanchot sees “one of Levinas’s most fascinating propositions,”441 that is, the il y a. When
everything disappears in the “first night,” according to Blanchot, the fact that “everything
disappears” appears in the “other night.”442 The appearance of the disappearance does not mean
the presence of presence containing all the forms, which refers back to the luminosity of the light,
but the presence without presence, with no form and no light. What disappears in the first night reappears and re-turns in the other night—it is the formless and nocturnal il y a where everything
disappears, and the disappearance appears. The il y a never completely disappears—for it is not a
thing—but continuously returns as the presence of absence or the presence without presence. When
the anarchic experience of the il y a vanishes into the bright darkness of the first night, this
forgotten experience re-emerges from the obscure darkness of the other night.
The nocturnal il y a returns not as the Heideggerian Es gibt, which is the generous, giving,
and so substantively metaphysical source, but rather as the formless, chaotic, anarchic, and
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“anonymous rumbling of existence,”443 that is, “the impersonal field of forces of existing.”444 In
this context, the forgotten experience of the night hovers on the edge of phenomenology since any
illuminating attempt to make sense of it veils, conceals, and covers up the nocturnal space of the
anonymous il y a. The nocturnal return of the il y a does not coincide with the phenomenological
movement toward “the return to the things themselves,” since the formless, nocturnal il y a never
returns in such a way that it simply hands itself to the panoramic vision of the light; rather, the
return of the il y a shakes, disrupts, and overflows the phenomenological light. The nocturnal
formlessness of the il y a discloses “this paradoxical existence” in the sense that it returns neither
as a phenomenon transparently present to the panoramic scene nor as a non-phenomenon
completely absent from this scene: “It is like a density of the void, like a murmur of silence. There
is nothing, but there is being.”445 The paradoxical feature of the il y a characterizes the paraphenomenality of being that cannot be exhaustedly described by the formal, dualist categories of
presence and absence, being and nothing, phenomenon and noumenon, and so forth.

3. Anarchy of Il y a and the Non-modality of Death
3-1. Shakespearean Meditation: Ontology or Hauntology?
At the moment in which Levinas encounters the limits of an ortho-dox phenomenology
that cannot properly capture the para-phenomenality of the il y a and so fails to describe the anarchic experience, Levinas returns to literature, especially that of Shakespeare, where he discovers
some literary ingredients that nourish and enrich the philosophical formulation of the il y a. Levinas
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even says in the 1946-47 lectures, “But it sometimes seems to me that the whole of philosophy is
only a meditation of Shakespeare.” 446 Levinas’s declaration deliberately recalls the famous
Meditations on First Philosophy by Descartes (1596-1650) who is roughly contemporary with
Shakespeare (1564-1616). Levinas attempts to situate philosophy within the literary context of
Shakespeare by calling into question the conception of the whole or bourgeois philosophy. For
Levinas, the whole philosophy begins with ontology as “first philosophy,” which flourishes in
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in Being and Time and then culminates in On Time and Being
where he delves further into the Es gibt as Ereignis underlying—or undermining—the fundamental
ontology. In this vein, Cohen identifies “the greatest originality of Levinas’s new conception of
philosophy” 447 in his claim that philosophy is a mediation of/on Shakespeare rather than a
meditation of/on Plato, Descartes, or Heidegger. As Shakespeare’s Hamlet speaks to his friend
Horatio who represents a rational scholar or philosopher, “There are more things in heaven and
earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”448 Inspired by Shakespeare—if not by
Levinas’s reading of Shakespeare—Derrida in Specters of Marx (1993) points out the typical facet
of this rational scholar who lacks a literary taste regarding ghostly features: “There has never been
a scholar who really, and as a scholar, deals with ghosts…[and] does not believe in the sharp
distinction between the real and the unreal, the actual and inactual, the living and the non-living,
being and non-being (‘to be or not to be’ in the conventional reading).”449 For Levinas, and as for
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Derrida, Horatio’s philosophy, representing the whole or bourgeois philosophy, fails to account for
something spectral that disrupts, blurs, and threatens the borderlines of these sharp distinctions. It
is in the paradoxical or in-between feature of the ghostly characters played in Shakespeare’s
tragedies that Levinas finds a philosophical significance, which leads him to retrieve the forgotten
experience of the il y a from the bourgeois philosophy.
In a genuine sense, for Levinas, philosophy awakened by the Shakespearean meditation
begins with what the whole philosophy has managed to exorcise or what Derrida calls “a logic of
the ghost” or “hauntology,”450 which has been expelled from the philosophical domain. The history
of the whole philosophy is the history of exorcism for the sake of identifying, determining, and
grasping everything according to the ontological mode of whether it is presence or absence, being
or nothing, life or death, and so forth. The business of ontology qua the first philosophy is to
exorcize hauntology so that it cannot capture the “in-between” modes of the ghost that haunts
between here and there, now and then, being and nothing, presence and absence, life and death,
and heaven and earth, as Derrida states: “Ontology opposes hauntology only in a movement of
exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration.”451 However, hauntology does not assert any proper place
within ontology by robbing it of its own topos but takes place on the hither side of its bourgeois,
authentic, and illuminated topos by rendering its preoccupation with exorcism ridiculous and futile.
Just as the ghost enters and exits, comes and goes, again and again in the darkness of the night—
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“Enter the Ghost, Exit the Ghost, Enter the Ghost, as before”452—hauntology irremissibly returns
on the hither side of ontology and shakes, dethrones, and threatens its unconquerable topos. The
Shakespearean meditation re-conjures up the ambiguous, nocturnal figures of ghosts, phantoms,
and specters that have been conjured away by the illuminating exorcism of the whole philosophy.
The originary experience of the il y a obscured by philosophy’s continuing preoccupation with
ontology can re-emerge with the retrieval of what the whole philosophy exorcizes; thus, the
Shakespearean mediation departs from ontology and begins with hauntology. For Levinas, one of
the great achievements of Shakespeare’s literature is to provide an opportunity to remove the bright
rays of the light, which have veiled the anarchic experience of the nocturnal il y a, and thereby to
lay bare this forgotten existence by means of deploying the literary instruments of the ghostly
characters.
However, Levinas would not be concerned with haunto-logy itself since it can be involved
in a self-defeating gesture. Indeed, ghosts are not something to be logicalized, rationalized, or
thematized; ironically, the logic of ghosts consists in the fact that they always exceed and betray
that very logic. Unlike Derrida’s central project in Specters of Marxism, Levinas’s primary
concern—at least in his early works, such as Existence and Existents and Time and the Other—is
neither with “the political,” “the economical,” nor “the technical”453 regarding the spectrality of
the ghosts by virtue of thematizing, theorizing, and objectifying them; instead, his focus is on why
every theoria necessarily fails to speculate, penetrate into, or see through the nocturnal spectrality
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of the ghosts that repeatedly slips into and away from the luminosity of the light. Levinas would
ward off any theoria about the ghosts since it readily falls into the temptation to make sure of and
make sense of them through shedding light on them; it would then entail a certain dogmatism into
which hauntology also might lapse. Indeed, on the hither side of a certain and meaningful topos in
broad daylight, the ghosts return with the obscure, chaotic, and meaningless darkness of the night.
All theoriae about the ghosts are already exposed to an ineluctable danger of a dogmatic exorcism
that drives them into the luminous realm of the light and, at last, deprives them of the very
spectrality. This dogmatic danger might be detected in the “hypothesis” of Specters of Marxism
when Critchley argues that hauntology is the transcendental “condition of possibility for ontology”
and so has “theoretical priority” over ontology.454
The hypothetical significance of hauntology in Specters of Marxism is centered in the
haunted subjectivity that the presence of every ego—such as the Cartesian ego, the Kantian “I
think,” the phenomenological ego, Dasein, and so on—is already invaded and haunted by the
spectrality of the ghost. Derrida notes, “Ego [Moi] = ghost [fantôme]. Therefore, ‘I am’ would
mean ‘I am haunted’”455; thus, the essential consequence of hauntology can be expressed as “I am
haunted, therefore I am.” However, Levinas conceives of the impersonal il y a which precedes the
advent of “I,” of “I am,” or even of “I am haunted”—not to mention all above-mentioned egos.
Nevertheless, Derrida’s initial motifs for hauntology are basically resonant with the “principal
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theme” of Existence and Existents in which Levinas elaborates on the nocturnal, impersonal, and
forgotten experience of the il y a: “But of itself Being refuses the personal form, how then are we
to approach it?”456 Levinas attempts to find a possible answer to this question in the literary motif
of the spectral or would-be [prétendu] characters, such as witches, shadows, bubbles, and ghosts
that are prevalent in Shakespeare’s tragedies. The spectral experience of the il y a already
anticipates an experience of the “Es spukt” presented in Specters of Marxism. Derrida writes:
The German idiom [Es spukt] seems to name the ghostly return, but it names it in a verbal
form. The latter does not say that there is some revenant, specter, or ghost; it does not say
that there is some apparition, der Spuk, nor even that it appears, but that “it ghosts,” “it
apparitions.” It is a matter, in the neutrality of this altogether impersonal verbal form, of
neither someone nor something—whatever it is something or someone, of a [neutral] “one”
that does not act.457
It is clear from this passage that the experience of the Es spukt shares the impersonal, neutral, and
indefinite character, that is, “the impersonal ghostly returning of the ‘es spukt’” 458 with the
anarchic experience of the return of the il y a. The nocturnal, formless, and anonymous il y a
returns, invades, or haunts like a ghost, which is neither a being nor non-being. From the
phenomenological perspective, it haunts beyond the distinction of a phenomenon and a nonphenomenon, of a presence and a non-presence, of an appearance and a non-appearance; it
ceaselessly reappears at the limit of phenomenality by disrupting those binary distinctions. The
456
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ghostly figure never takes its own, lightened, or authentic [eigentilch] place since it has no proper
place to take at all. In other words, it does not take this or that topos where it finds its secure place
to stay; nor does it take place in a sort of utopia [ou-topos] where it never finds any place to take;
rather, it comes and goes on the hither side of topos proper which is still there but remains
clandestine, unidentifiable, and indefinite. Properly speaking, it takes every topos without dwelling
in it in such a way that it may [peut-être] waver, linger, vacillate, and sur-vive [sur-vivre] the inbetweens of presence and absence, being and nothing, here and there, and life and death by
interrupting and crossing over the sharp borderlines; then, it perhaps [peut-être] is (present and yet
absent) and, simultaneously, is not (present and yet absent). The mode of the peut-être between
être and néant provokes an ontological question to pinpoint its topos, as the tragedy of Hamlet
begins with the celebrated question raised by a watchman, Barnardo, who is in charge of
identifying anyone/anything that appears to take topos: “Who’s there?” 459 However, Barnardo
could not have his question answered, since what approaches him is neither something nor
someone that takes any determinate, definite place. What takes place here, there, and everywhere
is the ghost of Hamlet’s father that paradoxically in no way takes any place; there is no topos
proper to the ghost. The proper topology of the ghost consists in the fact that there is no spectral
topos proper; therefore, the spectral topology undermines the ontological constitution of topos that
the whole philosophy seeks to establish in various ways.

3-2. Horror of Being Not Dead Enough
In the prison notebooks, Levinas already touches upon some paradoxical, ambiguous, or
equivocal figures that play the ghostly role in Shakespeare’s tragedies: “Shakespearean tragedy is
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above all the contact of human and nothing, of nothing in its equivocation, in its diabolic form: the
lie (The Lear King, Othello), the equivocation of the witches (Macbeth), the phantoms
(Hamlet).”460 The ghostly figure is neither living nor dead; it is not dead enough to be thought as
death while not living enough to be thought as life—less than living and more than dead. It is
neither present nor absent; it is not present enough to be thought as presence while not absent
enough to be thought as absence—less than present and more than absent. It is, therefore, neither
being enough to be thought as Sein nor non-being enough to be thought as Nichts; at the limit of
the Seinsdenken, paradoxically, it haunts as the living dead or the absent presence. The peculiar
characteristic of the ghostly character consists in “the insinuation of nothing in being (or being in
nothing),” i.e., the spectral equivocality of being and nothing; Levinas thus states, “Shakespeare
is the fabricator of nothing…who gives the appearances of being to nothing.”461 It is the character
Hamlet that suffers from the ghostly figure, the ghost of his father who is neither dead enough nor
living enough, neither present enough nor absent enough, but only ceaselessly returns on the hither
side of the dialectical interplay between a being and non-being, presence and absence, and Sein
and Nichts like the incessant return of the presence of absence, of existence without any existent,
of the anonymous il y a, and of the irremissible being [être] without any being [étant].
In Macbeth, the equivocal trait of the il y a insusceptible to the dialectic of being and
nothing becomes more palpable in terms of the spectral topos. The ghostly figures here appear on
and disappear from the stage in the guises of bubbles, shadows, or witches that vanish after
delivering the prophetic message to Banquo and Macbeth.
Macbeth
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Banquo
Macbeth

With such prophetic greeting. Speak, I charge you.
[The] WITCHES vanish
The earth hath bubbles, as the water has,
And these are of them. Whither are they vanished?
Into the air, and what seemed corporal
Melted as breath into the wind. Would they had stayed? 462

The bubbles metaphorically refer to the ghostly figures of the witches who might be here, there, or
anywhere, but not as beings or existents taking their own topoi. Just as the bubbles in the water
neither belong to the water nor take their topoi within it into which they could in turn be condensed
or liquefied and so lose their “bubbleness,” the ghostly figures in the earth neither belong to the
earth nor take their topoi within it where they would find their own place to dwell and so to be
fully buried and totally dead. When it comes to the ghostly figures, paradoxically, to take their
proper place means to be fully buried in the proper place which does no longer allow their return,
and thereby which deprives them of their spectrality by reducing, solidifying, and ossifying it into
the proper place where they are properly buried with the proper funeral rite. 463 As the above
conversation between Banquo and Macbeth shows, however, they still doubt where the witches
were (here, there, or anywhere); they even wonder whether the witches are now (present or absent).
Shakespeare remarkably writes here in italics “The WITCHES vanish” rather than “Exit the
witches,” as he would normally do; the witches do not simply exit or leave the stage but cryptically
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vanish without leaving any clue for their whereabouts. Banquo and Macbeth suffer from the
besetting question of identifying the ghostly topoi which expect the unexpected return of the
witches at any moment at any place. It is a baffling problem that comes from the spectral
equivocality on the hither side of the dialectic of being and nothing, presence and absence, and life
and death.
Macbeth’s suffering from the spectral equivocality culminates in the horrifying experience
of the formless apparition of Banquo’s ghost.
Macbeth

What man dare, I dare.
Approach thou like the ruggèd Russian bear,
The armed rhinoceros, or th’Hyrcan tiger;
Take any shape but that, and my firm nerves.
Shall never tremble. Or be alive again,
And dare me to the desert with thy sword.
If trembling I inhabit then, protest me
The baby of a girl. Hence, horrible shadow,
Unreal mock’ry, hence!464

On Macbeth’s soliloquy, Levinas observes that “the horror does not come from the danger,”465
which might threaten to kill Macbeth. That is to say, Macbeth is not horrified by something that
takes form, such as a man, Russian bear, rhinoceros, or tiger, against which he is willing to face
with no fear; rather, what horrifies him is that which does not take any form, i.e., the “horrible
shadow” of Banquo’s ghost: “Take any shape but that [Banquo’s].” It is the formless shadow or
“the shadow of being that horrifies Macbeth; being is profiled in nothing.”466 Even during the day
under the sun, Banquo’s ghost returns as the formless shadow in the insinuation of being in
nothing—it is the spectral experience of the “Night in full daylight”467 or, to use Blanchot’s term,
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of the other night. Beyond the reach of the luminous flux of the light, the ghostly return of
Banquo’s shadow that ceaselessly chases Macbeth alludes to the horrible experience of the
formless, anonymous, and nocturnal il y a. In this regard, the ghostly shadow is one of the “fissures”
through which Levinas attempts to seek “a decisive experience of the ‘no exit’ from existence.”468
The fissure of the spectral shadow that the light in no way fills up with its scintillating rays is the
horrible topos in which the perpetual drama of the impersonal, anonymous being with no exit takes
place. The fissures of the nocturnal figures, such as the witches, bubbles, shadows, and ghosts,
impervious to the luminosity of the light, disclose the fundamental feature of the Shakespearean
tragedy: “the fatality of irremissible being.”469 This is where the significance of the Shakespearean
meditation for Levinas’s philosophical consideration of the il y a comes in, as Levinas states:
The horror of the night, as an experience of the there is, does not reveal to us a danger of
death, nor even a danger of pain. That is what is essential in this analysis. The pure nothing
revealed by anxiety in Heidegger’s analysis does not constitute the there is. There is horror
of being and not anxiety over nothing, fear of being and not fear for being470; there is being
prey to, delivered to something that is not a “something.” When night is dissipated with the
first rays of the sun, the horror of the night is no longer definable. The “something” appears
to be “nothing.” Horror carries out the condemnation to perpetual reality, to existence with
“no exit.”471
In this crucial passage, Levinas does not simply oppose the fear of being to the fear for being—in
a Heideggerian sense of the term, the horror of being [être] to the anxiety [Angst] for Being [Sein].
What Levinas intends to show here is the primordial or anarchical fact that there is the horror of
being even prior to the anxiety for Being. According to Heidegger, anxiety brings Dasein to the
pure nothingness of its existence in which it finds its most authentic Being: “So if what anxiety is
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about exposes the nothing—that is, the world as such—this means that that about which anxiety
is anxious is Being-in-the-world itself.” 472 In the confrontation with the nothingness in which
Dasein is individualized by turning away from its everyday involvement in the innerworldly
objects and in the mundane world, Dasein is anxious about its own Being as Being-in-the-world.
At the bottom of the pure nothingness, the anxiety for Being thus becomes explicit in the mineness
[Jemeinigkeit]; existence exclusively belongs to Dasein by extracting itself from the anonymous
they [das Man]. However, Levinas attempts to reveal what underlies Dasein’s understanding of its
Being as Being-in-the-world—it is being, pure existing, existence without existents, or the il y a
before the advent of Dasein and its world, that is, of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world: “Existence is
not synonymous with the relationship with a world; it is antecedent to the world.” 473 Prior to
anxiety that individualizes Dasein in its own Being, there is the horror of an impersonal or
anonymous being, of “immortality, perpetuity of the drama of existence, necessity of forever taking
on its burden.”474 As Macbeth’s horrifying experience of the ghostly figures indicates, the horror
of the il y a does not come from a danger of death but rather from the fatal tragedy of the perpetual
burden of existence with no exit; therefore, it is the horror of not being dead enough.

3-3. “Tomorrow, Alas! Existence Will Have to Go on.”
It is the horror of being that the pure fact of existing appears as the irremissible burden
without exit, issue, evasion, or end. What primordially horrifies is no longer death as an end [Ende],
which can delimit or enclose [begrenzen] the totality [Ganszheit] of Dasein, as Heidegger states:
“Death is, after all, only the ‘end’ of Dasein, and formally speaking, it is just one of the ends that
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embraces the totality of Dasein. But the other ‘end’ is the ‘beginning,’ ‘birth.’ Only the being
‘between’ birth and death presents the total [Ganze] we are looking for.” 475 Heidegger’s
ontological interpretation of death concerns neither not-yet-being-there (before Dasein’s birth) nor
no-longer-being-there (after its death) but only the being-there [Da-sein] between two ends, i.e.,
its birth and death, which circumscribes the totality of Dasein. When it comes to the ontological
analysis of Dasein, death is itself appropriated into a “phenomenon of life” 476 that Dasein
understands as the most authentic [eigenste], non-relational [unbezügliche], insuperable
[unüberholbare], indefinite [unbestimmte], and certain [gewisse] possibility.477 By reducing death
into a phenomenon of life, for Levinas, Heidegger’s ontological treatment of death is a certain way
out of the irremissible burden of being. The ontological analysis of death that circumscribes the
totality of Dasein seems to circumvent the perplexing problem of death itself since it is concerned
only with the way of Dasein’s Being—the being-there—rather than with death per se.
What the horrifying experience of the il y a discloses is that death is not a mere
phenomenon that Dasein can [kann] understand [verstehen], embrace [umfassen], and grasp
[ergreifen] as its most authentic “possibility of the impossibility of existence,”478 but rather a paraphenomenon that overflows Dasein’s understanding, grasping, and comprehension. It is the
limitless [unendlich] situation where any possibility, including Dasein’s own death as the
possibility par excellence, is no longer assumed. Does not Levinas’s peculiar concept of the il y a
describe this limitlessness of the anarchic situation where there is neither beginning nor end,
neither arche nor telos? In the anarchic il y a, there is no possibility of the impossibility of existence
but only the irremissible persistence of the formless, impersonal, and anonymous existence that
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cannot be applied to modalities, such as possibility, contingency, and necessity, all of which are
appropriate to describe a particular mode in which “something” exists. At the stage of the il y a,
death can be attributed neither to possibility nor impossibility since there is nothing and nothing
else.
Levinas finds in Phaedra’s cry the non-modality of death, to which neither possibility nor
impossibility can be applied. Phaedra’s suffering from the inescapable burden of existence that
even death cannot dissolve is epitomized in her destiny condemned to take the endless [unendlich],
unlimited [unbegrenzt], and irremissible responsibility for being, which will survive [sruvivre] or
outlive [überleben] the totality of her Being as Being-toward-death. Phaedra’s tragic destiny
signifies that “death is thus never assumed.”479
The sky, the whole universe is full of my forefathers
Where may I hide? Flee to infernal night.
How? There my father holds the urn of doom.
Destiny placed in his ruthless hands.480
Phaedra recognizes that her personal existence is already committed to participating in the entire
universe where her forefathers grip her own destiny with their ruthless hands, which allow “an
existence no longer in any way private.”481 In doing so, Phaedra’s own existence loses “this private
character and returns to an undifferentiated background,”482 to pure existence, or to the anonymous
il y a; there is no longer topos for a personal, private, or jemeinig existence. These lines show that
Phaedra is not anxious about death as the possibility of the impossibility of her own existence but
horrified by the unassumability of death through breaking free from the perpetual, anonymous
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existence: “Tomorrow, alas! One will still have to live.” 483 What horrifies Phaedra is no longer the
finite destiny of her own existence—in Heidegger’s language, “the possibility of no-longer-beingable-to-be-there [Nicht-mehre-dasein-könnens]”484—but rather the fatal destiny of still-have-to-be
beyond the totality of her authentic Being. Phaedra’s cry displays that the horror of being outlives
the anxiety for Being; she has to live on, and hence (her) being will last beyond even (her own)
death. Death is no longer a solution to the burdensome existence; it is not a door to get out of being.
Already in his prison notebooks, Levinas writes, “death is not as strong as being. Even if it finishes
being, it does not exhaust all that being has done.”485 In no way does death do away with what
being has done and will do, that is, the irremissible persistence of the il y a.
No longer does Hamlet’s famous question of “to be or not to be”486 matter; indeed, it cannot
be resolved from the outset because it is not a matter of an either/or question. What matters here
is the anarchical fact that being has no exit since it has neither beginning that might begin being
nor end that could finish being. The beginning of being precedes all beginnings while its end
outlasts all ends; thus, the arche of being lies in in its anarchy. The anarchic dawn of Levinas’s
conception of being consists in the mere fact that there is (prior to Sein and even to the Es that
gives Sein); in order words, on the hither side of the totality of Being, there is still “there is.” This
does not mean that the Levinasian il y a simply embraces the Heideggerian Sein. Rather, what the
anarchic arche of the il y a signifies is that “there is” elsewhere than Sein, which cannot be
subordinated, absorbed, or totalized into Being. It is the Shakespearean meditation that awakens
the whole philosophy to the most brutal and anarchical dimension of being on the hither side of
what has been called Sein. The Shakespearean meditation leads Levinas to pay attention to the
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tragic and horrible fact that être has no exit so that it still has to go on. Prior to the “to be or not to
be” question, the fundamental question lies in the horror of the irremissible être that constitutes
“the final depths of Shakespearean tragedy.”487 Consequently, Levinas’s own meditation on the
Shakespearean mediation disrupts Heidegger’s ontological view of death and thereby prepares the
way for his extended elaboration on the ethical meaning of death, on which the next chapter will
further amplify.
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Chapter IV
Duo prior to Solo: The Paradox of Phenomenology of Death

The foregoing chapter has examined Levinas’s early consideration of the il y a against the
backdrop of Heidegger’s concept of the Es gibt in order to disclose a sheer dimension of être
without any étant, which has been covered up by the ontological layers of Sein. Whereas the
Heideggerian Sein is always already thought in terms of Seiendes and Dasein in particular, the
Levinasian être conveys the purely verbal sense of “to be” with no reference to a substantive étant,
which Levinas designates as the il y a, that is, existence without existents. It is the brutal nakedness
of the il y a that underlies and, simultaneously, undermines the ongoing complicity of Being and
beings, elaborated in terms of Differenz in the Heidegger I and of Unterschied, Ereignis, Kehre,
Austrag, or Es gibt in the II. In his initial treatment of the il y a, Levinas struggles with the difficulty
of articulating death since there is “there is” and nothing else; thus, death cannot be described by
employing any modalities, which describe a mode of “something” that exists, i.e., a Seiende or an
étant. In this regard, the early Levinas does not accept Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of
death as the impossible possibility of existence, which presupposes Dasein who exists in the world
and, accordingly, determines its mode of Being toward its own end. As seen in the foregoing
chapter, instead, Levinas takes advantage of the literary works—especially those of Shakespeare—
which provide him with the way of thinking—or more exactly, imagining—the pure depth of being
without beings with regard to death. With the literary benefit of the Shakespearean meditation on
the ghostly figures which ceaselessly return like the formless, anonymous, and anarchic il y a,
Levinas recognizes that death cannot be an evasion or escape from the il y a, an exit, which might
offer an answer to the “to be or not to be” question. In no way can death be any mythological,
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theological, or metaphysical solution to that question. The Shakespearean insight leads the early
Levinas to conclude that death is never assumable in the pure existence without existents; existence
never dies, but only the existents do.
This chapter will take into consideration the fundamental transition from existence to
existents, as the original title of Levinas’s early work De l'existence à l'existant intimates. If
Chapter Three deals with the former part, “From Existence” without the existents, this chapter
takes account of the latter, “to Existents” out of existence, with a focus on his conception of
hypostasis, that is, the advent of the existent emerging from existence. In the hypostasis, which is
further developed into a separate, independent, or atheistic subject in his mature work Totality and
Infinity (1961), the problem of death comes to the fore in opposition to Heidegger’s ontological
analysis of death. As seen in Chapter Two, Heidegger characterizes death as the most authentic
[eigenste], non-relational [unbezügliche], insuperable [unüberholbare], indefinite [unbestimmte],
and certain [gewisse] possibility488; thus, death is the ontological locus where Dasein grasps its
authentic [eigentlich] Being as a whole [Ganzheit]. For Levinas, however, is it not the case that
the heroism, sovereignty, or mastery of Dasein culminates in the ontological understanding of
death as the possibility par excellence, which individualizes Dasein to the point of confronting its
own Being out of its having fallen in with the anonymous they [das Man]? Is there any relation in
this authentic totality where the bourgeois identity of the moi and the soi is exemplarily achieved,
and where all relations with something other than itself collapse? Is this self-relation a relation in
a genuine sense? Finally, is death always already a matter of mineness [Jemeinigkeit] as if it were
mine [meine]? All these questions urge Levinas to seek to look at elsewhere than the ontological
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locus as death, which allows him to conceive of an ethical relation between beings prior to the
reference of Being.
This chapter will claim that in death, Levinas recognizes an elsewhere than the ontological
topos; in other words, death is the enigmatic locus of the alterity of the other. The significance of
the theme of death for Levinas becomes obvious in his attempt to find a genuine relation in the
para-phenomenon of death. For Levinas, death is not a mere phenomenon that can be transparently
understood as the possibility of impossibility, by which a relation between the moi and the soi is
reduced to the self-identity. Rather, death appears as the para-phenomenon that overflows all
understanding, comprehension, and identification and thereby that interrupts the bourgeois identity
of the moi and the soi. The para-phenomenon of death sustains a distance, interval, proximity,
separation, or transcendence that “[unties] the tie between the moi and the soi,”489 which will be
expanded into the ethical relationship between the same and the other in Totality and Infinity. This
chapter will show that it is in the enigma of death that Levinas discovers the radical alterity of the
other, by which the ethical relationship between the same and the other is concretized without
relapsing into the self-enclosed identity.

1. Hypostasis: The Advent of the Solo out of Zero
Before considering the way in which an existent or a substantive being [étant] emerges
from existence or the pure verbal being [être], it is important to note that little attention has been
given to the problem of why hypostasis, or an ontological transformation from existence to an
existent, takes place. This problem seems to have to do with the theological doctrines of creation,
which account for or justify the various ways of the coming forth of all beings from God as an

489

TO, 62; TA, 44 (translation modified).

164

arche and, simultaneously, of their return to God as a telos. The theological doctrines of creation
refer to the divine providence, which explains the ultimate dependence of the entire creature upon
the Creator. Levinas rigorously rejects any onto-theological account of creation and plainly
confesses: “Obviously I will not be able to explain why this [hypostasis] takes place. There is no
physics in metaphysics.”490 As seen in Chapter Three, Levinas avoids a why-question precisely
because it is based on a metaphysical or ontotheological idea which seeks a cause, origin, or arche
to make sense of why all beings come into being and thereby explains away the primordial enigma
of the anarchical il y a. The beginning of the hypostatic act, by which an existent accomplishes its
existence, has nothing to do with any ontotheological narratives of creation. Rather, its beginning
lies in its enigmatic anarchy that has no metaphysical source, which might account for “why.” The
only thing that Levinas can do here is, he immediately adds, “to show what the significance of
hypostasis is.”491 When it comes to hypostasis or the birth of an existent out of existence, Levinas
does not offer any genetic, theological, or ontological explanation but rather a phenomenological
account, which discloses the significance of hypostasis against the background of Heidegger’s
peculiar notion of ekstasis. This section will demonstrate that the significance of hypostasis does
not consist in establishing the solitude of the subject or of Dasein in the authentic totality of Beingtoward-death, but in preparing the way for producing the ethical relationship of the subject with
its other whose irreducible alterity is embedded in the enigma of death.
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1-1. Hypostasis on the Hither Side of Ekstasis
Prior to the advent of an existent that exists, there is merely “there is” that has neither
beginning nor end, neither arche nor telos; it is a zero-zone from which an existent emerges by
rupturing this anarchical situation of the il y a. Levinas states: “Consciousness is a rupture of the
anonymous vigilance of the il y a; it is already hypostasis.”492 Hypostasis is the name Levinas
gives to the rupturing event, which signifies “the suspension of the anonymous il y a, the apparition
of a private domain, of a noun.”493 In the uprising of hypostasis, Levinas does not envisage an
opposite situation of the il y a: an existent without existence in which there would be no longer
any relationship—whether a difference or separation—between the two. On the contrary, Levinas
designates hypostasis as the instant event in which the paradoxical relationship between existence
and an existent is produced, as he states: “What is absolute in the relationship between existence
and an existent, in an instant, consists in the mastery the existent exercises on existence, but also
in the weight of existence on the existent.”494 The instant of hypostasis denotes the sheer beginning
of an act of existence that characterizes the primordial relationship between existence and an
existent not as something given or givenness but as an accomplishment, which appears as an
inescapable burden. In the instant of the hypostatic act, an existent accomplishes its existence by
gathering itself against the anonymous il y a, to which it is continuously riveted, and, on that
account, the accomplishment of existence is experienced as an irremissible burden that it has to
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undertake. Consequently, the event of hypostasis is the rupturing instant by which the existent
breaks up the anonymous existence in the very accomplishment of existence.
For Levinas, hypostasis in a primordial sense is the conscious event by which an étant
becomes a subject of the verb être: “to be conscious is to be torn away from the il y a, since the
existence of a consciousness constitutes a subjectivity.” 495 However, this conscious event of
hypostasis does not refer to a cognitive activity which marks the intentional, theoretical, and
transcendental characteristics of consciousness in terms of a noetic-noematic correlation.
According to Husserl, the Cartesian ego as the res cogitans still belongs to an empirical, mundane,
or vulgar—rather than transcendental, intentional, or phenomenological—world; hence, it remains
a “piece of the world”496 and so fails to take fully itself as its own cogitatum in the transcendental
reflection. Husserl thus argues: “The expression ego cogito must be expanded by one term. Every
cogito contains a meaning: its cogitatum.”497 In the transcendental reflection, the transcendental
Ego as the ego cogito cogitatum becomes the transcendental reference of the Sinngebung according
to which all things, including the Ego itself who thinks of them, take place and obtain their
meanings in the transcendental realm. By contrast, Levinas finds a more fundamental dimension
of consciousness in the Cartesian ego as the res cogitans, which Husserl rigorously attempts to
reduce to the transcendental sphere. Prior to the transcendental constitution of the transcendental
Ego, Levinas argues, the ego has to take its own place or hypostatize itself at this very moment [en
ce moment même] and in this place [ici]. The profound insight of the Cartesian ego, epitomized as
“I am something that thinks,”498 continues in Levinas’s later work: “I spoke thus of the ‘hypostasis’
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of existents, that is, the passage going from being [être] to something [quelque chose], from the
state of verb to the state of thing.”499 Consequently, hypostasis as the conscious event signifies that
the ego cogito has to be posited as something [res/chose], that is, the res cogitans which underlies
the ego cogito cogitatum.
The hypostatic act that ruptures the anonymous il y a is not clarified in its cognitive,
intellectual, or intentional power of consciousness but rather in its power to sleep, which suspends
and localizes the very consciousness. Levinas writes: “Consciousness appears to stand out against
the il y a by its ability to forget and interrupt it, by its ability to sleep.”500 Just as the gleam of the
light comes out of the darkness of the night, “the scintillation of consciousness” emerges from its
suspension, sleep, or what Levinas calls “the unconscious.”501 In the hypostatic act that interrupts
the insomniac night of the il y a, the subject becomes capable of sleep. The rupture of the il y a
does not require a constant vigilance of consciousness but the power to sleep, i.e., the localization
of consciousness, which consists in the act of lying down, of taking position: “To lie down is
precisely to limit existence to a place, to position.” 502 Due to the power to sleep, an existent
accomplishes its existence in such a way that it delivers itself to a place by taking its position and
thus becomes the master of the verb “to be.” It is in this position that consciousness comes into
being with itself; thus, the act of taking position conveys a hypostatic “transmutation of a verb into
a substantive.” 503 Position here is not a transcendental, ontological topos in which a being
understands itself, comports itself with others, and exists in the world, but a hypostatic place by
which a being becomes the substantive subject of the anonymous verb “to be” by exerting a
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mastery over the fatality of being. The work of hypostasis leads up to the solitude of the subject in
this very moment of taking position here, in such a way that the subject posits itself as a solitary
presence as it is coiled up within its own position over against the anonymous il y a.

1-2. Position: Ici et en ce moment même
In terms of both here [ici] and the present, Levinas explicates the term position whose
hypostatic characteristics become apparent in contrast with Heidegger’s concept of ekstasis. On
the one hand, here [ici] is not there [da]. To be conscious is to have a place, torn away from the
anonymous il y a—it is to be an “ici” in which one lies down and falls asleep. The act of taking
position is a hypostatic moment of folding back upon itself, which is the instant of contraction,
retreat, or “‘polarization’ of being in general.”504 Just as the res cogitans is already a thing that
thinks, Levinas states, “thought, which instantaneously spreads into the world, retains the
possibility of condensing or shrinking itself [se ramasser] into the here, from which it never
detached itself.”505 Prior to thinking, comprehending, or referring to the world, the res cogitans
takes its position to be here, not there whatsoever. By contrast, Dasein, literally to-be-da, already
implies the world as soon as it is thrown into the there, and as long as it is there: “it is thrown in
such a way that it is the there as Being-in-the-world.” 506 Heidegger’s concept of existence
characterizes Dasein’s peculiar way of being-there as Being-in-the-world. In opposition to the
mode of the presence-at-hand [Vorhandenheit] that is present objectively “out there,” existence
[Existenz or Eksistenz] points to the mode of Dasein’s way of being-there, that is, the ecstatic mode
of “standing-out into the openness of the there.”507 The ontological peculiarity of Dasein’s Being
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as being-there amounts to its ecstatic mode of being outside of itself to stand out into the there, in
which Dasein discloses itself. The disclosure of Dasein refers to the existential fact that the Being
of Dasein is in every case to be its da. Thus, the Da of Dasein is not an ici in here or a là out there
in the mode of Vorhandenheit, but an essential disclosure as a “to-be-the-da,” that is, Da-sein in
the mode of Existenz.
However, Levinas here asks whether the Existenz is the original mode of being and argues
as follows: “To the notion of existence [Existenz], where the emphasis is put on the first syllable,
we are opposing the notion of a being [être] whose very advent is a folding back upon itself, a
being [être] which, contrary to the ecstaticism of contemporary thought, is in a certain sense a
substance.” 508 It is, of course, Heidegger who typically represents this ecstaticism when he
conceives of existence as an ecstatic substance. By rejecting a naïve conception of a static
substance beneath the changing flux of time, Heidegger asserts that “the ‘substance’ of human
being…is rather existence,”509 which characterizes the ontological condition of the constitution of
Dasein’s Being. However, Levinas states: “The here of consciousness, the place of its sleep and
of its escape into itself, is radically different from the Da implied in Heidegger’s Dasein. The latter
already implies the world. The here we are starting with, the here of position, precedes every act
of comprehension, every horizon and all time.”510 Thus, a being has to take its ici where it curls
itself up to sleep and hence hypostatizes itself even before stretching out onto the da in which it
can comport, reveal, or disclose itself. On Levinas’s view, the essential disclosure of Dasein as
Being-in-the-da requires something that is disclosed—whether ontically or ontologically,
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authentically or inauthentically—because it is not an “abstract being, hovering in the air, lacks…a
place.”511 The hypostatic act of position takes place prior to or on the hither side of the ontological
constitution of Being. In the Cartesian insight of the res cogitans, Levinas observes the
fundamental sense of a sub-stance as a hypostatic substance beyond an ontic-ontological,
authentic-inauthentic distinction; therefore, a being under-stands to take its position ici antecedent
to out-stands to exist da.
On the other hand, the fact that position is the hypostatic instant of taking place to be ici
already implies an intransitivity or evanescence of the present. The present is not (yet) time—it is
not a transitive moment in a consistent, linear, or chronological passage from the past to the future.
Rather, the present is the instant moment in which an existent accomplishes its existence by
interrupting the anonymous il y a. As will be seen, time comes from the other and hence surpasses
the solitary, monist, and solipsistic moment of the present.512 In this initial stage, the interruption
of the present is the intransitive instant of initiating a relationship between an existent and existence
in the moment of taking position here. Levinas thus argues, “the present is pure beginning,”513
because there is no metaphysical origin, cause, or arche that renders its beginning possible. The
present as a pure instant has no beginning or birth but is itself a beginning and birth, as if its point
of departure appears only in the instant of its arrival, as if the latter alone announces the former:
“each instant is a beginning, a birth.”514 This allegedly anachronistic feature of the beginning
characterizes an essential paradox of the present, as Levinas states: “Starting from this withdrawal
at the heart of the present, the present is effected, and an instant is taken up.”515 It is at the very
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moment of its retreat, withdrawal, or evanescence that the present effectuates itself. The
accomplishment of a being in the burden of being consists in an intransitivity or evanescence of
the present, not in the presence of the present in the transitive flux of time.
By contrast, Heidegger’s ontological-ecstatical analysis of time does not allow this
intransitive, hypostatic, or evanescent moment of the present. According to Heidegger, the ecstatic
temporality of time is the “horizon of every understanding and interpretation of Being.”516 As the
title of Being and Time insinuates, Heidegger investigates the meaning of Being in terms of time.
In other words, the meaning of Being of beings is exemplarily clarified in the ecstatic temporality
of Dasein’s Being. By distinguishing three “ecstases”517 of temporality, Heidegger claims that the
ecstatic character of temporality constitutes a coherent, consistent, and constant unity of these
ecstases, in which there is no longer room for an instantaneous moment. Heidegger writes: “The
unity of the horizonal schemata of future, present, and having-been, is grounded in the ecstatic
unity of temporality.”518 This ecstatic-horizonal unity does not mean that three ecstases come and
go in a linear succession of time or history [Historie], but that they concomitantly happen
[geschehen] in such a way that “the unity of the future…makes present in the process of havingbeen.” 519 Due to the ecstatic character of temporality or what Heidegger calls “the ecstatic

516

SZ, 17.
The ecstatic feature of time is characterized by three dimensions of time that Heidegger labels “Zukunft”
(the future or to-come), “Gewesenheit” (the past or having-been), and “Gegenwart” (the present or making-present).
As the term Existenz already indicates Dasein’s ecstatic mode of Being, that is, a standing out of itself and into the
there, Heidegger states, “Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-oneself’ in and for itself. Thus, we call the
phenomena of future [Zukunft], having-been [Gewesenheit], and present [Gegenwart] the ecstases of temporality,”
SZ, 329. For a discussion on three ecstases, see White, Time and Death, 96-103; Chanter, Time, Death, and the
Feminine, 124-26; Feron, Phénoménologie de la mort, 18-20; Critchley, “Originary Inauthenticity,” in Between
Levinas and Heidegger, 125-26.
518
SZ, 365. Levinas comments: “The original fact would be existence where past, present, and future would
be caught up at once, and where the present does not have the privilege of harboring this existence.” EE, 101; DEE,
141.
519
SZ, 326.
517

172

stretchedness of historical temporality,”520 three ecstases are seamlessly interweaved in the history
[Geschichte] so that the ecstatic temporality of time does not permit the hypostatic instant of the
present.
The problem with Heidegger’s account of temporality, according to Levinas, is that the
ecstatic temporality of time remains still abstract and fails to capture the concrete, instant, and
hypostatic upsurge of the existent accomplished in the present, that is, in ici et en ce moment même.
For Heidegger, the present is defined in terms of ekstasis by which it is integrated into the temporal
movement of existence, and thus it cannot be understood without reference to the past (havingbeen) and the future (to-come). By contrast, Levinas describes the present in terms of hypostasis,
the instant moment by suspending the anonymous being without any reference whatsoever to the
past and the future. Heidegger’s ecstatic view of temporality neutralizes this hypostatic moment
into the ecstatic movement in which “there is not that instant par excellence, which is the
present.”521 At the moment of positing hypostasis, the present derives its being neither from the
past (memory, reminiscence, or heritage) nor from the future (anticipation or projection); rather,
“the present refers only to itself, starts with itself.” 522 The intransitive moment of the present
remains antecedent or resistant to—rather than constitutive of or conducive to—the continuous
flux of time and to the ecstatic temporality of time in particular. The position as the basis of the
solitude of the subject is produced in the very instant of hypostasis beyond or on the hither side of
the ecstatic-horizonal structure of temporality: “The present is an ignorance of history.” 523
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Consequently, the hypostatic instant of the present, in which a being accomplishes its being and
enters into a relationship to this being at this very moment [en ce moment même] of taking place
here [ici], knows nothing of time and history.
Levinas suggests that a more crucial problem, which is entrenched in the ecstatic
temporality of time, emerges when Heidegger grants the ontological priority of the future over
other ecstases. Given that the ecstatic temporalization of time characterizes the coherent unity of
three ecstases, which does not permit any instant moment, the ecstatic temporality of time comes
to pass on the basis of the future. In section 65 of Being and Time in particular, Heidegger discusses
the ontological primacy of the future, which culminates in his account of Dasein’s authentic mode
of Being as Being-toward-death: “the future has a priority in the ecstatic unity of primordial and
authentic temporality.”524 This formulation highlights both the essential unity of three ecstases and
the priority of the future over others. On the one hand, although three dimensions of temporality
are exhaustedly intertwined in the temporalization of time, Heidegger says, “temporality
temporalizes itself primordially out of the future.”525 If Dasein were not thrown into the limit of
its own temporal finitude [Endlichkeit], if Dasein, ontologically not epistemologically, knew
nothing of death, and finally if its Being were characterized as infinite [unendlich] rather than as
finite [endlich], any futural possibility would no longer matter to Dasein itself. Death as the limit
or end [End] makes the future matter to Dasein. 526 The dimension of the future is itself the
originary horizon, which renders possible any understanding of Being at all, and thus within which
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Dasein exemplarily discloses its authentic Being as Being-toward-death. According to Charles
Guignon, therefore, the primacy of the future characterizes “Dasein’s authentic historicity.”527
On the other hand, the privilege of the future in Heidegger’s analysis of Being-towarddeath, Chanter asserts, is intended to “redound to the account of Dasein’s finite temporality as a
whole.”528 As seen in Chapter Two, however, the finitude of Dasein’s authentic Being in its totality
[Ganzheit] becomes explicit in Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Being-toward-death as
the possibility of the impossibility. If the priority of the future is to redound to Heidegger’s account
of the ecstatic unity of ecstases, then, this unity is to rebound upon his ontological analysis of death,
by which the authentic Being of Dasein as a whole is clarified. In this context, Jacques Taminiaux
epitomizes the decisive polarity in terms of temporality between ekstasis and hypostasis as follows:
“Finally, whereas the Heideggerian ekstasis is grounded in a process of temporalization which is
focused upon the future of the end and deprives the present of all privilege, the point in Levinas is
to grasp the hypostasis as an event which occurs thanks to ‘the very stance of an instant’.”529
However, this contrast remains, in a certain sense, facile or even misleading since, when it comes
to death, Heidegger does not belittle the present in favor of the future, as will be seen. More
importantly, Taminiaux’s simple contrast readily overlooks the pivotal point Levinas attempts to
make in his critical interrogation of Heidegger’s temporality. Levinas’s complaint does not merely
come from the fact that Heidegger’s emphasis on the future in the temporal-ecstatic unity
downplays all the privilege of the present, as if Levinas would reject the priority of the future in
order to restore the original privilege of the present—as if, Taminiaux states again, “Levinas
527
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deliberately resists Heidegger’s emphasis on the priority of the future.”530 On the contrary, Levinas
asks here whether Heidegger’s view of the future obliterates its irreducible futurity by
subordinating it into an outstretching presence in the guise of the ecstatic temporalization. The
fundamental problem, on Levinas’s view, lies in Heidegger’s ecstatic view of the temporality of
time—whether its focus is on the priority of the future or on the unity of ecstases—that reduces
the hypostatic instant of the present into the ecstatic movement of time and, on that account,
misleads a genuine sense of time and death altogether. As will be seen, the significance of
hypostasis, which the ecstatic temporality of time neutralizes and hence fails to capture, leads up
to the enigma of death where Levinas finds an alterity of the other who comes with time.

1-3. The Enigma of Death beyond Ecstatic Temporality
Just as Levinas begins to elaborate on time against the background of Heidegger’s ontology,
many discussions of Levinas’s view on time are presented in relation to Heidegger’s ontological
interpretation of time. Colin Davis, for example, points out that Heidegger not only offers “the
powerful lens,” through which Levinas himself reads critically Husserl’s intellectualism, but also
shows him a “way of understanding Being and beings as originally… engaged in time and
history.” 531 Indeed, there are some commentators who attend to the similarities or affinities
regarding time between the thoughts of Heidegger and Levinas. Feron argues, “the Levinasian
analysis of time enters into Sein und Zeit with such an acuity, with an exemplary rigorousness,
with such a depth that it can be no longer a question of a simple antagonism between two
530
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thoughts.”532 With a focus on Heidegger’s later conception of time and finitude, to which Levinas
rarely pays attention, Emilia Angelova also attempts to discover a “closer affinity between
Heidegger and Levinas than Levinas might admit.” 533 In this vein, Tina Chanter proposes,
“Levinas’s thoughts on time will remain inaccessible unless they are understood as having
emerged out of what was, at least initially, his wholesome immersion in Heidegger’s critique of
the traditional metaphysical view of time in Being and Time.”534 Iain Thomson, as a serious and
faithful interpreter of Heidegger, observes how profoundly Heidegger inspires Levinas’s
understanding of time and death, and then labels Levinas as a “post-Heideggerian thinker,” who
is “working critically against the background and within the perspective opened by Heidegger.”535
Nevertheless, there could be an apparent danger that marginalizes, as Richard A. Cohen insists,
Levinas’s core thesis on “veritable time,” which consists in “the rupture of contemporaneousness”
between the other’s time and my time when Heidegger’s influence on Levinas is overestimated.536
Although it cannot be denied that Heidegger certainly motivates Levinas’s consideration
of time, as well as there could be parallel structures apropos of time between two thinkers, this
section will show that Levinas’s peculiar conception of time is formulated in opposition to
Heidegger’s, and the opposition becomes more explicit in his interrogation of Heidegger’s
thanatology. Despite his debt to Heidegger, Levinas’s central claim about death, which runs
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through his consistent suspicion against the ontological-existential view of time, cannot prevent
him from attempting to leave the Heideggerian climate and the ontological perspective. Therefore,
it is necessary to pay close attention to Levinas’s critical engagement of Heidegger’s understanding
of time in terms of death, apart from trivial or superficial affinities between the two that ward off
access to the kernel of Levinas’s consideration of time and death.
The opening of Time and the Other begins by alluding to Levinas’s seminal idea of time
as opposed to Heidegger’s ontological view of ecstatic temporality: “time is not the achievement
of an isolated and lone subject, but…the very relationship of the subject with the other.” 537
Whereas Heidegger presents time as the ontological achievement of the heroic and solitary Dasein
whose existential mode of Being remains oriented toward death as the possibility of the
impossibility, Levinas insists that time has not yet been introduced to the solitude of the subject.
It is important for Levinas to first establish the intransitive, separate solitude that paves the way
for being opened up by the enigma of death in which a true dimension of time is enshrined. Before
moving on to discussing Levinas’s interpretation of time in terms of death, it is worthwhile to
consider exactly what Heidegger means by death as the “possibility” of the impossibility since, as
Derrida points out in his reading of Being and Time, “a certain thinking of the possible is at the
heart of the existential analysis of death.”538 Accordingly, the elucidation of this possibility will
demonstrate how Heidegger obliterates the enigma of death, which in fact Levinas attempts to
retrieve from the ontological and architectonic constitution of the ecstatic temporality.
For Heidegger, death is not a mere impossibility of existence or a cessation of being, but
the possibility of the impossibility of existence, of nothingness, or of no-longer-being-able-to-be-
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there; it is “the possibility of the very impossibility of Dasein.”539 In a lecture delivered in 1946
at a conference of the Club Maintenant in which Levinas participated, Jean Wahl misleadingly
presented Heidegger’s view of death by converting a simple, yet subtle formula of “the possibility
of the impossibility” into “the impossibility of all possibility.”540 Wahl stated that the moment of
death “will come when there will be no more possibilities,”541 as if it would be at the moment that
all possibilities are no longer possible and hence remain impossible. “At the terminus,” he
continued, “there is always death as the impossibility of possibility.”542 However, this is exactly
what Heidegger rejects. For Heidegger, death as the end of Dasein’s Being marks neither a mere
terminus of Dasein’s Being as Being-at-the-end nor the moment at which all possibilities have
been actualized or consumed in the completion of its Being. Rather, it characterizes the authentic
mode of Dasein’s Being as Being-toward-the-end, so that Dasein is always already toward its own
end. Hence, death is not the possible impossibility in which all possibilities are no longer available,
but the impossible possibility that makes all other possibilities possible. In a discussion following
Wahl’s lecture, Levinas clarified this point as follows: “Which permits possibility ever to remain
possibility, so much so that the moment at which it is exhausted is: death.”543 For Heidegger, and
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as Levinas rightly interprets him, death for Dasein remains the most authentic possibility from the
beginning to the end, which circumscribes the totality of Dasein’s Existenz.
According to Heidegger, death remains the possibility [Möglichkeit] par excellence so that
it does not concern the Being of Dasein in part, as if it would sometimes or in some cases matter
to Dasein and thus remain contingent or incidental to Dasein’s Being. This is what Heidegger
means by “categorial” possibility, which is applied to Vorhandenheit and not to Dasein’s Existenz.
When it comes to possibility as death, the totality of Dasein’s Being is in every case at stake, and
hence the possibility is imminent and immanent to Dasein. This immanent possibility belongs to
an “existential” possibility, which accounts for the fact that “Dasein is in every case what it can
be, and in the way in which it is its possibility.” 544 That is to say, Dasein is always its own
possibility—rather than actuality—to be able to be there [da] rather than to be merely out there.
By appealing to this existential possibility, Derrida identifies two meanings that “co-exist in die
Möglichkeit”: “the sense of the virtuality of or of imminence of the future” and “the sense of
ability.”545 Heidegger himself states: “Dasein’s own able-to-be [Seinkönnen] becomes authentic
and transparent in the understanding Being-toward-death as its most authentic possibility
[Möglichkeit].”546 The existential possibility qua death thus signifies the interplay of Möglichsein
and Seinkönnen, which characterizes the ecstatic Being of Dasein in such a way that Dasein as the
being-possible [Möglichsein] is in every case an able-to-be [Seinkönnen].
Dasein in its ecstatic mode of Being understands its death not as an impossibility to be nolonger-being-out-there, but as its most authentic possibility to be no-longer-able-to-be-there.
Heidegger thus notes: “With death, Dasein…is completely thrown back upon its most authentic
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able-to-be.”547 In other words, Dasein is itself the being-possible to be able-to-be-out-of-itself and
to be able-to-be-ahead-of-itself to the point of anticipating the impossibility of its own existence
by means of projecting itself toward nothingness, its end, death, or future to come. “Dasein is
futural in a primordial sense,”548 because it essentially remains being-possible in its able-to-be:
“As being-possible [Möglichsein], Dasein…is existentially that which it is not yet in its able-to-be
[Seinkönnen].” 549 Dasein takes a sheer impossibility of its existence as its own existential
possibility to be able to be what it is not yet by anticipating its no-longer-able-to-be-there
[Vorlaufen] and then “choose its hero”550 who gains the complete mastery of its authentic Being
[Enschlossenheit]. Due to the anticipatory resolution [vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit],551 which
explains a sort of transition or modification from inauthenticity to authenticity, this existential
possibility of the very impossibility of existence is the impossible possibility par excellence that
renders all other possibilities possible rather than the possible impossibility in which they all
collapse. Thus, death breaks down all the inauthentic possibilities of Dasein to break Dasein itself
from the “anonymous they.” Death does not break down Dasein itself but individualizes it. It is
the heroism, sovereignty, or mastery of Dasein who is able to forerun even into the nothingness of
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its own existence and hence takes death to be the existential possibility that renders its Being
authentic [eigentlich] and whole [ganz]. The ontological achievement of Dasein culminates in the
futurity of death as the existential possibility, which makes the future (to-come) matter to Dasein
itself in every case and thereby marks the authentic totality of its own Being as the ecstatic mode
of Being-toward-death.
Provided that Heidegger’s analysis of death as the existential possibility relies on the
futurity of Dasein, which leads to the architectonic constitution of Dasein’s authentic Being as a
whole, Levinas is critical of Heidegger’s temporality not for granting the priority to the future but
for failing to delve into the radical dimension of the futurity itself. Although Heidegger’s account
of Being-toward-death seems to focus on the future to come, this future is anticipated—albeit not
actualized—as if the future would be already always ek-sistentially present, due to Dasein’s
peculiar mode of Existenz based on the interplay of Möglichsein and Seinkönnen. Whenever
Heidegger speaks of the futurity of death, on Levinas’s view, he never means the future as such
but reiterates the present by making the future present: “Anticipation of the future and projection
of the future…are but the present of the future and not the authentic future.”552 The heroic Dasein
never tolerates the irreducible abyss between the future of death and the present in the sense that
it appropriates even its no-longer-existence or nothingness into its own Being. It is, therefore, of
no surprise to find that there is no conflict between the primacy of the future and the unity of
ecstases in Heidegger’s temporality. It is also the encroachment of the present on the future whose
futurity is essentially neutralized, contemporized, and totalized in the sturdy architecture of the
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ecstatic temporality of time. Insofar as the future is anticipated, projected, grasped, and known
whatsoever, it is dissolved into the totalizing synchronization of the present losing its futurity.
Levinas argues against Heidegger, “This future of death determines the future for us, the future
insofar as it is not present.” 553 This formulation, of course, recalls the Epicurean paradox, as
Levinas states in the following:

This is why death is never a present. This is a truism. The ancient adage designed to
dissipate the fear of death—‘If you are, it is not; if it is, you are not’—without doubt
misunderstands the entire paradox of death, for it effaces our relationship with death, which
is a unique relationship with the future. But at least the adage insists on the eternal futurity
of death. The fact that it deserts every present is not due to our evasion of death and to an
unpardonable diversion at the supreme hour, but to the fact that death is ungraspable, that
it marks the end of the subject’s virility and heroism.554
This passage unambiguously displays Levinas’s ambivalent stance toward Epicurus’s view on
death and, accordingly, toward Heidegger’s understanding of death. Although Epicurus already
anticipated the futurity of death that is never present, he failed to recognize its meaning by simply
dismissing it as meaningless and irrelevant. Reversely, in spite of the fact that Heidegger
appreciates the (ontological) meaning of death, which is remarkably clarified in the virility,
mastery, and heroism of Dasein, on Levinas’s view, his existential view of temporality could not
capture the futurity of death by means of reducing it into the ecstatic unity of time. Levinas protests
against Heidegger on the matter of whether the ontological analysis can exhaust the signification
of death and argues that the authentic sense of death does not consist in the ontological
accomplishment of the heroic Dasein. Rather, Levinas attempts to find the radical aspect of the
authentic futurity in what the ontological architecture of the ecstatic temporality dissimulates—it
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is an unknowable, unfathomable, or ungraspable enigma of death. Death is unknowable, but it is
not merely unknowable, because it exceeds all grasping and comprehension in which the subject
exerts its mastery. Accordingly, in the enigma of death, “the subject loses its very mastery as a
subject”555 and thereby no longer remains a being-possible in its ability-to-be. The radicality of
the future allows Levinas to catch sight of the mystery of death, which never comes out of Dasein’s
possibility in the resoluteness of its futural projection but comes to it outside its possibility by
undoing all possibilities. What the radical futurity of the future discloses is the enigmatic mystery
of death, which Heidegger reduces into the heroic mastery of death.
For Levinas, the enigma of death vanishes in the dialectic of Being and nothingness that
constantly runs through the ecstatic heroism of Dasein. In his early text written in 1940, “Ontology
within the Temporal,”556 Levinas already points out the solitude of Dasein in terms of the dialectic
of Being and nothingness as follows: “In original time, or in Being-towards-death, as the condition
of all Being, the person discovers the nothingness upon which it stands, which also signifies that
it rests upon nothing other than itself.”557 The heroic Dasein in the mode of Existenz is able to be
out of itself to the extent that it projects its existence into nothingness and returns to itself with an
authentic understanding of its own Being as a whole. The hero leaves itself in order to return to
itself; ultimately, it is at home with itself [chez soi] in the course of leaving and taking itself again.
As Being-toward-death, ironically enough, Dasein finds itself as Being-at-home-with-itself: “That
relation with Being is the truly original interiority.”558 In the dialectic of Being and nothingness
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that governs the entire passage or modification from the inauthentic Being to the authentic one,
death transparently appears to Dasein as always existentially present. However, beyond or on the
hither side of this dialectic that entails the ontological solitude of the heroic Dasein and that allows
nothing exterior to its solitary Being, Levinas asserts, death still remains ungraspable, unknowable,
and enigmatic since it is in no way assumed in the guise either of the future of the present
(anticipation and projection into nothingness) or of the present of the future (the being-possible
and the ability-to-be what it is not yet).
Indeed, death never fully arrives as presence in the present, over which the subject holds
sway in its solitude, but asymptotically approaches in proximity or nearness in which the subject
loses its mastery, power, or sovereignty. The subject here undergoes “the situation where
something absolutely unknowable appears. Absolutely unknowable means foreign to all light,
rendering every assumption of possibility impossible.”559 To the asymptotic approach of death, the
subject is exposed, with no capacity to understand, grasp, or anticipate its own nothingness, so that
it remains vulnerable, powerless, defenseless, and susceptible: “It finds itself enchained,
overwhelmed, and passive. Death is in this sense the limit of idealism.”560 This is why Levinas
gives his special attention to Shakespeare who already mediated upon an impenetrable depth of
death beyond the dialectic opposition of Being and nothingness, as he clearly notes, “Hamlet is
precisely a lengthy testimony to this impossibility of assuming death. Nothingness is
impossible.”561 Levinas thus goes on to claim: “What is important about the approach of death is
that at a certain moment we are no longer able to be able [nous ne pouvons plus pouvoir].”562 When
Heidegger recognizes in this certain moment of death the most virile, masterful, and heroic power
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of Dasein—the hero who is able to stretch out, snatch, and, at last, embrace even that moment
(nothingness) within its Being as its most authentic possibility—what he fails to recognize is the
very significance of death. It is the unreachable, unfathomable, and unseizable “proximity of
death” 563 that saves not only the futurity of death from the synchronization of the ecstatic
temporality but also, for that reason, its enigma from the dialectical trap of Being and nothingness.
The asymptotic approach of death never concurs with the solitude of the subject,
constituted by hypostasis at this very moment of taking position ici. Hence, the persistent
proximity of death signals the end of the mastery, that is, of the sovereign solitude of the subject.
This end does not refer to a Heideggerian end as the existential possibility that qualifies or
authorizes the authentic solitude of Dasein but to “the limit of the possible”564 that displaces or
dethrones the very solitude; it is the moment of de-positing the position of the subject whose
solitude is essentially “out of joint” from the outset. Although both the Heideggerian ekstasis and
the Levinasian hypostasis seem to share their attention to the constitution or accomplishment of
an ontological solitude, as Taminiaux rightly claims, “loneliness is not the ultimate feature of the
hypostasis.”565 Levinas thus writes, “To be an ego [moi] is not only to be for itself [soi]; it is also
be with itself [soi],”566 and “this other than me [moi] accompanies the ego [moi] like a shadow.”567
That is to say, the ego [moi] neither totally escapes from itself [soi] nor remains at home with itself
[chez soi], but chases or haunts itself [soi] in its out-of-jointedness with itself [soi]. What the
hypostasis ultimately signifies is the fact that the solitude of the subject is already out of joint,
fractured, disfigured, deformed, unhinged, deposed, or schizophrenic—it is rather a “dual solitude”
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that debunks an inflated, masterful, and conceited identity of the moi and the soi based upon a
bourgeois narcissism and that “awakens the nostalgia for escape.”568 In spite of the fact that the
subject “certainly recedes from itself, this stepping back is not a liberation. It is as if one had given
slack rope to a prisoner without untying him.”569 The tie of the moi to the soi is loosened, but not
untied. In the approach of death, however, the subject, who remains disjointed, fractured, or
dispositioned, finds itself in “relationship with what does not come from itself,” 570 so that it
confronts that which it cannot enclose in its isolated, authentic, and solipsistic solitude. It is the
radical futurity of death in proximity that discloses a deep-rooted—and yet veiled by the ecstatic
temporality of the heroic Dasein who in fact remains the same [même], confined to the ontological
prison—structure of the de-position or disjointedness of the subject. Therefore, the enigma of death
releases the solitary Dasein from the ecstatic-ontological fetter by means of opening it toward a
relationship with that which comes from elsewhere than an ontological topos, i.e., what is
absolutely other.
In the enigma of death, the subject encounters the other whose alterity introduces a genuine
dimension of time into the subject. In opposition to Heidegger’s temporality of time as the horizon
of Being of Dasein, Levinas argues that time does not occur in the relationship between Dasein
and Being but comes from the relationship between the subject and its other. As seen above,
Heidegger believes that time is the transcendental horizon of Being and that the meaning of Being
is clarified in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein; the authentic time is understood in terms of the
ecstasis of Dasein. In respect to the ecstatic conception of time provided by Heidegger, Levinas
states, “The subject in question was always a solitary subject. The ego all alone, the monad, already
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had time.” 571 However, Levinas claims that the solitary monad imprisoned in the windowless
present cannot traverse time because this monad cannot escape from itself [soi], and in its
incapability to escape from itself, it also cannot escape from its ecstatic presence: “The present
refers only to itself, but this reference, which should have dazzled it with freedom, imprisons it in
an identification.”572 There is no exit, issue, escape, or way out of being in its windowless presence.
Levinas thus asks whether Heidegger’s ontology and his ontological analysis of death in particular
remain within the metaphysics of presence that Heidegger himself attempts to overcome.
For Levinas, freedom does not proceed from an “effort to be”573 or responsibility for one’s
own, solitary, or authentic Being, which is nothing but a breathlessness or suffocation: “A free
being alone is responsible, that is, already not free.”574 Levinas thus claims, “Death in Heidegger
is an event of freedom.”575 It is only through the other, absolutely other than the solitary ego, who
stands in the face-to-face with this ego that a true dimension of freedom with regard to time is
introduced on the hither side of the stretchedness of the ecstatic temporality. Through the encounter
with the other, the ego finds itself in relationship to what it cannot stretch out, to the absolute
otherness that ruptures the ecstatic presence of the solitary ego and thereby liberates, relieves, and
frees it from its ontological shackle of the ecstatic temporality where it gets out of itself in order
to return to itself in its identification. In this context, the other is neither an obstacle to an effort to
be (free) nor a secondary or contingent means for salvation, which preserves itself in the selfish
hope; rather, it is very salvation that “can only come from elsewhere while everything in the subject
is here [ici].”576 It is the prerequisite condition for freedom with the proviso that the other alone
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makes the ego free, not only because the ego itself cannot be free on its own, but also because their
times never take place “at the same time.” It is the diachronic distance, proximity, or separation
that sustains the alterity of the other as the locus of escape, freedom, and salvation. Western
philosophy and Heidegger’s ontology in particular fail to account for the peculiar conception of
freedom in terms of time that consists in “having one’s being pardoned by the very alterity of the
other.”577 Heidegger’s projective, ecstatic theory of time cannot take into consideration Levinas’s
core idea of time, “the rupture of contemporaneousness,” by which “veritable time” begins.578 The
other brings the veritable time to the ego by rupturing the ontological confinement of the ecstatic
presence, and hence “the condition of time lies in the relationship between humans,”579 that is, in
the face-to-face encounter with the other. Without encountering the other, neither freedom nor
time can be produced; the other alone saves the ego. Therefore, the veritable time takes place in a
diachronical manner when the solitude of the ego is deposed by the other whose alterity essentially
remains refractory to the ecstatic temporalization.
As seen so far, Heidegger’s treatment of death is too dexterous to capture an enigmatic
character of death since, for Levinas, death remains impervious to an allegedly adroit weapon of
the dialectic of Being and nothingness. In this context, Peperzak states that death, like the other, is
not a noema or a theme that can be grasped by a representation, thematization, or comprehension;
it cannot take any place within “unfolding of my possibilities.”580 When interrogating Heidegger’s
view of death as the existential possibility of the impossibility, Derrida is quite right in saying that
“the existential analysis of death of Dasein will have to make of this possibility its theme.”581 It is
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not only because the entire process of the fundamental ontology of Dasein culminates in the theme
of death as the most authentic possibility for Dasein itself, but also, more fundamentally, because
the ontological-existential thematization of death illustrates how death appears to Dasein as a
transparent phenomenon. To be sure, Heidegger himself makes death a theme by taking advantage
of the dialectic of Being and nothingness and rigorously attempts to disclose the ontological
constitution of Dasein in the authentic totality of Being. In the doxcial thematization of death,
Heidegger clearly exhibits how transparently death appears to Dasein as the phenomenon par
excellence to be existentially comprehended, grasped, and seized by Dasein alone in isolation from
the anonymous they.
The fundamental ontology of Dasein leads to the existential analysis of death, which shows
that death appears to Dasein not as a “one-shot” event, abruptly happening to Dasein itself, but as
a “phenomenon of life”582 to be existentially understood by Dasein in its authentic totality. This
does not mean that the phenomenon of death is a noematic phenomenon or what Marion calls a
“flat phenomenon” to be theoretically understood, but an existential one embedded in “the depth
of the Heideggerian phenomenon” to be ontologically understood.583 Although Levinas does not
deny that there is a deeper dimension of the Heideggerian phenomenon, he also does not reject the
fact that Heidegger, in a certain sense, especially when it comes to the theme of/as death, repeats
a naiveté of the flat phenomenology which makes death appear to Dasein as the flat phenomenon.
Accordingly, Heidegger’s phenomenological-doxical thematization of death ends up dissimulating
the enigma of death into the architectonic totality of the heroic Dasein’s Being. Levinas’s challenge
against Heidegger results not from the failure of his phenomenological thematization of death but,
on the contrary, from his deft fulfillment to thematize a phenomenon of death through rendering
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possible what cannot be possible and hence thematizing what cannot be thematized. Already in his
early text Time and the Other, the paradox of Levinas’s phenomenology of death, which concerns
the puzzling problem of how to thematize what cannot be thematized, to phenomenologize what
cannot be phenomenologized, is inchoately noticed.
In the enigmatic mystery of death that Heidegger reduces to the heroic mastery of death,
Levinas finds the alterity of the other, which is in no way reduced, totalized, or thematized into the
ontological architecture. The approach of death in proximity overflows and suspends the subject’s
heroic capacity to project its Being into nothingness and, in turn, to appropriate this nothingness
into its Being in the authentic totality; it heralds the rupture of the solitude of the subject. Levinas
thus states: “My solitude is thus not confirmed by death but broken by it.”584 Instead, what the
approach of death confirms is the deposition of the solitude that gives rise to a multitude or
“plurality [that] insinuates itself into the very existing of the existent which until this point was
jealously assumed by the subject alone.”585 The relationship with death indicates that existence is
no longer a matter of a solo, as illustrated in Heidegger’s existential analysis of death in terms of
the solitary and heroic Dasein in the mode of Existenz, but rather of a multitude—or basically, of
a duo—which is concretized in the ethical relationship between the same and other where Levinas
finds the most fundamental structure of existence and time: “Being is produced as multiple and as
split into same and other; this is its ultimate structure. It is society, and hence it is time.”586 In order
to describe this ultimate structure, Levinas expects in Existence and Existents a new language other
than a monological, solipsistic, and ontological language that fails to describe time, death, and the
other altogether: “The dialectic of time is the very dialectic of the relationship with the other, that
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is, a dialogue which in turn has to be studied in terms other than those of the dialectic of the solitary
subject.” 587 Ontological language might succeed in describing the solitude of Dasein’s Being
apropos of time and death, as Heidegger’s ontological analysis of Dasein exhaustedly exhibits the
ontological meaning of death. However, Levinas argues that ontological language necessarily fails
to capture the mystery of death, since it is not proper to describe the relationship with the other
where the enigmatic signification of death is embedded. What the enigmatic mystery of death
signifies is the fact that the solitude is not the final word—it is the signification of death that the
solitary, solipsistic, or self-same relation of the subject cannot accomplish. In the approach of death,
the solitude of the subject is de-posited as if the initial position is already a de-position, which
anticipates an ethical relationship between the same and the other that Levinas later elaborates by
deploying ethical terms, such as responsibility, expiation, persecution, or substitution. It will be
the primary task of the next section to show that the ontological-existential analysis of death cannot
exhaust the signification of death itself in the sense that, prior to the ontological meaning of death,
the ethical meaning of death takes place in the duo-relationship on the hither side of the solorelationship.

2. Being Fractured: Posterior Duo Prior to Anterior Solo
It is worthwhile to note that Levinas has used “ethics” or “ethical” since the early 1950s to
describe the face-to-face relationship in terms of “the ethical order” on which the spiritual life of
Judaism is based. 588 It is in the 1951 essay “Is Ontology Fundamental?” that the ethical
signification of the other comes to the fore for the first time in explicit opposition to the
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fundamental ontology of Heidegger. The primary task of this text is to demonstrate that the
fundamental ontology remains not fundamental enough in the sense that there is a more
fundamental relation irreducible to the ontological relation where all beings are primordially
understood within the horizon of Being. For Levinas, a genuine relation cannot be found in the
ontological-solo relationship between Being and a being but rather in the ethical-duo relationship
between beings with no reference to or prior to “the openness of Being.”589 This fundamental
relationship cannot be possible “except for the other” 590 whose alterity exceeds and overflows the
ontological horizon of Being—whatever it is considered throughout Heidegger’s texts under
different names, such as aletheia, Wahrheit, Lichtung, Erschlossenheit, Offenbarheit, or
Gelassenheit. Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s ontology forms the initial preparation for the
elaboration of the ethical relationship between the same and the other, which is fully elaborated in
Totality and Infinity.

2-1. The Cartesian Idea of the Infinite
In order to discover a fundamental, genuine, and ethical relation, Levinas returns to the
Cartesian meditation on the ego as the res cogitans. The Cartesian formula “I am something that
thinks” motivates Levinas’s consideration of the idea of the infinite concretized into the ethical
relation, as he states in Totality and Infinity: “We have seen in it [the idea of infinity] the ethical
relation.”591 When it comes to Levinas’s analysis of the formal structure of the idea of the infinite
that remains inaccessible to totality, Being, or ontology, Robert Bernasconi contends that it is
Descartes who “gave Levinas his own voice with which to show what Husserl and Heidegger
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and…the whole tradition of Western ontology from Parmenides on failed to recognize and
preserve.” 592 Unlike Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology that radically reduces the res
cogitans to the ego cogito cogitatum, Levinas’s phenomenology retrieves what Husserlian
phenomenology reduces, that is, “I am something that thinks,” in terms of hypostasis. Moreover,
Heidegger’s notion of ekstasis still follows a Husserlian path, especially when it comes to his
thematization of death. This path can be depicted as Odysseus’s long journey after which he returns
home to Ithaca and reassumes his place as a rightful king of his Kingdom. Likewise, the ego—
whether the pure Ego or heroic Dasein—leaves itself in order to return to itself with a
transcendental or authentic status; it transcends itself in order to regain itself. This transcendental
or ontological adventure is motivated by acute nostalgia for the proper home [chez-soi], as if there
was, is, and will be the authentic topos proper to the solipsistic ego. Thus, the ego never loses itself
and its topos where it dwells; even death does not really matter to itself since it is already at its
own disposal.
However, the Cartesian ego is not simply something [res] that posits itself here and now
but also something that thinks [res cogitans]: “I am something that thinks.” Descartes’s profound
insight into the thinking ego leads Levinas to recognize in the idea of the infinite the formal
structure embedded in the ethical relationship, as if my solitude is already opened toward the
alterity of the other, as if my being already takes, occupies, and trespasses the topos of the other.
Like Abraham’s venturing out to an unexplored, unknown land without any return to his homeland,
there is no longer any proper or authentic home to which I go back, in which I remains with myself.
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Far from suffering from the nostalgia for my own topos, I unremittingly desire for the other who
comes from elsewhere unbeknown to me. Although Descartes’s idea of the infinite leads to the
proof of God’s existence, Levinas attempts to uncover in the idea of the infinite an ethical
significance inscribed in the face of the other who commands “Thou shalt not kill.” The primary
task of this section is to elaborate on “I am something that thinks” with a Cartesian inspiration of
the idea of the infinite and then account for the ethical signification of death, which underlies and,
simultaneously, undermines Heidegger’s ontological analysis of death.
In the 1957 essay, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” 593 before the publication of
Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas formulates the formal structure of the ethical relation by
means of exploring Descartes’s idea of the infinite. This text opens with revisiting the problem of
how philosophy seeks truth in terms of a relation between the thinker and what is thought. “In the
truth, a thinker maintains a relationship with a reality distinct from him, other than him—
‘absolutely other’.”594 To think is an audacious adventure toward an alterity; in other words, it
presupposes a distance between the subject that thinks and the object to be thought. To think, thus,
is to transcend the thinker who thinks toward other than itself, i.e., the object, and transcendence
is secured in the very distance, which maintains the entire process of thinking. In thinking of even
myself, I first objectify myself, take it as an object to be thought, and represent it in terms of
propositions, just as the Kantian “I think” is already inscribed in all representations concerning an
object, the world, God, or whatsoever to be thought. Due to the distance in me, I am not only the
subject as a thinker who thinks but also the object to be thought. I am the subject that thinks insofar
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as I am the object to be thought, and vice versa, so that the thinking or philosophical odyssey seems
to overcome a naïve or natural dualism of the subject and the object, of idealism and realism, and
to achieve its truth in which the thinker remains at home with itself. For Levinas, however, the
overcoming of dualism basically relies on “subjectivism more objective than all objectivity”595
and thus leads to a dialectical fusion or union in which both subjectivity (immanence or interiority)
and objectivity (transcendence or exteriority) are sublated in the speculative or dialectical
movement of the Absolute Spirit (Hegel) in and for itself that resolves a distance sustaining the
separation between the two. The telos of the Spirit is no other than its return via mediation to its
arche, and nothing remains inaccessible, exterior, foreign, or other to it; therefore, “the Ego [Moi]
remains the Same [Même]!”596
Levinas diagnoses in philosophical thinking a narcissistic odyssey of self-knowledge
whose truth consists in the “reduction of the other to the same,”597 that is, the identification of the
same; then he asks whether the thinker has ever encountered absolutely and infinitely other than
itself. In doing so, philosophy entertains itself with virile, lofty, and heroic pretentions without
doing its own job: “Autonomy, the philosophy which aims to ensure the freedom, or the identity,
of beings, presupposes that freedom itself is sure of itself, is justified without recourse to anything
further, is complacent with in itself, like Narcissus.” 598 Heidegger’s ecstatic temporality
exemplarily shows this narcissistic pretention in the sense that the heroic Dasein makes all of time
its own time by bringing the past, the present, and the future together into the ecstatic unity, which
constitutes the history of its own Being with no recourse to anything other than itself. Levinas thus
claims: “the Ego remains the Same by making of disparate and diverse events a history—its
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history.”599 From the Cartesian idea of the infinite, Levinas attempts to redeem what Heidegger’s
analytic of Dasein in its finitude of the authentic Being fails to consider, in the sense that
“Heideggerian philosophy precisely marks the apogee of a thought in which the finite does not
refer to the infinite.”600 Due to its lack of consideration of the infinite, Heidegger’s philosophy
ends up “affirming a tradition in which the same dominates the other, in which freedom, even the
freedom that is identical with reason, precedes justice.”601 The radical profundity of Descartes’s
meditation on the idea of the infinite that attracts Levinas’s attention lies in the fact that the ego no
longer remains the same in the course of thinking; in other words, the ego finds itself placed in a
primordial relationship with infinitely other than itself, the absolutely other whose alterity remains
resistant to the totalizing identity of the same.
Against the background of Husserlian conception of intentionality that characterizes the
fundamental feature of consciousness in terms of an adequation or correlation between an
intentional act (noesis) and its correlated object (noema), Levinas goes further into what the
intentional structure of the noema-noesis presupposes and yet dissimulates—it is a non-adequation,
non-correlation or disjointedness that Levinas recognizes in the Cartesian idea of the infinite. In
other words, when the ego thinks of the infinite, it “from the first thinks more than it thinks.”602
The infinite that the idea thinks of it is not adequate to the very idea since the infinite itself
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surpasses the idea that thinks. Due to this non-adequateness, the alterity of the infinite is never
abolished. The idea of the infinite marks the paradoxical attempt to think of what it cannot think;
indeed, a thought is out of joint with itself in the idea of the infinity. The content of what is thought
cannot be exhausted by the very thought since the ideatum cannot be comprehended or grasped by
the idea. When it comes to the idea of the infinite, indeed, the cogitatum exceeds the cogito itself:
“the idea of the infinite is exceptional in that its ideatum surpasses its idea.”603 The idea of the
infinite signifies an exceptional relation which cannot be equivalent to a corresponding
relationship between a subject and an object, in which the latter is integrated, sublated, or reduced
into the former, and, accordingly, the distance between the two is no other than a synthetizing
impetus for the identification of the same. Basically, an intentional relation can be characterized
as the returning movement of the ego; it is the same [même] gesture that never allows anything
exterior, transcendent, and other to itself. However, the relation with the infinite does not lead to
the return of the ego to itself but to opening itself toward what it cannot contain, embrace, and
grasp, toward the irreducible exteriority of the absolutely other. The encounter with the other
cannot be inscribed in the resister of need, which proceeds from the ego to fill out its voids; rather,
it is the unsatiable movement of desire for the other without a return to itself: “A thought that
thinks more than it thinks is a desire.”604
In no way does Levinas overlook the fact that this excessive characteristic of intentionality
is already found in Husserl’s reading of Descartes. In the 1959 text entitled “The Ruin of
Representation,” Levinas points out Husserl’s implicit dimension of intentionality that engenders
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the ruin of classical representationalism with reference to Cartesian Meditations: “Every ego as
consciousness, is, in a broad sense, the ‘meaning’ of the thing that it intends, but that ‘meaning’
exceeds, at each instant, that which at that every instant, is given as ‘explicitly intended.’ It exceeds
it….This exceeding of the intention in the intention itself, which is inherent in all consciousness,
must be considered as essential to that consciousness.” 605 The representationalist notion of
intentionality is understood in terms of an exact correlation between the explicitly intentional
subject and the explicitly intended object, which does not permit any implicit or excessive meaning
other than the explicitly intended meaning qua a representational product of this exact correlation:
“The object is at every instant exactly what the subject currently thinks it to be.” 606 Husserl
becomes more radical in probing into the implicit dimension of intentionality, which designates a
relation between the intentional subject and the intended object, but “a relation essentially bearing
within itself an implicit meaning.”607 In addition to the explicitly intended meaning that the ego
explicitly intends, there remains an implicit or excessive meaning, since the intention exceeds itself
in itself: “We are beyond idealism and realism, since being is neither inside nor outside thought,
but thought itself is outside itself.”608 However, Levinas becomes even more radical by making
this implicit meaning explicit, or more properly, by considering what the explicit dimension of
intentionality presupposes—it is an essential excess that conditions the very intentionality. In the
Preface to Totality and Infinity, therefore, Levinas speaks of “the break-up of the formal
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structure—the noema of a noesis—into events which this structure dissimulates, but which sustains
it, and restore its concrete significance.”609
Properly understood, Levinas claims, “intentionality bears within itself the innumerable
horizons of its implications and thinks of infinitely more ‘things [choses]’ than of the object upon
which it is fixed.”610 In his own reading of Descartes’s Meditations, Levinas comes to recognize
one of these “things”: the idea of the infinite which nevertheless is indeed not a thing to be thought
but an incomprehensible surplus overflowing all thought. At the limit of thinking, the idea itself is
a paradoxical attempt to think of what it cannot think. Rather, the idea of the infinite as an excess
is a thought which “I [Moi]” cannot think but which is thought in “me [moi].” Whenever I think
of the infinite, I discover myself not as the thinker who thinks of it but as what is thought by what
I think, as if I were no longer the subject who thinks of the object but rather the object to be thought
by something wholly other than myself, as if the subjective or substantive Moi aiming at what it
intends to think of were to be thought of as an objective or accusative moi interpellated by that at
which the Moi aims. In the idea of the infinite, thus, the subject no longer remains a purely
intentional subject who thinks; simultaneously, the object no longer remains a purely intended
object to be thought. In this regard, intentionality properly understood by Levinas means that all
consciousness is consciousness of something, but on the essential proviso that “every object calls
forth and as it were gives rise to the consciousness through which its being shines and, in doing
so, appears.”611 However, this does not mean that Levinas envisages a reversed intentionality by
which the intentional subject becomes an intended object while the intended object becomes an
intentional subject, as if the correlation between the two entailed again an inverted version of a
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dialectical fusion that might rest on objectivism more subjective than all subjectivity. Rather, the
Cartesian model of the idea of the infinite anticipates the original way of being, that is, the
preoccupation with another being by means of an “inversion of its very exercise of being, which
suspends its spontaneous movement of existing.”612
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas delves further into the fundamental structure of being in
terms of the idea of the infinite, which is concretized in the relationship between the same and the
other: “Being is produced as multiple and as split into same and other; this is its ultimate
structure.”613 In the opening sections, Levinas first diagnoses a narcissistic gesture of philosophy
that dissimulates this ultimate structure of être by means of the comprehension of Sein, the Being
that serves as a third term by which all beings take their forms, give themselves to the panoramic
vision, and become intelligible. In the comprehension of Being that neutralizes all beings into the
ontological—or same [même] according to Levinas—level where the relation among them no
longer matters, the difference between Being and beings alone matters. Levinas thus argues,
“Western philosophy has most often an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by
interposition of a middle or neutral term that ensures the comprehension of Being.”614 Philosophy
as ontology presupposes the spontaneity of the same and, simultaneously, “promotes freedom—
the freedom that is the identification of the same.” 615 For Levinas, therefore, the narcissistic
character of philosophy stems from its preoccupation with the free spontaneity of the same which
reduces the fundamental structure of being separate as same and other into the comprehension of
Being.
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Levinas goes on to claim that philosophy’s failure to capture the fundamental dimension
of being does not result from failing to do its job but rather from betraying itself. While rigorously
doing its own job, philosophy has no idea about what it is doing, as Levinas states, “knowing
becomes knowing of a fact only if it is at the same time critical, if it puts itself into question, goes
back beyond its origin.”616 Unless philosophy knows nothing of what makes its knowing possible,
it will remain dogmatic rather than critical or philosophical. Philosophy betrays itself to the point
of being lost in the arbitrary exercise of freedom without calling into question its origin, an
autonomous spontaneity in which philosophy is sustained, verified, and justified by itself alone.
However, Levinas argues, “To philosophize is to trace freedom back to what lies before it, to
disclose the investiture that liberates freedom from the arbitrary.”617 In this regard, philosophy
becomes essentially critical only when “It discovers the dogmatism and naïve arbitrariness of its
spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of the exercise of ontology.”618 The essential
hallmark of critical, not dogmatic, philosophy, as Levinas understands it, lies in the fact that in
order to do its job in a right way, philosophy must begin with what Levinas calls “metaphysics”
or ethics of the other, which calls into question the ontological egoism of the same. It is in the
critical moment that philosophy becomes what truly it is: ethics as first philosophy.
A calling into question of the same—which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of
the same—is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my
spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his
irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts, and my possession, is precisely accomplished as a
calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the
welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the
calling into question of the same by the other, that is, the ethics that accomplishes the
critical essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, metaphysics precedes
ontology.619
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It is clear from this important passage that ethics or metaphysics is not a mere antonym for
ontology, as if Levinas attempted to replace the latter with the former. Ethics does not simply go
an opposite way in which ontology reduces the other into the same, as if it tried to reduce the latter
into the former. Furthermore, ethics is not simply a reaction to ontology in order to remedy the
illness of all the varieties of what Levinas calls totality. The raison d'être of ethics for Levinas
does not lie in inventing another dogmatism in place of ontology but in unveiling what ontology
dissimulates, the ultimate structure of being split into same and other. Levinas thus asserts: “Prior
to the disclosure of Being in general as the basis of knowledge and as the meaning of Being, the
relation with an existent that expresses itself pre-exists. Prior to the plane of ontology, the ethical
plane pre-exists.”620 In no way does ethics conceive of the annihilation of the solitude of the same
in favor of the sovereign alterity of the other. Indeed, a considerable portion of Totality and
Infinity—and the Section II entitled “Interiority and Economy” in particular—is dedicated to
developing the solitude of the subject in terms of psychism, egoism, sensibility, enjoyment, and
dwelling, which is the necessary condition for the constitution of the thinking ego who has the idea
of the infinite. In her brief analysis of the general structure found in Totality and Infinity, Leora
Batnitzky does not accept the view that Levinas is one of the postmodern thinkers insofar as
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“postmodern philosophy takes as its villain the subject of Descartes’s cogito.” 621 Instead, she
emphasizes the sincerity of the Cartesian notion of sensibility that much inspires Levinas’s
deliberation of the sensible subject, in which she finds “Descartes’s so-called modern subject”622
as an independent, separate, and atheistic subject. Batnitzky goes on to argue that “Levinas’s ego
is not a thinking self but a self that senses itself as uniquely separated from being,” and thereby
that the central argument presented in Totality and Infinity is not a claim about “the self’s
obligation to the other” but about the “separable, independent subject,” out of which his ethics
grows.623
In the Preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas himself states that “this book then presents
itself as a defense of subjectivity.”624 However, the overriding purpose of this defense lies neither
in returning to the Heideggerian notion of the ecstatic solitude of Dasein nor in repeating Levinas’s
own early consideration of the hypostatic solitude of the subject, but in penetrating into the ultimate
dimension of being [être] produced as split into the same and the other. This ultimate depth of
being separated, fractured, and out-of-jointed underlines the solitude of the subject, as if the
hypostatic position of the subject is already de-positioned from the outset. In “Violence and
Metaphysic,” Derrida’s polemical interpretation of Totality and Infinity seems to miss this
fundamental dimension of being that Levinas tries to disclose, due to its confusion between Sein
and être, which are not equivalent for Levinas himself. When Levinas criticizes Heidegger’s notion
of Sein in order to delve further into the ultimate structure of être, Derrida counters Levinas’s
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concept of être from the perspective of the Heideggerian Sein. Derrida’s presumable confusion
between Sein (of Seienden) and être (without étants) basically shows that he seems to remain
within the (pre-)Heideggerian climate, which Levinas attempts to leave. The Heideggerian notion
of Sein refers to the Being of beings and Dasein in particular, which serves to “[place] ethics under
the heel of ontology,”625 whereas Levinas does not conceive of such a third, middle, or neutral
term that sheds light on beings and lets them be. Despite this different connotation between Sein
of beings and être without beings, Derrida argues that the thought or comprehension of Being
“conditions the respect for the other as what it is: other.”626 However, Levinas calls into question
the condition as Being that might respect the other by asking what justifies this condition. Levinas
probably finds his answer in the Cartesian idea of the infinite: beyond or on the hither side of Sein,
être at its ultimate dimension is already separated into same and other, and the concrete relation
between the two is produced without any recourse to a mediation, such as an ontological Sein or
theological God. Levinas thus immediately adds: “it [this book] will apprehend the subjectivity
not at the level of its purely egoist protestation against totality, nor in its anguish before death, but
as founded in the idea of infinity.”627 In this context, the Cartesian idea of the infinite provides
Levinas with “the formal design of the structure it outlines,”628 on the basis of which he builds up
the defense of subjectivity in terms of the face-to-face relationship. Unless Levinas’s adoption of
Descartes’s idea of the infinite is considered, his main project presented in Totality and Infinity

625

WD, 135; ED, 198. Apart from whether Derrida’s polemical reading of Levinas can be justified, his
reading is too powerful and insightful to neglect it. Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas’s text does not lead to a
dogmatic rejection of Levinas’s text but to an ethical gesture, which makes it work properly without falling into any
ethical dogmatism. Far from being a trenchant critic who simply rejects Levinas’s ethical project, Derrida seems to be
Levinasian more than Levinas himself by calling him into question. Hence, Derrida’s powerful reading illustrates that
ethics can be ethics only when it remains critical of itself rather than dogmatic. I will return to Derrida’s deconstructive
reading of Levinas in the next chapter.
626
WD, 138; ED, 202.
627
TI, 26; TeI, xiv.
628
CPP, 53; DEHH, 238.

205

cannot be properly appreciated. After explicating some conditions for representation including
sensibility, enjoyment, and dwelling, Chanter goes against Batnitzky by pointing out another
condition which must be taken into account in the reading of Totality and Infinity: “The idea of
infinity conditions everything that is said in Totality and Infinity.”629 Levinas retains the formal
structure of the Cartesian idea of the infinite in order to reveal the ultimate structure of being as
split into the same and the other, as he writes, “Descartes, better than an idealist or a realist,
discovers a relation with a total alterity irreducible to interiority, which nevertheless does not do
violence to interiority.”630

2.2. The Anterior Posteriority of the Other
In the Cartesian idea of the infinite, Levinas recognizes an anachronic or anarchic logic of
“after the fact” or what he calls “the posteriority of the anterior,” 631 which contributes to
advocating his defense of subjectivity. According to this absurd logic, the anterior perception of
the infinite seems to follow the posterior perception of the finite, as if the former were posterior to
the latter. In fact, the Cartesian ego finds itself as imperfect and finite only after its recognition
that it has been given or “implanted” in itself the “innate idea,”632 by which the ego is aware of
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God as perfect and infinite. Levinas thus states: “A being receiving the idea of Infinity, receiving
since it cannot derive it from itself, is a being taught in a non-maieutic fashion.”633 For Descartes,
the source of finitude of the finite cannot originate from its own (Being) but from the infinite (God)
who has no source for its existence but is itself the very source, cause, origin, or arche of existence.
Levinas here refers to Descartes’s Meditations:

I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite one,
and hence that my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my
perception of the finite, that is myself. For how could I understand that I doubted and
desired—that is, lacked something—and that I was not wholly perfect, unless there were
in me some idea of a more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own defects
by comparison?634
In the ontological account of the idea of the infinite, Descartes conceives of the finite ego in
relation to the infinite God. In this relation, the ego appears as the effect dependent upon its cause
of being, that is, God as a necessary being who alone does not depend on anything other than itself
for its own existence: “So from what has been said it must be concluded that God necessarily
exists.”635 To be sure, Levinas detects a theological or “pre-modern” trace in Descartes’s modern
ontology: the ultimate dependence of all beings as created upon God as the creator. “The cogito in
Descartes rests on the other who is God and who has put the idea of infinity in the soul.”636 In
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other words, the finite being is dependent on the divine relation with God, without which it remains
incoherent and unjustified, whereas God absolves itself from this relation by receding into its
hidden excess which cannot be exhaustedly comprehended or grasped by the finite idea. Levinas
thus claims: “The idea of the infinite is not for me an object. The ontological argument lies in the
mutation of this ‘object’ into being, into independence with regard to me; God is the other.”637
However, the ontological argument would miss a concrete or positive structure of the idea of the
infinite, as Levinas immediately adds: “If to think consists in referring to an object, we must
suppose that the thought of the infinite is not a thought. What is it positively? Descartes does not
raise the question.”638 Levinas delves further into what the Cartesian version of the ontological
argument does not tackle, that is, the positive structure of the idea of the infinite concretized in the
ethical relationship between the same and the other: “The ‘resistance’ of the other does not do
violence to me, does not act negatively; it has a positive structure: ethical.”639 In this context, the
divine relation between the finite being and the infinite being that Descartes envisages in the formal
idea of the infinite remains unilateral or one-sided. This unilaterality of the divine relation wards
off “the production of infinity [that] calls for separation”640 not only because the finite and the
infinite remain not enough separate from each other, but also because they do not sufficiently
absolve themselves from the divine relation.
If Descartes provides an onto-theological account of the idea of the infinite, which leads to
the proof of God’s existence, Levinas gives a phenomenological account of the idea of the infinite,
which takes a concrete form in the ethical relation between the same and the other without
toward Descartes’s argument that the infinite God is the onto-theological ground, origin, or arche of finite beings, but
distances himself from both Descartes and Heidegger by arguing that they fail to tackle the ultimate structure of being
separate into same and other.
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neglecting the anachronic logic of “after the fact.” Just as the Cartesian ego finds itself as finite
and imperfect after the fact that it understands God as infinite and perfect, Levinas claims, “the
present of the cogito, despite the support it discovers for itself after the fact in the absolute that
transcends it, maintains itself all by itself.” 641 The separate subject discovers itself in its
spontaneous solitude only after the fact in its relationship with the infinitely other who contests its
solipsistic subjectivity. If the solitude of this subject is ontologically an anterior condition for any
relation to other than itself, the ethical relation with the other phenomenologically pre-conditions
the anterior condition for the solitude: “the After or the Effect conditions the Before or the Cause:
the Before appears and is only welcomed.”642 In the concrete encounter with the other, the same
finds itself already placed in the traumatic relation with that which is no longer at its disposal, the
infinitely other who comes to the same by calling into question its arbitrary exercise of freedom.
It is the ethical resistance by the other to the same, not the free spontaneity of the same, that initiates
the ethical relationship between the two.
According to the anachronistic logic of “after the fact,” the subject does not first find itself
in its spontaneous solitude and then enters into the relation with the other, but retroactively or
anachronistically finds itself after the fact in its relation to the other. Peperzak rightly states: “The
original state is not that of an ego enjoying its isolation before it would meet others; from the
beginning, and without escape, the Same sees itself related and linked to the Other from which it
is separated, and it is unable to escape from this relationship.”643 Phenomenologically speaking,
subjectivity is not produced by the identification of the subject, but, on the contrary, by its concrete
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relation with the other absolutely other than itself, who awakes it from its self-enclosed, self-same,
and solipsistic captivity. What confirms the subjectivity of the subject is neither its arbitrary
practice of being nor the comprehension of Being but the ethical relation with the other. This is
Levinas’s anachronistic conception of subjectivity at the fundamental level that he defends in
Totality and Infinity. Chanter precisely points out the Cartesian motivation found in Levinas’s
consideration of subjectivity: “Levinas’s understanding of the temporality by which the subject
finds itself after the fact in relation to the Other is Descartes’s idea of infinity.”644 The ultimate
structure of being, concretized in the ethical relation between the same and the other, does not
constitute any form of totality, which invalidates all separations, but divulges the breach or rupture
of the totality. What ethics seeks to disclose is precisely what ontology neutralizes, dissimulates,
and covers up—it is the sincerity and depth of being as fractured, plural, or, basically, dualistic,
not as monistic, solipsistic, or same [même].
The Cartesian model of the idea of the infinite informs the original way of welcoming the
other—properly speaking, of being welcomed by the other—which expresses the metaphysical
desire for the infinitely other who comes too early to the same before the latter welcomes the
former. “I must have been in relation with something I do not live from. This event is the relation
with the Other who welcomes me in the Home.”645 The too-early advent of the other does not
establish any fixed, conclusive relation that maintains the status quo into which the same is thrown.
The anachronic order of the ethical relation already implies an anarchic arche of the other, which
cannot be synchronized into the presence of the same, just as the cause of the thinking subject is
both “older than itself” and “still to come.”646 The alterity of the other, who has no source, cause,
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origin, or arche, appears as an incomprehensible, unrepresentable, asymmetrical, and anarchic
source of the finitude of the same by calling into question the latter’s freedom and autonomy. The
welcoming relationship between the same and the other does not refer to a peaceful, undisturbed,
intimate, or harmonious I-Thou relation, which might constitute or contribute to the totality of
Being, as if the duo separate as same and other were totalized into a higher, formal, and synthetic
unity. By contrast, Levinas writes, “The welcoming of the Other is ipso facto the consciousness of
my own injustice—the shame that freedom feels for itself.”647 Thus, the ethical relation is not a
mutual, reciprocal, or symmetrical relation where the same finds its own spontaneity by reducing
the alterity of the other into its identity that ensures the comprehension of Being. It is the
comprehension of Being that obscures the concrete structure of being split into same and other;
accordingly, “the shock of the encounter of the same with the other is deaden.”648 On the hither
side of the comprehension of Being, however, the concrete, naked, formless, and anarchic face of
the other, impervious to the ontological light of Being, puts into question the same, and in this
face-to-face relation, the other presents itself to the same by announcing that freedom cannot be
justified by itself. Ethics concerns itself with the fundamental structure of being concretized in the
relationship between the same and the other, in which the other calls into question the freedom of
the same while the same finds its freedom to be arbitrary, violent, and unjust.

2.3. Religion as rapport sans rapport: The Holy Versus the Sacred
This section will claim that although the Cartesian idea of the infinite shows the way of
welcoming the other, it cannot exhaust the hallmark of the ethical relation between the same and
the other, which culminates in Levinas’s paradoxical conception of religion. The relation between
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the idea that thinks and the infinite to be thought cannot be determined by an adequation,
correspondence, or satisfaction. There always remains an asymptotic surplus—it is the more in the
less, the other in the same, or the infinite in the finite that characterizes the formal structure of the
idea of the infinite. By appealing to this formal structure, Levinas discerns the concrete dimension
of the idea of the infinite in the ethical relationship between the same and the other. When
Descartes’s formal account of the idea of the infinite gives rise to the ontological proof of God’s
existence, Levinas claims that “The ambiguity of Descartes’s first evidence, revealing the I and
God in turn without merging them, revealing them as two distinct moments of evidence mutually
founding one another, characterizes the very meaning of separation.”649 Descartes’s ambiguity of
the paradoxical relation, sustained by the separation between the thinking being as finite (the cogito)
and the known being as infinite (God), engenders in turn Levinas’s own ambiguous stance toward
Descartes. In other words, Levinas rejects Descartes’s ontological proof of God’s existence, which
accounts of the divine relation between the finite or imperfect humanity and the infinite or perfect
divinity, whereas he appreciates what this ontological proof relies on, that is, the anachronistic
logic of “after the fact.” The overarching task of this section is to show that it is the anarchic logic
of “the posteriority of the anterior” that phenomenologically clarifies the ethical, religious, and
absolute relationship between the same and the other. For Levinas, the Cartesian argument remains
under the shadow of a onto-theological tradition, so that it cannot capture the absolute character
of separation, which works at two distinct levels.
On the one hand, separation or absolutio is an essential characteristic of each relatum,
which constitutes a relation. As seen above, however, the Cartesian or divine relation between the
cogito and God remains one-sided in the sense that the former relatum is still theistic and so
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dependent upon or relative to the latter relatum; the separation of the former is not sufficiently
produced since it still depends on the latter as its epistemological and ontological guarantor.
Levinas thus argues against Descartes, “The separation of the I is thus affirmed to be noncontingent, non-provisional. The distance between me and God, radical and necessary, is produced
in being itself.”650 Each relatum that constitutes a relation should remain separate from each other,
so that they absolve themselves [s’absolvent] from what they constitute, without being conflated,
integrated, or aufgehoben into a totalizing union where their separations vanish. In the totalizing
or pseudo-relation, the relatum is nothing more than a solipsistic being who encounters itself and
nothing else; it remains the same [même] in its suffocation, imprisonment, and enchainment.
On the other hand, the relata that found a relation should be separated from what they
found since each separation of the relata is found only after the fact in relation to the relation they
found; it is, Levinas states, “a relation in which the terms absolve themselves [s’absolvent] from
the relation, remain absolute [absolus] within the relation.”651 In this two-fold relation, separation
is thus produced, but this production is not found unless every relatum absolves itself from what
it establishes. In order to maintain any relation between the same and the other, they remain
absolute without being totalized into a pseudo-relation in which their absolutions dissolve: “The
same and the other at the same time maintain themselves in relationship and absolve themselves
from this relation, remain absolutely.”652 Thus, the ethical relation refers to the absolute and nontotalizing relationship with the other absolutely other than the same, i.e., the absolutely other who
absolves itself not only from the same but also from the relation with the same. This relation is
exactly what Levinas means by religion: “We propose to call ‘religion’ the bond that is established
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between the same and the other without constituting a totality.”653 In spite of the fact that Levinas
never produces an articulation of the notion of religion in a detailed or systematic way but only
sporadically mentions it throughout his oeuvre, the crux of religion in his ethical thought can be
epitomized as his paradoxical expression “rapport sans rapport.” 654 The ethical relationship
between the same and the other is itself religion or a “relation without relation” whose religiosity
does not consist in a mystical participation, dialectical reconciliation, or sacredness but in the
absolute separation, distance, or “holiness [sainteté].”655 Thus, a nom “religion” is not a mere noun
or name that envisions a fixed, self-enclosed, or totalizing identity of what the name names.
Levinas states: “The ethical relation is defined, in contrast with every relation with the sacred, by
excluding every signification it would take on unbeknown to one who maintains that relation.”656
In this absolute relationship or what Derrida even calls a “non-relationship,”657 separation takes on
its ethical, metaphysical, and thus religious signification of the holiness, which ruptures any pagan
form of totality based on a participation, fusion, absorption, dependence, synthesis, or union
among the relata.
The rupture of totality cannot be accomplished by a pseudo-relation based on a simple
opposition where all the relata remain the same (difference), but by the production of separation
in the absolute relation in which they remain atheistic and so absolute. “Only an atheist being can
relate itself to the Other and already absolve itself from this relation,” Levinas claims, “[and finally]
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welcome the absolute purified of the violence of the sacred.”658 For Levinas, preoccupation with
the sacred gives rise to a fanatic enchantment or pagan idolization, not because it is atheistic, but,
contrarily, because it is not atheistic enough due to its neglect of the significance of this Hebrew
word “kidouch,” that is, separation, distance, or absolutio. Derrida here recognizes that the French
term “sainteté” employed by Levinas is the translation of a Hebrew word “kidouch.”659 Apropos
of an absolute [absolus] implication of sainteté or kidouch on the hither side of a simple polarity
between the negation and the affirmation of God, Levinas re-defines atheism as “separation so
complete that the separated being maintains itself in existence all by itself, without participating
in the Being from which it is separated.”660 In the experience of the sacred, there is no relation at
all since the separated being does not remain atheistic or absolus in relation to a relation it founds
and thus dissolves into a fanatic union—it is an airproof enchainment into which all beings are
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suffocated. Levinas asserts, “The numinous annuls the links between persons by making beings
participate, albeit ecstatically, in a dream not brought about willingly by them, an order in which
they lose themselves [s’abîment].”661 In this context, Derrida makes a quite Levinasian argument:
“the hypersanctification of this non-relation or of this transcendence would come about by way of
desacralization rather than through secularization or laicization…perhaps even by way of a certain
‘atheism’.” 662 From the ethical, metaphysical, and religious perspective of Levinas’s thought,
atheism eventually marks the breach of all the varieties of what theology calls God, what ontology
calls Being, and what Levinas calls totality. In a genuine sense, the ethical, metaphysical, and
religious relation “respects the total Transcendence of the other without being bewitched by it.”663
It is the radical paradox of Levinas’s idea of the religious relation or relation without relation
whose relationality consists in its separation, absolution, distance, or holiness; consequently, a true
atheist alone can be truly religious.
In no way is the paradoxical rapport as religion a relation with the sacred, that is, a
synchronic-symmetrical rapprochement in which the same stands by the other at the same time
[en même temps] and in the same place [au même endroit]. This rapprochement takes place in the
same plane in which the same makes the other same; thus, it reverts to a pseudo-relation found
upon a self-indulgence, satisfaction, contention, complacency, and repos en paix, totally
indifferent to the diachronic-asymmetrical coming, calling, suffering, and death of the Other. In
the metaphysical, ethical, and religious relation, however, the same and the other never meet at the
same time in the same place since the other always comes over too early against the same by
calling into question the same place. The idea of the infinite is the first evidence of the too-early
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arrival of the other who comes from absolutely other than the same place; in other words, the
absolutely and infinitely other has already thought of me [moi] in an accusative form before I [Moi]
in a subjective form thinks of the other. In my gaze that aims at the other, the very other already
“looks at moi and accuses moi in the face of the Other.”664 In the idea of the infinite, the sober,
separate, and atheistic I finds the substantive Moi that thinks of the other only after finding itself
as an accusative moi that is thought by the other absolutely other than the moi-même. The other
speaks to the moi before the Moi gives its word to it. The promise that the Moi gives to the other
is already inscribed in the responsibility undertaken by the moi for the other. The too-early,
anachronic, and so anarchic advent of the other appears to reveal and accuse [accuser] my arbitrary
freedom and its injustice. Levinas states: “the other absolutely other—the Other—does not limit
the freedom of the same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies it.”665 If the separate,
independent, or solipsistic Moi is always occupied with itself, the other wholly other than itself
already preoccupies, obsesses, and accuses it as the accusative moi. Hence, the Moi neither begins
nor ends the ethical relation with the other; even death is no solution to this ineradicable relation.
The face of the other cannot be measured, calculated, or sublated by the Moi in terms of a
transcendental, ontological, or dialectical mediation; rather, it is the very ethical call expressed in
the face of the other that straightforwardly [droite] reveals itself to the moi and accuses the moi
with its first word “Thou shalt not kill.”666

3. The First Word of the Other: “Thou Shalt Not Kill”
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As seen in the first section, the early Levinas recognizes the alterity of the other in the
ungraspable mystery of death, which Heidegger reduces to the heroic mastery of death. For
Heidegger, death is the transparent event for Dasein, who understands it as its own existential
possibility of the sheer impossibility by which the ontological meaning of death is clarified. Death
thus determines the finite solitude in its authentic totality where Dasein discovers itself as the Same
[Même], as Cristian Ciocan puts it, “What is constituted by death is the authentic, the identical,
totality, or the Same in Levinas’s term.”667 In opposition to Heidegger’s ontological interpretation
of death, the early Levinas in Time and the Other argues that death is the enigmatic event that
cannot be captured by the doxical thematization, spiritual conceptualization, or intentional
representation. Thus, the mystery of death impervious to the comprehension of Being does not
confirm the solipsistic Being of Dasein in its most authentic possibility but, on the contrary,
ruptures, interrupts, and breaches it beyond or on the hither side of all the possibility. The mature
Levinas in Totality and Infinity goes further into the ultimate structure of être produced as split
into same and other and uncovers the ontological canopy, which dissimulates this ultimate depth
of être by veiling it up with Sein. At its most fundamental dimension, être understood by Levinas
is not a Heideggerian Sein whose authentic totality can be achieved in the solitude of Dasein as
Being-toward-death; from the beginning, it is already fractured, split, and separated into same and
other. Provided that the ultimate dimension of being is concretized in the relation between the
same and the other, death becomes a matter of a duo prior to that of a solo; in other words, it is no
longer a matter of ontology but rather of ethics, of religion in the first place. If the early Levinas
formulates his view of death against the backdrop of Heidegger in order to disclose the enigmatic
mystery in which he recognizes the alterity of the other, the mature Levinas delves further into a
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primordial phenomenon of murder that opens up “the scale of human relations.”668 For Levinas,
the ethical signification of death takes place in these human relations, which Heidegger’s
ontological analysis simply dismisses as an ontic matter that impedes access to the ontological,
existential, and authentic sense of death. No longer can death be understood in a neutral, indifferent,
or ontological way in which it manifests itself as a mere phenomenon that appears to the solipsistic
Dasein alone; rather, the problem of death intensifies to the extent that my death turns into the
death of the other in terms of violence, hostility, aggression, and murder. It is in murder as “the
absolute violence” that Levinas recognizes “the essence of death,” 669 from which the ethical
significance of death emerges.

3-1. Murder in the Economy of Death
The first death would be murder; Cain killed before he died. Cain gave death to Abel while
Abel took it from Cain. The essential characteristic of murder consists in a unilateral, asymmetric
exchange of giving and taking death. Murder takes place in the asymmetric economy of death that
operates between the same and the other, one of which unilaterally gives death to another while
the latter unilaterally takes it from the former without any compensation for the death. For nothing
replaces death; it is neither reversible nor repeatable. It cannot take place twice since it is a deadend game that never allows another game to undo it; there is no exit, no escape, and no evasion in
the one-shot event. Murder is not an evasion from being, nor “a passage into nothingness,” nor “a
passage to another existence, continuing in a new setting.”670 It seems to simply aim at annihilation.
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The two-fold implication of murder in terms of a giving-and-taking of death exceptionally and
symmetrically converges in suicide or murdering oneself, in which the one who gives death is the
very who takes it. Suicide would be the facile, painless panacea that terminates this dead-end game.
When I am suffering to the degree that my being riveted to myself appears as the unbearable,
immeasurable, or insufferable burden, murdering myself shows up as a possible escape from this
extreme suffering by giving and taking my death. In suffering at its peak, suicide might appear to
me as a salvation, which puts an end to the unbearable weight of my existence. In this extremely
desperate suffering, ironically, I obtain all the capacity to make an exit on my own to the extent
that I am able to give death to me and take it from me; therefore, suicide or killing myself no longer
matters to me since death itself is at my disposal. Suicide as the exceptional event characterizes
the symmetric and same [même] economy of death in which the exchange of giving and taking
occurs in myself [moi-même] at the same time [en même temps].
According to Derrida’s reading of the Heideggerian version of the economy of death, the
exceptional trait of suicide is authentically banalized by the mineness of death. In The Gift of Death,
Derrida reinterprets Heidegger’s ontological analysis of death in terms of sacrifice. For Heidegger,
sacrifice—dying for the other or, more generally, the death of the other—is ontologically
meaningless and even impossible in the sense that no one can die in the exact place of the other:
“Such dying for…can never mean that the other has thus had his death in the least taken away.”671
I can, of course, die for the other in its place, but my dying never takes its death away from it. I
can sacrifice myself for the other “in some definite affair or cause [in einer bestimmten Sache],”672
but my sacrifice cannot deprive the other of its own death. Ontologically understood, Dasein alone
takes death upon itself in every case, as soon as it is thrown into there, and as long as it is there.
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Heidegger writes, “No one can take the other’s dying away from him.”673 In this mineness of death,
Derrida recognizes that “One has to give it to oneself by taking it upon itself, for it can only be
mine alone, irreplaceably.”674 No one else can either give death to me or take it from me: “death
is in every case mine.”675 In the midst of giving and taking death, Dasein transparently understands
death as its most authentic possibility, which individualizes Dasein itself to the point of
accomplishing the ontological solitude in its authentic totality. What the mineness of death
signifies is the fact that the gift or giving [donner] of death is the same as the taking of it; the
giving-and-taking of death takes place within the symmetric and same economy. In this same
economy of death as in the case of suicide, death no longer matters to Dasein since it is already
mine [meine]; the heroic Dasein becomes the master of death. There is no room for the other(s) in
the same economy of death.
It would not be exaggerating to say that Levinas relates suicide to Dasein’s death, as Bergo
points out in her recent work. By arguing the sensibility underlining the ethical ground of the other
in the same, which “phenomenalizes as an affect—anxiety,…as a persistent passion,” Bergo
contends that this anxiety is clearly distinguished from “Heidegger’s Angst ‘unto death,’ which for
Levinas engulfs us in a narcissistic suffering or tempts us to suicide.”676 For Heidegger himself,
however, the experience of suicide is ontologically absurd since death itself is not something that
Dasein actualizes by committing suicide but the possibility par excellence that cannot be actualized,
insofar as it is there. Ontologically understood, death is probably the possibility of giving and
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taking, but, as Derrida rightly puts it, “Death would be the name of what suspends every experience
of giving and taking.”677 Nevertheless, the parallel structure found in both suicide and Dasein’s
death becomes evident when they remain within the narcissistic and same economy of death, which
symmetrically operates in the solitude of the solipsistic subject. For Levinas, the same economy
of death conceals the ultimate structure of being and, for that reason, betrays the essence of death
as murder by making it the symmetric event in which the giver and the taker remain the Same
[Même].
From Levinas’s perspective, murder as the essence of death is not something that I can give
and take in my solitude. Unlike suicide or Dasein’s death in the symmetric economy of death, the
genuine, ethical, or religious sense of murder, although it still remains within the economy of
giving and taking, emerges from the ultimate dimension of being as split into the same and the
other prior to my solitude. The solitude of my death cannot make the other disappear since the
other has already been there, is still there, and will be there; the “there” from which the other comes
is neither a da nor an ici but “elsewhere” than any of these. Given the ethical situation in which
my solitude is already de-posited and so faced with the alterity of the other, my death is already
under the other economy of death, absolutely unbeknown to me. The other who comes from
elsewhere never indifferently comes to me; it is not always my congenial, likable, or hospitable
friend who welcomes me but also an unknown, dangerous, or hostile enemy who comes to murder
me. As Levinas states, “The Other, inseparable from the very event of transcendence, is situated
in the region from which death, possibly murder, comes.”678 I have no idea of whether the other
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welcomes or murders me since the alterity of the infinitely and absolutely other exceeds my idea
of it; otherwise, the alterity of the other, either my friend or my foe, is measured by and finally
reduced into my self-knowledge, representation, or comprehension. The hostile threat of the other
does not issue from its fatal violence to kill me for sure but from what I cannot anticipate, project,
or assume—it is “the very unforeseeableness of [its] reaction”679 that makes me restless, unsettled,
and non-indifferent by suspending, shaking, or undermining my selfsame identity.
The approach of the absolutely other traumatizes, astonishes, and staggers me to the extent
that it deprives me of my mastery over death in which I find myself in my authentic totality. My
death does not come from myself in the narcissistic economy of death where I remain the same by
giving and taking death as my most authentic possibility; otherwise, death would be then the
solipsistic locus in which I exert my power, mastery, and sovereignty. Levinas states: “But the
possible is immediately inverted into Power and Domination. In the new that springs from it the
subject recognizes himself. He finds himself again in it, masters it.”680 In this regard, suicide like
Dasein’s death is the exceptional moment of a self-negation where the giver who gives death to
the taker takes again what it gives; thus, the giver and the taker are the Same [Même]. The gift of
death remains within the symmetric and same economy of death. However, murder as the essence
of death does not belong to the symmetric economy of death since the giver who gives death does
not take again what it gives; it gives it to the other absolutely other than itself. Rather, my death
comes from the absolutely other whose gift of death remains within the asymmetric economy, that
is, the other economy of death that disrupts the same economy of death over which I hold sway.
Due to the asymmetric economy of death, it is the absolutely other who alone gives death to me,
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and not vice versa. Consequently, death truly matters to me since it is not mine, out of my hand:
“death threatens me from beyond.” 681
The asymmetric economy of death signifies that I am not only a vulnerable victim of the
critical menace of the other but also a hostile enemy who can kill the other, as Levinas writes:
“The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill.”682 In his early text entitled “Ethics and Spirit”
(1952), Levinas already touched upon this point, arguing that the face of the other is “an absolute
resistance to possession, an absolute resistance in which the temptation to murder is
inscribed….The Other is the only being that one can be tempted to kill.”683 I cannot wish to murder
animals, angels, or ghosts but only the one who has a face that speaks to me and commands me
not to murder. It is interesting to note that just as Heidegger differentiates dying from perishing or
demising, John Llewelyn makes a distinction, with a nuanced—stripped off ontological
connotations—tone, between murdering and exterminating: “a being [that] I exterminate or
destroy, is not one I can want to murder or kill.”684 However, this does not mean that my temptation
to murder brings about the interdiction in order to ward off further murdering, as if without my
initial intention to kill there would be no interdiction, as if Cain’s murdering gave rise to one of
the Ten Commandments. Properly speaking, the posterior temptation makes sense of the raison
d'être of the anterior commandment, as if my temptation were the cause of the first word of the
other. The interdiction of the other does not follow, Levinas claims, “after the event, but looks at
me from the very depths of the eyes I want to extinguish.”685 Even prior to any initiative to kill the
other at whom the subjective or substantive Moi aims, the eyes of the other already look at the
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accusative moi and speak to it “Thou shalt not kill” by which the Moi finds its freedom arbitrary,
unjust, and murderous rather than innocent, intact, and just. It is as if I already did, even though I
have never committed murder.
However, the primordial interdiction of the face does not simply mean the impossibility of
murdering; rather, it presupposes the possible transgression of what it interdicts. Levinas even says,
“in fact the interdiction already dwells in this possibility.”686 In reality, murder is not, of course,
impossible as in the case of suicide, for it is still under the economy of death in terms of giving
and taking. In fact, the murdering still prevalent in our reality undoubtedly discloses the ethical
exigency inscribed in the face of the other as “more primordial than everything that takes place in
[us].”687 Cain is the first one who violated the interdiction by giving death to Abel. In murdering
his brother, what Cain failed to see is the profound depth of the face, that is, the most vulnerable,
unprotected, and naked locus of Abel, by reducing it into a plastic form of a visage through which
he would see, and over which he would hold sway. Cain slew Abel but could not annihilate his
face whose infinity exceeds and paralyzes Cain’s power and mastery over death, so that Able had
already looked at Cain with “the eye that in the tomb shall look at Cain,”688 even before being
murdered. In Levinas’s view, whenever I wish to annihilate the other, the other denies me not a
greater power that I cannot overcome with my power but the “ethical resistance”689 that calls into
question my power as such and unveils its murderous violence. Levinas thus notes, “The
movement of annihilation in murder is therefore a purely relative annihilation.”690 The murdering
of the other is not a total annihilation but the very attestation of the arbitrary, unjustified, and
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violent exercise of freedom. In this relative annihilation, my power is frustrated and exposed to
the ethical call, which leads to the Pascaline insight that my being is itself already the usurpation
of the world. As Levinas puts it, “I am not innocent spontaneity but usurper and murderer”691 even
though I could not even kill anyone, including myself. In this regard, the murder of Cain betrays
the essence of death, which consists in the impossibility of murdering in spite of the fact that Cain
slew Abel: “the impossibility of killing is not real, but moral.”692 Cain really murdered Abel, but
ethically failed to murder him. Murder always aims at the face but already misses it, as Levinas
states, “Murder exercises a power over what escapes power.”693 Paradoxically, the essence of
death enshrined in murder lies in the inevitable failure of murdering the other, which is
primordially inscribed in the first word of the other: “Thou shalt not kill.”

3-2. Time against Death
The asymmetric economy of death signifies that it is the absolutely other alone who not
only gives me [moi] death but also to whom I [Moi] cannot give death in my spontaneity. Hence,
death is not the possibility over which I hold sway by anticipating the nothingness of my own
existence, of my no-longer-able-to-be-there, but rather the limit of the possibility in which I am no
longer able to be able or have no longer power, mastery, or sovereignty. In the asymmetric
economy of death, I [Moi] am no longer toward death as my most authentic possibility, but the
enigmatic, unknowable, and mysterious death is toward me [moi] on the hither side of any
possibility: “In the being for death of fear, I am not faced with nothingness, but faced with what is
against me, as though murder, rather than one of the occasions of dying, were inseparable from
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the essence of death.”694 The true menace of death does not spring from its deadly violence that
kills me at a certain moment but from its unknowability, unforeseeability, or unassumability,
which cannot be synchronized into my time in terms of either memory/reminiscence or
projection/anticipation. I cannot even assume what is against me since it asymptotically comes to
me and approaches me with secrecy; the last moment is hidden from me [ultima latet].695 My death
comes from “elsewhere” than the ontological topos in which I can exercise my power; it is out of
my control. The gift of death in the asymmetric economy of death does not mean that the other
gives death to me immediately and so annihilates me for good, but that the other liberates me from
my solipsistic (dis)closure or imprisonment at the heart of myself [moi-même]. In the asymmetric
economy of death, what the other gives is exactly what I take, that is, my time to respond. It is my
time granted by the other that “separates me from my death dwindles and dwindles without end,
involves a sort of last interval that my consciousness cannot traverse.”696 Before my death, I still
have time to be against death, against the last moment—albeit unbeknown to me; it is an interval,
postponement, or delay that allows me to be ethical, religious, and responsible.
However, my time as a postponement of death should not be confused with an inauthentic
time or the time of the anonymous they [das Man], as Chanter might hold. According to Heidegger,
death does not matter to the Man since it is delayed to the infinite future; it is not mine [meine]
and not right now for the Man. After clearing the way of an inauthentic understanding of Beingtoward-death that the Man misconstrues, Chanter argues that this inauthentic understanding of
death is “not ‘inauthentic’ according to Levinas,” and even claims that “for Levinas it is part of
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the essence of death to be always infinitely future.”697 However, Levinas does not subscribe to
Heidegger’s distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic understanding of death in terms
of the comprehension of Sein, which conceals the ultimate structure of être. Moreover, the essence
of death does not consist in a mere postponement of death to the infinite future. Levinas would
agree with Heidegger that the Man “always has more time up to the end,”698 so that death does not
matter to it. The criticism that Levinas levels against the time of the Man is that the Man still has
more time to delay its death to the infinite future, but has no sense of responsibility for the other,
not even for its own Being. The Man’s “to still have time” gives rise to the lack of responsibility
and so the indifference to its own death whereas my time “to be against death” leads to the exigency
of my response to the ethical call of the other. Against my death, against my last moment, I still
have time to be not for myself but rather for the other who calls for my response. What
individualizes me is not my death but rather my response to and my responsibility for the other,
who makes me restless and non-indifferent and, therefore, solicits my irreducible, insatiable, and
irreplaceable responsibility.
In the asymmetric economy of death, the essence of death takes on its ethical signification:
the inescapable exigency of the ethical command inscribed in the expression of the face “Thou
shalt not kill.” Prior to my anticipatory resolution that I am toward death in my responsibility for
my solipsistic Being, I am against death in my responsibility for the other. Death truly matters to
me since “Death, source of all myths, is present only in the Other,” 699 who summons me to my
response, to my responsibility. Death is out of reach, out of hand; indeed, it matters to me insofar
as it is not mine. The face of the other as the holy locus of the original language calls for my
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response “It’s me here [Me voici]”700 and commands the moi to take responsibility for the other.
In the face-to-face relationship, I discover myself as the accusative moi who fears murder in my
responsibility for the other, prior to as the substantive Moi who is anxious of death in its own
responsibility for the authentic Being: “anxiety of death is inverted into fear of committing
murder.”701 The ethical signification of death emerges from the inverted movement of being from
the being-for-itself to the being-for-the-other. For Levinas, to be mortal is to still have time to
respond, to be for the other, to be moral, and to be religious. It is my first response, “Me voici,”
that delivers the moi to the other: the primordial exposure to the other on the hither side of the
(dis)closure of Being.

3.3. The Failure of Phenomenology of Death
As seen so far, death is not the ontological locus of the solitude of Dasein but the ethical
locus of the alterity of the other; it is neither something nor nothing that I can give and take in my
spontaneous freedom. Just as Heidegger’s ontological analysis of death or thanato-logy neutralizes
the mystery of death into the mastery of death, any doxical thematization of death deprives the
alterity of death by making it a pure, flat, or transparent phenomenon. Levinas’s ethics calls into
question the Heideggerian version of thanatology because death as such cannot be logicalized,
thematized, or grasped; otherwise, “Ethics, where the same takes the irreducible Other into account,
would belong to opinion [doxa].”702 Death as the enigmatic locus of the alterity of the other might
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not be a proper subject matter for phenomenology since it never manifests itself as a theme, object,
or phenomenon. Thus, death escapes from all doxical thematization and all phenomenological
description so that phenomenology fails to thematize death and to make sense of it. In this vein,
“phenomenology of death” seems to be oxymoronic since death rejects phenomenology. Ironically,
the successful achievement of phenomenology of death betrays not only death itself but also
phenomenology all together.
For Levinas, phenomenology of death is exemplarily achieved by Heidegger’s ontologicaldoxical thanatology through thematizing what cannot be thematized. By means of this doxical
thematization, the ontological meaning of death is unconcealed in the “Sein-topped” architecture.
However, what is still concealed in this unconcealment is what is more primordial and urgent, that
is, the very ethical meaning of death. In order to unveil the ethical signification of death,
phenomenology should fail to thematize death. This does not mean that phenomenology should
not thematize what cannot be thematized, i.e., death; rather, it has to thematize it but fails to do so.
Paradoxically, phenomenology justifies its raison d'être in its failure. Only the miscarriage of the
phenomenological project exposes why death is neither a mere phenomenon nor a pure nonphenomenon. Indeed, death is neither a pure phenomenon which can be grasped by doxical
thematizations and whose meaning is exhausted in its manifestation, nor a pure non-phenomenon,
which remains irrelevant and meaningless to the phenomenological investigation. The failure of
phenomenology is the unavoidable price Levinas has to pay in his attempt to debunk the successful
thematization of death achieved by Heidegger’s ontology. It is the paradox of Levinas’s own
phenomenology of death that consists in the failure of phenomenology itself.
Nevertheless, the possibility of Levinas’s own phenomenology of death comes from the
failure of phenomenology itself. That is to say, the failure of phenomenology leads Levinas to go
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back to what phenomenology has sought, i.e., the Sachen selbst as they are. On the hither side of
the binary opposition of a pure phenomenon and pure non-phenomenon, death appears as a paraphenomenon, which reveals itself as it is without being reduced to a flat phenomenon or being
withdrawn into a pure non-phenomenon; there always remains an incomprehensible excess or
surplus impervious to the doxical thematization. What Heidegger’s doxical analysis of death
covers up is the very mystery, enigma, or para-phenomenality of death; in doing so, the paradoxical signification of death is largely subordinated into the doxical meaning of Being. The
primary task of Levinas’s phenomenology of death is to unveil what has been veiled by the doxical
thematization of death and to lay bare the exigency of the paradoxical signification of death,
inscribed in the face of the other, prior to the doxical-ontological meaning of Dasein’s death. At
the limit of phenomenology, Levinas recognizes both the possibility and the impossibility of
phenomenology of death in terms of a para-phenomenality of death. The phenomenological
challenge Levinas faces in the ultimate structure of being split as the same and the other becomes
even more complicated and exigent when the third party or the other other than the other enters
the ethical relation between the two. “The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other.”703
Every other is absolutely and infinitely other. Now death is no longer a matter of a duo but of a
trio and more. The central aim of the next chapter is to examine this perplexing problem concerning
the death of the others in terms of the third party, on which Levinas himself largely remains silent.
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Chapter V
Trio and More from the Outset: Hyperbolic Phenomenology of Death

Chapter Four has considered Levinas’s mature elaboration of being [être] whose ultimate
dimension lies not in the solitude of the solipsistic subject but in the separation between the same
and the other. If the early Levinas, especially in Existence and Existents and Time and the Other,
discovers the brutal nakedness of being [être] without any being [étant] or of the anonymous il y
a by calling into question the ongoing complicity or conjunction of Sein and Seidendes, the mature
Levinas in Totality and Infinity goes into the concrete structure of being produced as split into
same and other antecedent to a solipsistic, solitary, or lonely being or Dasein. Ontologically, in
order to enter a relation to the other, the subject must first preserve its own place in which it is able
to stand on its own; otherwise, it would be impossible for the subject to have any relationship with
other than itself. Thus, the ontological relation always presupposes an authentic place proper to
the subject. However, Levinas contends that this authentic place is already the usurpation,
domination, and sovereignty of the subject where it remains the same in its self-identification,
which is nothing but the reduction of the other into the same.
Phenomenologically, the central thesis of Totality and Infinity illustrates that the anterior
solitude of the subject can be found only after the fact in its posterior relation to the other, as if the
posteriority of its relationship with the other already conditions the anterior solitude of the subject.
If the solitude of the subject is the condition for the ontological relation to the other, the too-early
advent of the other already pre-conditions, pre-concerns, and pre-affects this solipsistic subject.
The posterior relationship between the same and the other betrays the anterior solitude of the
subject in such a way that the subject no longer finds its base, cause, origin, or arche in itself,
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which founds, sustains, and justifies its own solitude; the subject no longer remains at home with
itself [chez-soi] but always already exposed to the other. The phenomenological or anarchic logic
of “the posteriority of the anterior”704 discloses that my being is primordially structured as beingfor-the-other prior to being-for-myself. The anterior posteriority of the other undermines the
constant complicity between Dasein and Being, which denigrates, marginalizes, or belittles the
ethical relation between beings as an ontic or inauthentic issue. What Levinas means by “the ethical”
is not something ontic that waits for ontology to make clear its way of Sein since ontology blurs,
distracts, or covers up “the royal road”705 to the bare depth of être. Consequently, Levinas claims
that what ontology has dissimulated by means of the various ontological coverings and Sein in
particular is this concrete and ultimate dimension of être produced as multiple.
By appealing to the Cartesian idea of the infinite, Levinas in Totality and Infinity attempts
to strip off what has been accumulated in the pure bottom of being in order to disclose the
primordial structure of being concretized in the metaphysical, ethical, religious, and absolus
relations between the same and the other without constituting any form of what Levinas calls
totality. Just as the idea, already implanted in the cogito, thinks of the infinite whose excessive or
“desirable” content cannot be exhaustedly captured, grasped, or comprehended by the cogito, the
idea of the infinite formally signifies an unsurpassable distance, separation, or “holiness [sainteté]”
between the terms that relate. This formal structure of a relation of the idea to its ideatum, which
maintains the absolus distance between the relata, takes its concrete form in the ethical encounter
with the other. The face of the other signifies the rupture of the totalizing disposition of my identity,
and its ethical resistance calls into question the free, arbitrary, and unjust spontaneity in my selfidentification. Prior to my own death toward which I am able to be in the ontological responsibility
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for my own, proper, or authentic Being, I still have time to be against death in the ethical
responsibility for the other. The essence of death embedded in murder takes on the ethical
signification when death truly matters to me, not because it is mine, but precisely because it is a
matter of the other. The ethical signification of the death of the other originates from the irreducible,
irreplaceable, and inescapable exigency of the ethical call inscribed in the command of the face:
“Thou shalt not kill.” The interdiction of the face announces that I am already an accomplice in
murdering the other—even though I have never committed murder in reality—and, accordingly,
calls for my responsibility to respond, “me voici.”
However, the ethical situation becomes convoluted when the third party as the other of the
other interrupts my excessive and exclusive responsibility for the other and calls for my response:
“me voici.” The advent of the third party as another other other than the other commands me what
the other commands me; I must give my word “me voici” not simply to the other alone but also to
the third party, and to all the others. It is the troublesome moment of politics or justice that
introduces “the latent birth of the question in responsibility.”706 However, this does not mean that
the later Levinas compromises the ethical burden of responsibility for the other; on the contrary,
he intensifies it to the point of my responsibility for the responsibility of the other by employing
hyperbolic notions, such as substitution, sacrifice, or dying for others. The central task of this
chapter is to examine how the later Levinas elaborates on this complicated question, that is, the
political moment in the ethical in terms of the interrogation of the third party. In order to answer
this question, it is important to first consider Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Levinas that
makes clear the way in which Levinas formulates the very question on the basis of his departure
from both Husserl and Heidegger. The aim of the first section is to disclose that the essential
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advantage of Derrida’s critical analysis of Levinas does not simply consist in his effective or potent
censure on Levinas’s ethical project but rather in his deconstructive gesture which clarifies
Levinas’s own question running through his later texts.

1. Derrida’s Deconstructive Gesture toward Levinas
Provided that Levinas’s elaboration of ethics as opposed to ontology is mostly flourished
in his mature work Totality and Infinity, Derrida exemplarily presents a sort of a “classic” reading
of Levinas’s ethics. It is “Violence and Metaphysics” (1964 & 1967)707 that ignites various and
extended debates on Levinas’s own ethics in relation to Derrida’s deconstructive reading of it
inside and outside the Levinasian scholarship.708 Before moving onto Levinas’s later work, it is
worthwhile to consider how Derrida attempts to deconstruct Levinas’s ethics, developed in his
mature work Totality and Infinity, in order to recall what Levinas has done with ethics hitherto and
to foresee what he will do hereafter. However, this does not mean that Levinas’s later texts and
especially Otherwise Than Being or beyond Essence are merely a response to Derrida’s critique of
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Totality and Infinity, as some commentators hold.709 Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley, for
example, state, “Might not Otherwise Than Being is seen as a re-reading of Totality and Infinity in
the light of ‘Violence and Metaphysics’? Although the dialogue between Levinas and Derrida
should not be reduced to a question of influence…it seems clear that Levinas has carefully read
and assimilated Derrida’s essay.” 710 Consequently, if the “first generation” of the Levinasian
scholarship has been largely established by Totality and Infinity along with Derrida’s reading of
it—i.e., “Violence and Metaphysics,” Bernasconi and Critchley argue that “its second generation”
requires “Re-reading Levinas,” which can be determined by their later works, such as Otherwise
Than Being and “At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am.”711 However, what is at stake
here is neither to examine a philosophical dialogue or “chiasm” between Levinas and Derrida nor
to verify Derrida’s critique of Levinas—all of which are neither meaningless nor insignificant at
any rate—but rather to read Levinas properly with regard to his phenomenology of death. When it
comes to the central purpose of this dissertation, a Derridean passage—whether Levinas himself
indeed underwent or not—plays a significant role in understanding how Levinas’s phenomenology
of death departs from Husserl’s phenomenological method and Heidegger’s ontological
709
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thematization of death. Moreover, Derrida’s critical engagement of Levinas’s ethics makes clear
Levinas’s own question, which runs through his early texts implicitly and his later ones explicitly.
By means of examining the Derridean passage, this chapter claims that far from falling into a pure,
impotent, or angelic ethics, Levinas’s ethics remains ethical in the political moment of the third
party who calls into question the duo-relationship between the same and the other.
Derrida’s peculiar concept of deconstruction or clôture shows the way he reads a text by
treating it as a “tradition.” When reading a metaphysical tradition, he describes the deconstructive
situation of metaphysics by posing “the question of the relations between the belonging
[appurtenance] and the opening [percée], the question of clôture.”712 In terms of the strategy of
deconstruction that characterizes a textual practice of double or equivocal reading, Derrida
attempts to exhibit that philosophy necessarily belongs to a metaphysical tradition and,
simultaneously, searches for the breakthrough from that tradition. In “Violence and Metaphysics,”
Derrida takes Levinas as a text and then reads him with regard to the deconstructive strategy, which
consists in the double reading of Levinas. In the first reading, Derrida follows “in the style of
commentary”713 Levinas who reads traditional texts—especially Husserl and Heidegger. Derrida’s
reading style of commentary means neither an annotated repetition of the text to simply accept it
nor a refutation of the text to leave it behind, but rather gives rise to the second reading in which
he re-reads his first reading by opening up the ellipses embedded within Levinas’s treatment of
the traditional texts. Derrida believes that his deconstructive reading of Levinas makes Levinas
qua the text more Levinasian than Levinas himself by disclosing the blind spots—which Levinas
might not recognize—within Levinas’s own reading of Husserl and Heidegger. Derrida goes on to
argue that his double reading of Levinas “will ask several questions. If they succeed in approaching
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the heart of this explication, they will be nothing less than objections, but rather the questions put
to us by Levinas.”714 Consequently, it is the essential merit of Derrida’s reading of Levinas that
clarifies Levinas’s own question via the deconstruction of Levinas’s consideration of Husserl and
Heidegger.

1-1. Transcendental Violence of Light
According to Derrida, Levinas’s ethical thought “summons us to depart from the Greek
site,” 715 which is the source of the violence placed in both Husserlian phenomenology and
Heideggerian ontology. In the deconstruction of Levinas’s reading of Husserl, Derrida points out
that Levinas condemns Husserl’s phenomenology for its violence of the phenomenological “light”
as the third term that reduces the Other to the Same; the other is neutralized under the panoramic
vision of the transcendental Ego. For Levinas, vision always presupposes the light. What the eye
sees is not the light but objects in the light, by which they obtain their own forms and become
intelligible in the transcendental sphere. Derrida maintains that what bothers Levinas here is “the
imperialism of theoria” precisely because “More than any other philosophy, phenomenology, in
the wake of Plato, was to be struct with light.” 716 The phenomenological eye becomes the
transcendental locus of theoria which penetrates or sees through all objects and makes sense of
them on the basis of the light. In the eyes of Levinas, Husserlian phenomenology presents the other
as an alter ego, constituted by analogical appresentation in the Ego’s intentional sphere, and thus
reduces the infinite alterity of the Other to the totalitarian identity of the transcendental Ego.
Levinas thus states, “The neutralization of the other who becomes a theme or an object—appearing,
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that is, taking its place in the light—is precisely the reduction of the other to the same.”717 Levinas
attempts to protect the alterity of the Other from the violent light through his own metaphysical
ethics or “Ethics of Ethics”718 in Derrida’s word.
However, Derrida argues against Levinas that the transcendental reference to analogical
appresentation does not refer to the subordination of the other to the same, which destroys the
alterity of the other, but to “the unsurpassable necessity of (nonobjective) mediation,”719 without
which the other ceases to be an (other) ego other than the same as the (same) ego and so cannot
appear to the same. Derrida goes on to ask whether it is possible to maintain any philosophical or
ethical “discourse” presented in Totality and Infinity without the phenomenological light; he then
contends that there can be no pure ethics without violence, since the phenomenological light is a
necessary condition for the presence of the other to the same. Insofar as the other cannot present
itself to the same, there will be neither violence nor responsibility altogether in Ethics of Ethics.
Derrida thus argues, “It is difficult to maintain a philosophical discourse against light.”720 The
Levinasian version of ethics or a meta-ethics, as Derrida understands it, seems to conceive of the
presence of the other as a pure absence, and thereby the other appears as a pure non-phenomenon:
“The other must present himself as absent and manifest as non-phenomenal.” 721 If the other
manifested itself as a pure non-phenomenon outside the phenomenological light and so never
appeared to the same, the ethical resistance of the other would be, Derrida claims, “the strange,
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unthinkable notion of unreal resistance.” 722 Accordingly, the non-phenomenality of the other
would simply go far beyond the phenomenological inquiry, as if the face of the other were not a
proper subject matter of phenomenology, as Derrida states: “Thus the expression of the face is
expressed beyond all thematization, all constitutive analysis, and all phenomenology.” 723 For
Derrida, thus, Levinas fails to recognize that Husserl has already achieved what Levinas himself
attempts to achieve through overcoming Husserlian phenomenology:
Levinas and Husserl are quite close here. But by acknowledging in this infinitely other as
such (appearing as such) the status of an intentional modification of the ego in general,
Husserl gives himself the right to speak of the infinitely other as such, accounting for the
origin and the legitimacy of his language. He describes the system of the phenomenality of
nonphenomenality. Levinas in fact speaks of the infinitely other, but by refusing to
acknowledge an intentional modification of the ego—which would be a violent and
totalitarian act for him—he deprives himself of the very foundation and possibility of his
own language....To return, as to the only possible point of departure, to the intentional
phenomenon in which the other appears as other, and lends itself to language, to every
possible language, is perhaps to give oneself over to violence…but in question, then, is an
irreducible zone of factuality, an original, transcendental violence, previous to every ethical
choice, even supposed by ethical nonviolence.724
As this passage clearly shows, Derrida does not reject Levinas’s claim that to speak of the other in
terms of the intentional modification of the ego is essentially violent; the reason Derrida criticizes
Levinas here lies in the latter’s rejection of this essential, original, or transcendental violence in
the discourse of the other. For Derrida, the transcendental reference to analogical appresentation
is the minimum violence only on the basis of which the other can be an (other) ego other than the
ego, that is, an alter ego: “the other as transcendental other…can never be given to me in an original
way and in person, but only through analogical appresentation.”725 In opposition to Levinas who
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insists that Husserl’s conception of analogical appresentation gives rise to the reduction of the
other to the same, Derrida advocates that analogical appresentation is the only way to “confirm
and respect separation” between the same and the other: “The other as alter ego signifies the other
as other, irreducible to my ego, precisely because it is an ego, because it has the form of the ego.”726
In Derrida’s reading of Levinas’s ethical language, the refutation of the Husserlian analogical
appresentation not only deprives Levinas of the right to speak of the other but also necessarily
entails the worst violence Levinas attempts to avoid. Insofar as Levinas does not accept that the
other is recognized as an alter ego by way of the intentional modification of the ego, according to
Derrida, he cannot speak of the other as infinite, absolute, or whatsoever. Neither does the
Levinasian other lend itself to any language nor appears to the same who would respond to the
ethical call. Therefore, Derrida argues that Levinas’s ethical discourse of the other is “the very
gesture of all violence,”727 since it never allows the other to be an (alter) ego.
Derrida contends that Husserl, unlike Levinas, is able to speak of the other as an alter ego
whose egoity “permits him to say ‘ego’ like me….This is why the other is face, can speak to me,
understand me, and eventually command me.” 728 The minimum violence of the intentional
modification based on the analogical appresentation discloses Derrida’s basic premise of economy
of violence, which is intolerable to Levinas: “Dissymmetry itself would be impossible without this
symmetry.”729 The ethical dissymmetry between the same and the other that Levinas maintains
can properly work only under the symmetrical condition that the other be an ego like the same qua
the transcendental Ego. At the expense of entering into the philosophical discourse and becoming
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an (alter) ego, the other is necessarily exposed to a “transcendental and preethical violence,”730
without which the other cannot obtain the transcendental status of an ego and thereby have any
relationship with the same; thus, to reject the minimum or least violence is to risk the worst
violence. By criticizing a non-violent relationship to the other as an “ethical ideal,” Marin
Hägglund follows Derrida: “Violence does not supervene upon a peaceful Other but marks the
possibility of every relation.”731 He goes on to argue that for Derrida, unlike Levinas, violence is
not a corruption or derivative of a pure or ideal peace. It is not only because there can be no absolute
peace uncontaminated by violence according to the deconstructive logic, but also because such a
peace would in fact annihilate the possibility of all relations in advance and thus be “the equivalent
of absolute violence.” 732 Instead, Hägglund makes a Derridean claim that a “constitutive
violence”733 opens up the relationship between the same and the other; the relation to the other
cannot be ethical in a primordial sense. As Derrida insists in Of Grammatology, it is a preethical,
transcendental, or violent opening that renders possible the ethical relationship: “the nonethical
opening of ethics.”734 In this context, Levinas’s ethical discourse of the other exempt from all
violence ironically envisions the pure other who remains abandoned to the worst violence, since it
can neither enter any relationship with the same nor be even said and articulated by the ethical
discourse: “pure nonviolence, the nonrelation of the same to the other (in the sense understood by
Levinas) is pure violence.”735 Consequently, Derrida claims that the Levinasian other remains
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vulnerable, susceptible, or exposed to the worst violence although it might be free from the least
violence; pure non-violence is nothing but pure violence.
As seen in the foregoing chapter, however, the approach or epiphany of the other is neither
a sheer phenomenon nor a sheer non-phenomenon but rather a para-phenomenon on the hither
side of the binary opposition between being and non-being, between presence and absence, or
between phenomenon and noumenon. For Levinas, the other is merely neither present nor absent;
rather, it is not present insofar as its presence is not synchronized into the presence of the same,
and, at the same time, it is not absent insofar as its presence calls into question the presence of the
same. The ambiguity of the approach of the other, culminated in the enigma of death, characterizes
the para-phenomenality of the other’s alterity, which cannot be captured by the doxical
thematization, ontological comprehension, or transcendental phenomenology. However, this does
not mean the Levinasian other, as understood by Derrida, simply goes beyond or strays from
phenomenology as if the inexhaustibility of the alterity of the other simply remains outside all
phenomenological investigation. Levinas thus notes: “The face, still a thing among things, breaks
through the form that nevertheless delimits it.”736 In the confrontation with the enigmatic alterity
of the other, Levinas never leaves phenomenology behind but shows its failure. It is an
inexhaustible excess, surplus, or para-doxa, inscribed in the face of the other, that overflows,
ruptures, and frustrates all doxical thematizations and transcendental reflections. In this failure of
phenomenology, the para-phenomenality of the other signifies an “infinite dimension which
separates me from the other, both present and still to come, a dimension opened by the face of the
Other.” 737 Insofar as the other is understood as an alter ego in terms of the analogical
appresentation of the ego, its upright [droit] expression is subsumed under the symmetric system
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of language where the exigent call of the other is banalized into an everyday moment of a mutual
communication. In this vein, the least or transcendental violence of language that Derrida
maintains in order to ward off the worst violence is no other than the very violence—whether it is
least or worst—that compromises the alterity of the other, as Levinas contends.
When it comes to speaking of the other, the primary interest of Levinas’s ethics does not
lie in the Derridean question of how the discourse of the other possibly enters into a linguistic
system, which enables or entitles the other to communicate with the same in a symmetrical or
reciprocal manner. Rather, the essential point Levinas attempts to make here is to disclose not only
what renders the symmetrical system of language possible but also what this linguistic system
dissimulates—it is the first expression of the face, “Thou shalt not kill,” that underlies all
symmetrical system of language. Levinas thus claims: “The ambivalence of apparition is
surmounted by expression, the presentation of the Other to me, the primordial event of
signification.”738 The ethical discourse begins with the first word of the other, which does not
consist in a symmetrical communication between the same and the other but in the asymmetrical
obligation to the command, as Levinas unambiguously states, “The face opens the primordial
discourse whose first word is obligation.”739 The problem with the phenomenological light for
Levinas is that the mediation of the third term nullifies the straightforwardness or uprightness
[droiture] of the expression of the face by synchronizing the approach of the other into the presence
of the same. If the phenomenological light is a transcendental condition for the appearance of the
other to the same, for Levinas contra Derrida, the original uprightness of the expression of the face
already pre-conditions this transcendental condition. Just as the ethical relationship between the
same and the other is not an intimate one, the other approaches to the same neither indifferently
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nor symmetrically but always asymmetrically calls into question the self-enclosed, solipsistic, and
egoistic identity of the same. This traumatic encounter characterizes the para-phenomenality of
the other that cannot be exhausted by all doxical thematization and thereby discloses the inherent
miscarriage of ortho-dox phenomenology.

1-2. Ontological Violence of Being
The ethical discourse of the other becomes more problematic in Derrida’s deconstructive
reading of Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s ontology. According to Derrida’s reading of Levinas,
Heidegger’s ontology affirms the priority of Being over beings, by which the other is neutralized
as an anonymous being among others; thus, the Being appears as the neutral or third term, that is,
“the light in which existents become intelligible.”740 Derrida points out that “the light of Being”
as the third term “brings the other back into the midst of the same for the sake of the unity of
Being.”741 For Levinas, the intelligibility of beings is constituted on the basis of the light of Being,
not only which reduces the alterity of the other into the identity of the same, but also in which “the
shock of the encounter of the same with the other is deadened.”742 In Derrida’s view, however,
when Levinas criticizes the priority of Being for its power or domination over beings and the other
in particular, Levinas seems oblivious to the ontological difference between Being and beings that
Heidegger rigorously attempts to make. Derrida claims against Levinas that “there can be an order
of priority only between two determined things, two beings” and thereby that “to precomprehend
or explicate the implicit relation of Being to a being is not to submit a being (for example, someone)
to Being in a violent fashion.”743 For Derrida along with Heidegger, the Being is not an excellent
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or highest being among other beings that governs, controls, or suppresses other beings: “Being is
not a principle, is not a principal being, an archia which would permit Levinas to insert the face
of a faceless tyrant under the name of Being.”744 Rather, it is “the letting-be [laisser-être]” or
Gelassenheit in Heidegger’s own term that lets beings—including the other in the first place—
reveal themselves as they are: “If to understand Being is to be able to let be,…then the
understanding of Being always concerns alterity and par excellence the alterity of the Other in all
its originality.”745 Derrida asks whether Levinas can legitimately conceive of the other without the
(pre-)comprehension of Being and argues that Levinas has no choice but to state the other (ethical
discourse) with the language of the same (ontological language); otherwise, he “must renounce all
language and first of all the words infinite and other.”746 Without the precomprehension of Being,
the other can neither manifest itself to the same nor be stated whatsoever; accordingly, no language,
no responsibility, or no ethics will be possible. Derrida’s polemic against Levinas’s critique of
Heidegger’s ontology lies in the fact that the thought of Being does not refer to the reduction of
the other into the same but rather conditions the respect or responsibility for the other as it is in its
alterity.
Furthermore, Derrida provides a syntactic analysis of a verb “to be” which shows that
Levinas’s alleged neglect of the ontological difference entails the serious pitfalls of the ethical
discourse of the other. Derrida doubts whether Levinas’s ethical language as “nonviolent language
would be a language that would do without the verb to be, that is, without predication.” 747
Syntactically, Being or to be is the minimum requirement of sentence, discourse, and language,
which functions as the most common copular or a linking verb. It is not simply a real predicate of
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a subject in a sentence but rather a “transcendental or transcategorical predicate” 748 that
authorizes all predication, sentence, and language. Neither can the other escape from Being nor
the ethical discourse of the other can be immune from ontological language. Insofar as Levinas
conceives of the ethical language, which lacks this necessary component of a sentence or what
Derrida calls “the passage through Being,” his own ethical discourse is no other than a “speech
produced without the least violence [that] would determine nothing, would say nothing, would
offer nothing to the other.”749 Accordingly, Levinas seems to present a silent or angelic language
exempt from the violent source of Being, which would be in fact hollow, irresponsible, and even
violent—it is “a certain silence, a certain beyond of speech.”750 Ironically, the ethical discourse
makes the same and the other silent altogether; in the silent language of ethics, nothing exchanges
between the same and the other. Therefore, Derrida’s syntactic account of Being illustrates that
Levinas’s description of the ethical relationship between the Same and the Other requires a
minimum violence of Being, without which not only the Other cannot command that “Thou shalt
not kill,” but also the Same cannot respond: “me voici.”
In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida’s deconstructive gesture toward Levinas does not
display the regrettable fact that the language of Totality and Infinity should not have been
ontological in order to be ethical, but the inevitable fact that it should remain ontological in order
to articulate “the ethical.” Although Totality and Infinity attacks the totality of ontology in favor
of the infinity of ethics, its ethical discourse of the other still relies on ontological language. In
other words, Levinas’s critique of ontology ironically affirms what it wants to reject. Derrida thus
states: “Levinas must ceaselessly suppose and practice the thought of precomprehension of Being
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in his discourse, even when he directs it against ontology.” 751 According to Derrida’s
deconstructive reading of Levinas, therefore, whenever Levinas speaks of the other by means of
ethical language, he cannot but betray his original intention to articulate the ethical discourse of
the other as wholly and absolutely other.
The fundamental pitfall Derrida recognizes in Levinas’s ethical discourse of the other is
that in order to save the other from the least violence, that is, the circulation of Being or ontological
language, Levinas sacrifices the essential condition for the ethical relationship between the same
and the other. The ethical discourse of the other purified of all violence cannot properly articulate
the other; only through the circulation or passage of Being, the other can be legitimately stated,
and hence its face can be respected. For Derrida, thus, pure non-violence without the least violence
is nothing but pure violence: “Without the thought of Being which can open the face, there would
be only pure violence or pure nonviolence.” 752 From his deconstructive reading of Levinas,
Derrida draws a question—if not a conclusion—about Levinas’s metaphysical ethics: Does
Levinas become an irresponsible and violent dreamer who dreams of the Other as an angelic figure
free from all violence by employing “language without sentence [phrase],”753 which in fact does
not deserve its name? When Levinas speaks of the Other as an infinitely and absolutely other,
Derrida notices that this Other is a pure Other other than the same who is totally free from all
violence and so “absolved of its relationship to the same.”754 Insofar as Levinas attempts to keep
an ethical language from the least violence, that is, Being or ontological language, his metaphysical
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ethics would remain a “dream of a purely heterological thought at its source.” 755 Derrida
eventually claims that “We say the dream because it must vanish at daybreak, as soon as language
awakens”756 and as soon as the light of Being illustrates the nocturnal anonymity of all beings.

1-3. Être (Responsible) on the Hither Side of Sein (Authentic)
Does Levinas really dream of the infinite Other, purified from the light of Being as the
locus of all violence, in his articulation of ethical metaphysics, as Derrida holds? Does Levinas
think of ethics for an angelic other rather than a human other by abandoning Heideggerian ontology,
as if ethics as the “royal road” would never “dirty its hands”? Indeed, Levinas’s view of violence
is much more complex than the view that Derrida attempts to attribute to him, as Bernasconi
holds.757 Nevertheless, Levinas ceaselessly pays attention to the problems of both “where” and
“when” violence takes place. This is where Derrida remains close to Levinas even though he still
doubts whether Levinas overlooks the ontological difference between Being and beings. Derrida
suspects that for Levinas, the ontological difference gives rise to the reduction of beings into Being
or an “ontic domination between Being and beings.”758 And he argues against Levinas that the
Heideggerian Sein does not control, reign, or oppress beings since it is the Sein-letting of beings
as they are; rather, it is a necessary and minimum condition for “the respect for the other as what
it is: other.” 759 The comprehension of Sein, as Derrida understands it, does not entail the
submission of beings into an excellent being. Thus, domination, submission, oppression, or
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violence for Derrida does not take place in the ontological relation between Being and beings but
only in the ontic relation between beings; it is an ontic matter of beings rather than of an ontological
matter of Sein. However, this is exactly what Levinas emphasizes when he discovers “the absolute
violence” in murder, which reveals “the scales of human relations.”760 It is far from clear that
Levinas would concede that the Heideggerian Sein does directly violence to beings and, on that
account, it is the exceptional place from which violence proceeds. Nonetheless, it is quite clear
that Levinas would not accept that the Sein is completely immune from violence, not because it is
the excellent or highest being as the ultima ratio or the causa prima, as onto-theological tradition
conceives. Rather, it is precisely because the Sein is always in and through beings and Dasein in
the first place, as Derrida also notes: “Being is nothing outside of a being.”761 That is to say, the
inseparable attachment of Sein to beings renders Sein itself not free from violence, since Sein is
itself the ontological locus that lets beings be as they are. For Levinas, therefore, the secret of
violence resides in the ongoing complicity of Sein and beings.
The secret of violence is already disclosed in Derrida’s syntactic analysis of Sein.
Syntactically, Sein or the verb “to be” as a transcendental predicate (Sein) of a subject (Dasein) is
itself the minimum or “least” violence, which plays an essential role in the constitution of sentence
and language. Sein in a verbal sense is no longer a pure non-violence but the least violence, which
prevents the worst violence with regard to substantive beings and the other in particular. Derrida
criticizes Levinas’s ethical discourse for its lack of the necessary passage or circulation of Sein, as
if the ethical language conceived by Levinas would be an angelic language by and for angels which
never allows the least violence of Sein. However, it is even far from apparent that Levinas would
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reject Derrida’s syntactic interpretation of Sein. Indeed, Levinas appreciates Heidegger’s original
motif to discover a pure verbality of Sein by means of the Seinsfrage: “Being [Sein] of beings is
not a being [Seiende].”762 Nevertheless, Heidegger’s Seinsfrage remains not radical enough for
Levinas to delve further into being in a purely verbal sense without any reference to a substantive
or subjective connotation, because the Heideggerian Sein—albeit not a being—is always the Being
of beings and Dasein in the first place: “Being is always the Being of beings.”763 This is why the
early Levinas radicalizes the Seinsfrage to the point of articulating an absurd notion of the il y a,
being without beings, or être in general against the backdrop of the Es gibt.764 In order to disclose
the brutal nakedness of being, into which the Heideggerian version of the Seinsfrage fails to
penetrate, it is important for Levinas to first uncover the ontological coverings, which shed light
on—more properly, cover up—être per se.
As seen in Chapter Three, Levinas’s notion of être does not convey any violence but almost
nothing; it is the anonymous, impersonal, neutral, anarchic, and enigmatic il y a. It cannot be
properly expressed in terms of ethico-ontological categories because it is neither being nor an other
of being but prior to an ontological distinction or ethical separation; (it is merely) il y a. Even the
name or noun [nom] “il y a” cannot exhaust the pure verbality of what it names. The name
expresses the il y a by betraying it prior to or on the hither side of all the categorial distinction
between being and non-being, between presence and absence, between arche and telos, and so
forth. By contrast, the Heideggerian Sein, as Levinas understands it, cannot be completely immune
from violence since it is always in and through beings. Strictly speaking, Levinas’s polemic against

762
SZ, 6. It is important to remember that Levinas admires Being and Time, in which Heidegger awakens a
“verbality” of Being. EI, 38; EeI, 28.
763
SZ, 9.
764
Levinas states: “I do not believe Heidegger can admit an existing without existents, which to him would
seem absurd.” TO, 45; TA, 24.

251

Heidegger’s ontology does not come from the fact that Being does violence to beings and the other
in particular, as Derrida might interpret it, but from the ontological difference, which is further
developed into various gestalts in the later Heidegger, such as Kehre, Seyn, Astrag, Unterschied,
Ereignis, and Es gibt. Unfortunately, Derrida points out the indispensability of the “systematic
confrontation” between Levinas’s il y a and Heidegger’s Es gibt but never elucidates it at least in
“Violence and Metaphysics.” 765 Due to the lack of any close attention to the crucial relation
between the early Levinas and the later Heidegger, between the il y a and the es gibt, or between
être and Sein, Derrida’s interpretation of Levinas seems to miss the essential point Levinas
attempts to make in the radical version of the Seinsfrage, which in fact concerns the Levinasian
être rather than the Heideggerian Sein.
When Derrida challenges Levinas’s treatment of being, he seems not always conscious of
the distinction between the Heideggerian Sein and the Levinasian être, especially when it comes
to the violence of being—either être or Sein. Derrida of course uses the French être but means the
German Sein in Heidegger’s terminology in revisiting both Heidegger’s ontology and Levinas’s
own ethics. As the above-mentioned claim “being [l’être] is nothing outside of a being” indicates,
although Derrida writes the French être, what is meant by it is not the Levinasian être but the
Heideggerian Sein. For the Levinasian être in a primordial sense refers to being without beings or
the il y a and hence is not simply an opposite of nothing; it is prior to the distinction between being
and nothing. In Derrida’s original intention, this remark is deployed to condemn Levinas’s
blindness to the ontological difference and so to the inseparability between Being and beings.
When Levinas speaks of être, Derrida criticizes him by means of Sein. The confusion between the
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Levinasian être and the Heideggerian Sein gives rise to Derrida’s misconstruing Levinas’s point
in the critique of Heidegger’s ontology as well as his project of ethics. In the elaboration of ethics,
Levinas does not merely modify the Heideggerian Sein to discover a Sein otherwise or another
Sein but struggles to penetrate into the pure depth of être other than and, at the same time, older
than the Sein in order to express the pure verbality of being. It is thus not fair to say that Levinas’s
view of violence of Sein stems from his oblivion of the ontological difference because he would
neither misunderstand Heidegger’s notion of Sein nor reject Derrida’s (syntactic) interpretation of
it. What is at stake here is that the ontological difference does not really matter to Levinas since it
does not make a difference to the fact that Sein is—albeit not in a direct or ontic way—involved
in violence, as Derrida also states: “it is impossible to avoid the ontic metaphor in order to articulate
Being [être but read: Sein] in language, in order to let Being [être but read: Sein] circulate in
language.”766 Consequently, Levinas remains not too far away from Derrida in arguing that the
Heideggerian Sein, not the Levinasian être, can be the dormant locus of violence insofar as it is
inseparable from beings where violence actually takes place.
When it comes to the problem of violence, what is more crucial to Levinas is that the
(ethical) meaning of violence emerges when it takes place. As seen in Chapter Four, the absolute
or first violence took place in Cain’s murder of Abel. The absolute violence as murder consists in
the failure of encountering the other in the face-to-face relation; that is, it occurs when the same
fails to recognize the face of the other who commands “Thou shalt not kill.” The pre-original
expression of the face does not consist in the disclosure of Being where its alterity is reduced,
dissimulated, or “[congealed] into a plastic form,” but rather in the discourse of the other, which
testifies “the manifestation of a face over and beyond form.”767 Cain wanted to annihilate Abel by
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reducing the face of his brother into a faceless form over which he would hold sway and annihilate
forever. Nevertheless, this annihilation, although Cain really slew Abel, remains “a purely relative
annihilation” since Cain could not annihilate the face of Abel who had already looked at him “as
the eye that in the tomb shall look Cain.”768 This relative annihilation in murder discloses the
impossibility of murdering the other whose face paralyzes my mastery or power over death and
accuses me even before my intention to kill. Prior to my initiative to murder the other at whom I
[Moi] aim in my intention, the face of the other accuses me [moi] and testifies that “as me [moi], I
[je] am not innocent spontaneity but usurper and murderer.”769 The ethical meaning of murder
springs from the first word of the other, “Thou shalt not kill,” by which the substantive Moi finds
itself as violent, murderous, and unjust in its accusative moi. The primordial prohibition inscribed
in the face does not refers to the impossibility of murdering in reality but rather presupposes the
possibility of violating what it prohibits. Levinas states: “This interdiction is to be sure not
equivalent to pure and simple impossibility and even presupposes the possibility.”770 Cain really
slew Abel but ethically could not murder him, as Levinas claims, “Murder exercises a power over
what escapes power.”771 Cain’s murder of Abel betrays the impossibility of murder; the ethical
impossibility is revealed by the real transgression or betrayal of it. Murder does not aim at
something faceless but only at the face of the other who forbids it; therefore, the impossibility of
murder is not real but ethical. Consequently, the face of the other is not the single-faced locus
insulated from all violence but the double-faced locus, which instigates and, at the same time,
interdicts murder as the absolute violence.
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In no way does Derrida lose sight of the Janus-faced feature in Levinas’s view of the
violence of the face, as he points out, “murder is always directed against the face, but thereby
always misses it.”772 However, Derrida’s attention to the ambiguity of the face does not release
him from his relentless suspicion about Levinas’s alleged misreading of the ontological difference
when Levinas claims that the alterity of the other is dissimulated into the comprehension of Being.
Derrida states, “for both [Heidegger and Levinas], dissimulation would be a conceptual gesture.
But for Levinas, the concept is on the plane of Being; for Heidegger, it is on the plane of ontic
determination.” 773 In Derrida’s view, whereas a dissimulation as a conceptual determination
belongs to an ontic gesture for Heidegger, Levinas considers it an ontological gesture of Being,
which neutralizes, suppresses, or de-faces the face of the other; thus, Derrida’s critique of Levinas
hinges upon this ontico-ontological confusion. Finally, Derrida raises a Seinsfrage concerning the
face of the other: How can the face of the other be present to the same without the minimum
condition for its presentation, i.e., the Heideggerian Sein, which does not reduce the other into the
same but in fact lets the other be totally and absolutely other than the same?
Before answering this Heideggerian question put by Derrida against Levinas, it is important
to first consider exactly what Levinas means by non-violence, whose primordial signification leads
him to put into question Heidegger’s ontology. Levinas states non-violence as the presentation of
the face as follows:
The face in which the other—the absolutely other—presents itself does not negate the same,
does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the thaumaturgic supernatural. It
remains commensurate with the one who welcomes; it remains terrestrial. This presentation
is preeminently nonviolence, for instead of offending my freedom it calls it to
responsibility and founds it. As nonviolence, it nonetheless maintains the plurality of the
same and the other. It is peace.774
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The presentation of the face is non-violence par excellence, which sustains the ethical relationship
between the same and the other, and the absolute violence takes place in this relationship. Hence,
non-violence for Levinas is not a pure, impotent, angelic, negative, or silent emptiness devoid of
all violence that the worst violence or pure violence immediately and necessarily occupies, as
Derrida might interpret it. As seen above, Derrida argues contra Levinas that pure non-violence is
nothing but pure violence, since they lack the least and yet necessary condition for the presentation
of the other, that is, the passage of Sein. For Levinas contra Derrida, however, non-violence is
neither the exact opposite of pure violence nor the exact same as pure violence, both of which can
be thought only on the basis of the Heideggerian Sein. What Levinas means by non-violence is
that the presentation of the face is the primordial locus of the ethical prior to or on the hither side
of pure violence and pure non-violence in terms of the Sein. Levinas hence argues that the
presentation of the face appears as the ethical resistance of the other, which calls for my
responsibility, respect, and response: “The ‘resistance’ of the other does not do violence to me,
does not act negatively; it has a positive structure: ethical.” 775 The primary leitmotif running
through Levinas’s critical stance toward Heidegger’s ontology lies in the fact that ontology
dissimulates this positive structure of the ethical meaning of être beneath or on the hither side of
the ontological coverings and Sein in the first place.
The central task of Totality and Infinity is thus to expose the primordial depth of being, that
is, the production of being [être] prior to the comprehension of Being [Sein]. According to Levinas,
prior to the light of Sein in which all beings are understood, intelligible, and grasped, “être is
produced as multiple and as split into same and other,”776 and this fundamental structure of être is
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concretized in the ethical relationship between the same and the other. The problem with the
dissimulation of Being—whether it is an ontic or ontological gesture—for Levinas is that as soon
as the face of the other obtains its intelligible form in the light of Being, it loses its alterity;
therefore, it is defaced in the comprehensive and comprehensible whole of Being. Whether the
dissimulation of Being is an ontic or ontological—and violent or non-violent—gesture is not
Levinas’s concern since this question already presupposes the ongoing complicity of Being and
beings. Derrida is well aware of this ontico-ontological ambiguity: “In reality, there is not even a
distinction in the usual sense of the word, between Being and beings.”777 In his elaboration of
ethics, Levinas does not simply go to either an ontic or ontological way in the sense of Heidegger’s
terminology because the ontico-ontological difference knows nothing of a primordial separation
as being out of joint, ruptured, fractured or separated, that is, as être split into same and other. The
difference only knows of an ontological distinction in the reciprocal relation between Being and
beings, which is exactly what the later Heidegger means by the Kehre. As seen in Chapter Three,
the fact that Heidegger’s Kehre makes no difference to the ongoing complicity of Being and beings
enables Levinas to speak of the Heidegger in his sustained polemic against Heidegger. While John
D. Caputo insists that ethics does not require “ontological preparation (the Heidegger of Being and
Time),”778 Levinas’s ethics does not—and must not—wait for even the later Heidegger of On Time
and Being since “the ethical” is there from the very outset prior to “the ontological.”
The anachronic or anarchic logic of the anterior posteriority justifies the raison d'être of
ethics Levinas envisages in Totality and Infinity. As seen in Chapter Four, the absurd logic of “the
posteriority of the anterior” 779 discloses that the ethical relationship (separation or absolutio)
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between the other and the same—although it is dissimulated by the ontological coverings—is
concretely produced antecedent to the ontological relation (difference or Differenz/Unterschied)
between Being and beings. Levinas’s ethics is neither a reaction to ontology to remedy all kinds
of the illness of what he calls the totality nor a rejection to the Heideggerian ontology to invent
another ontology; rather, the pressing task of ethics consists in unveiling what ontology
dissimulates. It is the pure depth of être, which is concretized in the ethical situation where the
irreducible alterity of the other calls into question the egoistic spontaneity of the same and thereby
makes the same vigilant, wakeful, and non-indifferent to the first word inscribed in the face: “Thou
shalt not kill.” The ethical signification of the pure verbality of “to be” proceeds from the
primordial expression of the face; “to be [être]” is primordially to be responsible before to be
authentic [eigentlich]. The presence of the face does not do violence to me but calls, summons,
and awakes me to be responsible for the death of the other before to be authentic in my Beingtoward-death. Levinas thus claims: “Prior to the disclosure of Being in general as the basis of
knowledge and as the meaning of Being, the relation with an existent that expresses itself preexists; prior to the plane of ontology, the ethical plane pre-exists.”780 Levinas’s polemic against
ontology consists in the fact that the irreducible alterity of the other is dissimulated, neutralized,
and compromised in the ongoing complicity of Being and beings, which serves as the ontological
violence that “places ethics under the heel of ontology.”781 This is why Levinas attempts to leave
the Heideggerian climate under which Derrida would still stay in his deconstructive reading of
Levinas.

2. How to Speak of the Unspeakable: The Political in the Ethical
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As the anachronic logic of the anterior posteriority indicates, the ethical signification
emanates from the face-to-face relationship with the other, in which I find myself as the accusative
moi prior to the subjective or substantive Moi. I am already opened and exposed to the infinitely
other who calls for my response, “me voici,” which expresses the unthematizable exposure of the
moi to the other whose an-archic primordiality cannot be represented, recuperated, or synchronized
in the ecstatic presence of the Moi. Levinas thus states, “‘Me voici’ as the testimony of the Infinite,
but the testimony that does not thematize what it testifies, and whose truth is not the truth of
representation, is not evidence.”782 Chapter Four has described this anterior posteriority of the
accusative moi over the substantive Moi as the infinite in the finite, the more in the less, or the
other in the same. What me voici testifies is the very idea of the infinite; there always remains an
incomprehensible surplus or excess that overflows, exceeds, and unsettles what the Moi thinks.
This asymmetric relation between the idea that thinks of the infinite and the excessive ideatum to
be thought takes a concrete form in the non-adequate, non-correlate, and asymmetric relation
between the command of the other and my response of me voici. The Cartesian model of the idea
of the infinite informs the primordial way of being, which signifies my preoccupation with another
being prior to the comprehension of my authentic Being. To give my word “me voici” to the other
is to respond to the call of the other by way of an “inversion of [my own] exercise of being, which
suspends [my] spontaneous movement of existing.”783 The posterior response to the other in the
moi is phenomenologically anterior to taking my place in which the Moi can respond. Before the
Moi claims its own, proper, or authentic place, the ethical call of the other accuses the moi of taking
my place and calls for my response. Thus, the testimony of me voici is the expression of the
passivity of the accusative moi on the hither side of the spontaneity of the substantive Moi.
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The biblical implication of the original Hebrew word “hineni” discloses that the English
“It’s me here” is probably a more appropriate translation for the Hebrew hineni than the English
“Here I am” and, as will be seen, (more or less) than the French “me voici” Levinas constantly
uses. First of all, the English “It’s me here” can preserve the accusative form of the moi that “Here
I am” cannot. It is not “I” in the substantive who is standing here to wait for the order of the other;
rather, it is the other who puts “me” in the accusative into here. More importantly, Hilary Putman
provides an etymological account of hineni, which conveys not simply a descriptive but rather
performative proposition; to say “hineni” to the other is to perform “the speech-act of presenting
oneself, the speech-act of making oneself available to another.”784 To give my word does not
simply refer to giving propositional signs but giving myself to the other. In a similar vein, Oona
Eisenstadt prefers the French “me voici” to the English “Here I am” because “The French does not
imply that the subject is something, but simply that she offers herself. Moreover, as Levinas points
out, the subject or the ‘I’ or me voici appears in the accusative.”785 She complains about the English
“Here I am” since it implies the substantive subject as the Moi who autonomously gives itself to
the other and thereby nullifies the passive exposure of the accusative moi to the other. The witness
of me voici as offering the moi to the other is not the outcome of a free will or decision made by
the Moi; rather, the anterior Moi in the substantive is already summoned, interpellated, and elected
as the posterior moi in the accusative by the other. Eisenstadt goes on to argue that the English
translation contains the copula verb, which not only neutralizes the original connotation of the verb
“to behold” but also serves as “the root of all thematization.”786 For Levinas, the ethical discourse
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of the other does not begin with the verb “to be” which authorizes all propositional predications in
the linguistic system but with giving me to the other in the primordial utterance of me voici. The
“me voici” is thus “the very essence of language of every language,” 787 including ontological
language in the first place. It is the key motif of Levinas’s later work, Otherwise Than Being, in
which he rigorously struggles with the problem of language to find ethical language as “autrement”
in an adverbial form irreducible to a noun or a verb, even to the copular verb—all of which, for
Levinas, conveys a spontaneous, voluntary, or self-assured activity of the substantive Moi that
undermines the radical passivity of me voici.

2-1. To Whom to Give: “Here I Am,” “It’s Me Here,” and “Me voici”
Although the etymological account of me voici might undercut Derrida’s critique of
Levinas’s ethical language for its lack of the indispensable or transcendental predicate of the
copular verb “to be,” Levinas would not reject Derrida’s challenge when he continues to employ
the verb “to be” in his consideration of the ethical signification primordially found in the mode of
being-for-the-other prior to being-for-oneself or to be responsible prior to be authentic. While
accepting the language of his early work is ontological in order not to be psychological,788 the later
Levinas becomes more attentive to the problem of language in his treatment of the entry of the
third party [le tiers] into the ethical relationship between the same and the other. The entrance of
the third party calls into question my exclusive response to the other and calls for my another
response; “me voici” can no longer be silently performed in my unquestioned and unconditional
response to the other. The advent of the third party announces that “me voici” should be stated,
thematized, or said [dit] in the ontological language. It is the political moment in the ethical that
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requires ethics to “dirty its hands” in order to respond not only to the other but also to all the others.
The linguistic question of the problematic relation between ethics and ontology becomes more
complicated and serious when the third party interrogates the duo-relationship.
In his early text in 1954 entitled “The Ego and Totality,” Levinas already touched upon the
linguistic problem of the third party, which clarifies what he means by a society in an ethical sense.
By attacking an “intimate” or “closed” society from which “third parties are excluded,” Levinas
contends that an ethical society is founded upon “the relationship with a third party—responsibility
extending beyond intention’s ‘range of action’—characterizes the subjective existence capable of
discourse essentially.”789 The essential involvement of the third party in the duo-relation of the
same and the other is also echoed in Totality and Infinity where Levinas argues that the ethical
relationship is not an intimate, exclusive, or formal I-Thou relationship but a traumatic one in
which “the third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other—language is justice.”790 In the face-toface relationship with the other, the third party other than the other always already solicits and
calls for my response: me voici. In his later texts and especially Otherwise Than Being, the
linguistic problem concerning the third party receives more attention and development than in
previous works. The primary task of this section is to examine how the later Levinas articulates
the political moment in the ethical with regard to his linguistic consideration of the third party.
In the Preface to the German edition (1987) of Totality and Infinity, Levinas admits that
although there is no “terminological difference” in Totality and Infinity between the responsibility
for the other and justice for others or between ethics and politics, “the general ethical notion of
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justice is mentioned without discrimination in the two situations.”791 In Otherwise Than Being,
Levinas delves further into this terminological distinction in terms of the distinctive and yet
inseparable relation between “the Saying [le Dire]” on the side of ethics and “the Said [le Dit]” on
the side of ontology.792 Since the third party also commands me what the other commands, the
Saying can no longer remain in a silent or angelic Saying but must be Said and thematized via the
passage of the verb “to be.” Due to the appearance of the third party, I have to compare, measure,
or calculate to whom I respond, to whom I give my word “me voici,” and to whom I offer myself.
This is where the French me voici runs the risk of being translated into the English “It’s me here”
by betraying the original Hebrew hineni. The ethical Saying of “me voici” must be said, translated,
thematized in the ontological Said of “It’s me here.” Now, the unthematizable Saying of “me voici”
must find its way into the language to be thematized and undergo the passage of the copular verb
in the Said without sacrificing the accusative form of the moi, as the English “It’s me here”
properly displays.793 The major challenge of Levinas’s later work lies in the Derridean question—
in fact, Levinas’s own question clarified by Derrida—of how to pinpoint the Said inspired by the
Saying in terms of the notion of the third party, which leads the later Levinas to the painful struggle
to articulate an ethical language in and through an ontological language: the extraction of the
ethical Saying from the ontological Said.
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In his later reading of Levinas in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1997), Derrida also
appreciates the significant status of the third party in Levinas’s ethics to the point of arguing that
“almost the entirety of Levinas’s discourse, for example, almost the entire space of its intelligibility
for us, appeals to this third.”794 The linguistic dilemma imposed upon Levinas intensifies to the
extent that the ethical discourse is no longer a matter of a duo but of a trio and more, since the third
party is not a latecomer who comes only after the Other, but “comes at the origin of the face and
of the face to face.”795 For Derrida, therefore, the position of the third party signifies “the leap
without transition”796 in Levinas’s ethical thought, since it never waits but has already been there
from the very beginning. It would be reductive to say that Levinas’s later work, Otherwise Than
Being, is a mere response to Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Totality and Infinity, as if there
would be an apparent “chiasm” between Levinas and Derrida. Levinas rarely interrogates
Derrida’s deconstructive thought or responds to Derrida’s reading of his work in any detail except
in “Wholly Otherwise” (1973).797 Moreover, the theme of the third party in terms of the ethical
discourse has already appeared in the early text, even before the publication of Totality and
Infinity.798 It is, however, apparently misleading to say that any cross-reading between two thinkers
is futile or meaningless insofar as Derrida’s critical or deconstructive reading of Levinas makes
clearer and more distinct Levinas’s own question concerning the linguistic problem of the ethical
discourse throughout the gradual evolution of Levinas’s ethics.
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The dilemma of language into which Levinas might fall in Totality and Infinity underlies
the leitmotif of Paul Ricoeur’s exegesis of Otherwise Than Being. In Autrement: Lecture d’
Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence d’Emmanuel Levinas, Ricoeur dedicates his effort to
scrutinizing the themes of the third party and justice by discerning in the ethical thought of Levinas
an “advance [avancée],” which brings out a “new Said evoked by the Saying,” that is, “otherwise
Said [autrement dit].” 799 According to Ricoeur, while Levinas thoroughly wrestles with “the
difficulty for ethics to liberate itself from its unflagging confrontation with ontology” in the midst
of groping for an ethical language as an “exception disrupting the regime of Being,”800 the third
party comes to the fore in the competing field in which Levinas struggles to get out of his linguistic
pitfalls. Ricoeur depicts the linguistic dilemma as “dessert of words” 801 that Levinas faces in
searching ethical language in ontological language. Consequently, the beginning of Levinas’s
presumable response presented in Otherwise Than Being to Derrida’s critical reading of Totality
and Infinity hinges upon how to find the Saying otherwise than the Said in and through the Said.
Drawing on the problem of how the ethical Saying is to be (the) Said within the ontological
horizon, Simon Critchley makes a Levinasian response to Derrida’s challenge. According to
Critchley, deconstruction never posits “the question of politics as a question,” which is Derrida’s
own “impasse of the political.”802 He goes on to argue that the Derridean impasse can be overcome
by “Levinas’s traversal of the passage from ethics to politics,”803 from Totality and Infinity to
Otherwise Than Being. This traversal can be accomplished by the “linguistic or deconstructive
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turn” from the “unjustified Said” to the “justified Said.”804 But wouldn’t this effective promise
make the problematics of an ethical language too facile or schematic? One might be doubtful
whether there would be possibly any justified Said that effectuates the transition from ethics to
politics. Would Levinas himself subscribe to any justified Said into which the Saying is reduced
in a conclusive manner? On the contrary, does not politics demand that the possible effectivity of
the ethical promise must be effectuated? If this promise remains permanently an effective
possibility, does not it betray the promise itself by delaying or evading what it promises? Isn’t it
Derrida, along with Ricoeur—although Critchley might not agree at least in The Ethics of
Deconstruction—that raises all these aforementioned questions in terms of justice and politics?
What is at stake here is how the linguistic turn itself can be effectuated in the swing of the linguistic
pendulum from the unjustified to the justified Said. It is the linguistic predicament that Ricoeur,
along with Derrida, points out in his reading of Otherwise Than Being: “the effectuation of the
Saying in ethics.”805

2-2. Political Interrogation of the Third Party
Whether there is a terminological difference (Levinas), a leap (Derrida), an advance
(Ricoeur), or the linguistic turn (Critchley) between the ethical responsibility for the Other and
justice for others on the basis of the third party, it should not be understood as the replacement of
the former by the latter since the appearance of the third party in no way destroys the fundamental
structure of being concretized in the ethical relationship between the same and the other. Indeed,
Levinas never loses sight of ethics as first philosophy. It is, however, obvious that the advent of
the third party makes the duo-relationship more problematic in the sense that the third party calls
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into question a unilateral, unconditional, or exclusive responsibility of the same for the other and
thereby makes it restless, vigilant, awake, and non-indifferent. Levinas thus contends that the entry
of the third party brings forth “the latent birth of the question in responsibility” and introduces a
“contradiction into the Saying”806—or “Contra-Diction”807 in Derrida’s word. This unquestioned
responsibility becomes the birthplace of the very question, which requires a new Said evoked by
the Saying, that is, an “otherwise Said.” The crucial moment of the otherwise Said is to “resay”
the ethico-ontological language in the political situation; now language is not only a matter of a
relation between ethics and ontology but also of justice and politics. Accordingly, the interrogation
of the third party seems to force Levinas to summon again what has been rejected in favor of the
exclusive responsibility for the other:
The other and the third party, my neighbors, contemporaries of one another, put distance
between me and the other and the third party. “Peace, peace to the neighbor and the one
far-off” (Isaiah 57:19)—we now understand the point of this apparent rhetoric. The third
party introduces a contradiction in the Saying whose signification before the other until
then went in one direction. It is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the
question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of consciousness. Justice is
necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order,
thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in
intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and thence also a copresence
on an equal footing as before a court of justice.808
The position of the third party qua the other of the other calls into question the unconditional
relationship between the same and the other and calls for comparison, thematization, calculation,
judgment, synchrony, intentionality, and so forth: “In the comparison of the incomparable there
would be the latent birth of representation, logos, consciousness, work, the neutral notion
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being.”809 In this regressive move, Levinas recognizes “the limit of responsibility” in the political
situation where the third party always already troubles and disturbs my exclusive responsibility
for the other. However, this regression does not refer to the relapse into the Heideggerian climate
to resume the Seinsfrage which “places ethics under the heel of ontology,”810 but rather to the
return to the basic motif of the Levinasian question clarified by Derrida: How can ethics remain
ethical without falling into an angelic form of ethics? Unless the position of the third party is
seriously taken into consideration with regard to the moi-Vous relationship, one will make a fetish
of the Other who might be a celestial angel—or the “beautiful soul”811 in Hegel’s language—in
the ethereal Empyrean rather than an other person in the battlefield of the socio-political
predicaments, such as antagonism, conflict, discord, contention, and anti-Semitism. Derrida’s
critical stance toward the Levinasian Other would be quite Hegelian in this sense.
Arguing that Levinas’s ethical transcendence and infinity should be “aufgehoben” from the
Hegelian perspective that Levinas might not basically accept, Anselm K. Min convincingly points
out the danger of a pure ethics without totality, history, politics, or justice, which Levinas cannot
and indeed does not reject. In favor of “the positive dialectic of infinity and totality in the interest
of solidarity,” 812 Min contends that the unconditional “denial of all historical mediation”
necessarily produces an “angelic,” “empty,” and “sentimental” relation in which the Other is
reduced into an “ahistorical abstraction.” 813 Min’s Hegelian charge against Levinas discloses
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Levinas’s main project of Otherwise Than Being, upon which this chapter embarks: “We murder
the other not only by reducing the other to an object of violence in history and also by elevating
and etherealizing the other beyond all history in thought.” 814 As will be seen, Levinas’s
consideration of the political in terms of the third party might be a certain response to the HegelianDerridean challenge by showing that the fetishism of the Other necessarily yields a pure ethical,
apolitical, and so anti-ethical relation. This chapter claims that Levinas’s ethics is already always
political by means of examining the notion of the third party and justice.
Levinas’s conception of politics or “the political” does not simply follow traditional views
of politics. In the first place, Levinas is not interested in formulating any legal systems or moral
norms to generate a “technique of social equilibrium,”815 a means to maintain the status quo, in
which politicians or political theorists might be interested. Their primary interest lies in how to
regulate human masses to ensure the “most complete exercise of spontaneity” by reconciling their
conflicting freedoms, which allows them to be “situated within the totality.”816 It is the technique
of a symmetric economy of Being that renders all beings to participate in an intimate, harmonious,
or sacred community. Levinas thus condemns that “Politics left to itself bears a tyranny within
itself”817 by neutralizing the same, the other, the third, and all the others altogether according to
universal rules and norms; thus, “Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naivete.”818
However, politics for Levinas is not a tactical skill to manage antagonistic forces or a tactful
rhetoric to negotiate them in favor of a unified or totalizing society. Instead, Levinas recognizes a
genuine “place for politics” when “your neighbor attacks another neighbor or treats him
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unjustly.”819 In “The Ego and Totality” (1954), Levinas already alluded to the ticklish position of
the third party in terms of violence and forgiveness:
But the conditions of a legitimate forgiveness are realized only in a society of beings totally
present one another, in an intimate society. Such is a society of beings who have chosen
one another, but in such a way as to keep a hand on all the ins and outs of the society. Such
a truly intimate society is in its autarchy quite like the false totality of the ego. In fact, such
a society consists of two people, I and thou. We are among ourselves. Third parties are
excluded. The third person essentially disturbs this intimacy: my wrong with regard to you,
which I can recognize entirely on the basis of my intentions, is objectively falsified by your
relations with the third person, which remain hidden from me, since I am, in turn, excluded
from the unique privilege of your intimacy. If I recognize the wrong with regard to you, I
can, even by my act of repentance, injure the third person. Hence, my intention no longer
exactly measures the meaning of my act.820
It is clear from this passage that Levinas does not find true violence in an intimate society of the
duo as the same and the other, in which a symmetric economy of violence is perfectly at work. In
an intimate society where the two involved in the violence are fully present to each other, the
violence might be forgiven according to their intentions. However, their symmetrical acts cannot
exhaust the meaning of their intentions since there is the third party who is already engaged in the
violence. Levinas thus claims, “the violence undergone by a victim who is capable of annulling it
is not properly speaking violence.” 821 There is always the third party whose unblinking eyes
unremittingly gaze, concern, and witness the violence; the victim can forgive it, but the third cannot.
Violence is thus not simply a matter of a duo but of a trio and more. The entry of the third party is
not simply the empirical fact that the third person is numerically added to the duo-relation between
the moi and Vous, but rather the pre-original fact that all the others other than the other—albeit in
absentia—gaze, call, and obsess me through the eyes of the other from the outset; thus, in the
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proximity of the other, “this obsession cries out for justice.” 822 Justice begins with the absent
presence of the third party that “interrupts the face to face of a welcome of the other human,
interrupts the proximity or approach of the neighbor.”823 Therefore, Levinas’s peculiar view of
politics should be understood on the basis of the third party and justice. It is the political moment
that puts ethics into question and renders it a vigilant question in non-indifference to the challenges
of an infinite number of the third parties. At the limit of the political in the ethical, Levinas
painfully undergoes the paradoxical question of “How to speak of the unspeakable, to thematize
the unthematizable, to compare the incomparable, and to calculate the incalculable.” In this vein,
Ricoeur claims that the third party or “justice permits to thematize a type of the Saying that allows
[Levinas] to philosophize.”824

2-3. Proper Name Proper to the Saying Proper
Provided that Levinas’s own question proceeds from the just exigency of the third party,
which calls for Saying the Saying in and through the Said, the equivocal implication of the term
“l’exposition”825 illustrates the way in which Levinas attempts to philosophize in terms of the
distinctive and yet inseparable relation between the ethical or unthematizable exposure to the other
(the Saying) and the ontological thematization or exposition of this exposure (the Said). When it
comes to the different modes of language, the anachronic logic of the anterior posteriority is still
at work. Although the Saying in the present participle is grammatically later than the Said in the
past participle, the former is phenomenologically older or more primordial than the latter. It is as
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if the past Said could not reveal itself without the present Saying, as if the present Saying alone
could render the past Said reverberant en ce moment même et ici, and not the other way around.
As “me voici” indicates that the accusative moi is already exposed to the other before the
substantive Moi speaks to the other, the Saying is “prior to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the
linguistic systems and the semantic glimmerings, a fore-word [avant-propos] preceding
languages.”826 Levinas does not designate the Saying as a principle, origin, or arche of all language
which belongs to the language of onto-theology and thereby reduces the Saying to the past Said of
the present Saying; rather, it is a pre-original or an-archical “silence ahead of all words.” 827
Therefore, the anarchical foreword of the Saying from the immemorial past cannot be
synchronized into the thematization of the Said.
However, the appearance of the third party does not let the Saying remain unthematized in
its silence but claims it to be said, betrayed, and thematized. In order to betray [trahir] itself in the
Said, the Saying has to betray [trahir] itself in the Said. Levinas states, “The correlation of the
Saying and the Said, that is, the subordination of the Saying into the Said, to the linguistic system
and to ontology, is the price that manifestation demands.”828 As soon as the Saying is to be Said,
it is absorbed into “the doxa, the already Said, fable, or epos where the given is held in its
theme.”829 The Saying here runs the risk of moving into the Said in such a way that the Saying
betrays itself in the Said by circulating the verb “to be” in it; therefore, “me voici” is to be translated
into “It is me here.” Politics here takes on a peculiar meaning in the interrogation of the third party,
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who solicits me to solemnly say “It’s me here” to all the others rather than to silently say “me voici”
to the other alone.
What is Said about the Saying is expressed in a sentence or language, which inevitably
undergoes the ambiguous passage of being—either a noun or a verb—or what Levinas calls
“essence” in a verbal-cum-substantival fashion. In the Preliminary Note to Otherwise Than Being,
Levinas redefines essence as follows: “the term essence here expresses être different from an étant,
the German Sein distinguished from Seiendes, the Latin esse distinguished from the Scholastic
ens.”830 As seen above, the fundamental ontology for Levinas is not fundamental enough due to
the ongoing complicity of Sein and Seiende; thus, Levinas understands it as a “less restricted
ontology” 831 when he uses être, Sein, esse, essence, or essance—all of which are “confirmed
positively to be the conatus of beings.”832 It is the so-called “conatus essendi,”833 borrowed from
Spinoza, that characterizes the essence of being involved in the ontico-ontological complicity: the
constant and consistent persistence in being that never allows any interval, trauma, diachrony, or
distance, which interrupts the being interested in maintaining its own being in the present. “Esse
is interesse; essence is interestedness [intéressement].”834 In the correlation of the Saying and the
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Said, the Saying is reduced to the Said in which the Heideggerian Sein, esse, and essence echo as
the conatus essendi, that is, being-for-oneself that undermines the ethical signification of the
Saying itself. Levinas thus states, “The birth of ontology finds its place in the Said. Ontology is
stated in the amphibology of être and étant.”835 Levinas contends that language remains dogmatic
in the history of Western philosophy when it finds its ultimate meaning in the correlation of the
Saying and the Said, as if the Said could exhaust the signification of the Saying. “The logos Said
has the last word dominating all meaning, the word of the end, the very possibility of the ultimate
and the result. Nothing can interrupt it.”836 By calling into question this dogmatic Said as the locus
of Sinngebung, Levinas attempts to lay bare “a prior signification proper to the Saying, which is
neither ontological nor ontic.” 837 Levinas thus raises a semantic question about whether all
meaning originates from being, Sein, Essence, or conatus essendi echoed in the Said.
According to Levinas, the fact that the Saying reveals itself by betraying itself already
heralds that language is itself skeptical since what is betrayed in the Said is to be betrayed by the
Saying: “Language is already skepticism.”838 The Saying lets itself be translated, conveyed, and
Said in the Said by betraying the very Said. If there is betrayal in the philosophical discourse, this
betrayal already presupposes a betrayal of the betrayal: “The philosophical speaking that betrays
in its Said the proximity it conveys before us still remains, as the Saying, a proximity and a
responsibility.”839 In no way is the signification of the Saying exhausted in its manifestation via
the Said; the Saying signifies otherwise than the Said “as an apparitor presenting essence and
beings.”840 This is where the second reduction or the reduction of the reduction takes place in terms
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of the betrayal of the Said in the Saying. Through the chiasmatic reduction between the Saying
and the Said, Levinas writes, “We must go back to on the hither side of this correlation.”841 For
Levinas, philosophy cannot be released from skepticism since it is sensitive to the ambivalence of
the term “l’exposition,” which refuses to synchronize the primordial exposure to the other with the
doxical thematization or ontological exposition of this exposure. Skepticism can secure the Saying,
having undergone through the passage of being, from being reabsorbed into the Said where being
and essence resound. The skeptical discourse sustains a distance, proximity, diachrony, or interval
between the Saying and the Said, which makes it possible for the Saying to be heard, written, and
Said on the hither side of the Said. Levinas thus claims, “Language permits us to say, be it by
betrayal, this outside of being, this ex-ception to being, as though the other of being were an event
of being.”842 The Saying unsays the Said, resays it, says it again in other words, and says otherwise
than the Said; it is to be Said autrement on the hither side of the amphibology of a verbal being
and a substantive being. Therefore, the skeptical language conceives of otherwise than being or
beyond essence without relapsing into being otherwise or another essence; that is, it articulates
being as otherwise than being via being without being reduced to being.
As seen above, Levinas’s ultimate question posed in Otherwise Than Being lies in how to
articulate the Said inspired by the Saying—it is the question about a “nom propre,” a proper
noun/name of the Said for the Saying or of the Said proper to the Saying proper. The skeptical
language enables Levinas to designate the nom propre for the Saying not as a being otherwise or
another essence which is inevitably subsumed under the regime of ontology, but as otherwise than
(the Heideggerian) being or beyond (the Heideggerian) essence, which exceptionally ruptures the
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ontological regime. Consequently, what the nom propre signifies is the fact that there is no
conclusive, authentic, or proper name/noun of the Said that exhausts the ethical signification of
the Saying proper. Although the thematic-ontological exposition of “It’s me here” lets the preoriginal or an-archical response of “me voici” be heard, thematized, and Said, the primordial
signification of “me voici” cannot be exhausted in the Said of “It’s me here.” Unless I say “me
voici” to the other, I cannot say “It’s me here” to all the third parities; in other words, if I failed to
see the face of the other, I could not see those of all the others. The primordial voice of “me voici”
resounds on the hither side of “It’s me here.” Levinas writes, “the reduction is reduction of the
Said to the Saying, beyond the logos, beyond being and non-being, beyond essence,…to
signification, to one-for-the-other involved in responsibility (or more exactly in substitution).”843
It is the anarchical surplus or excess of the Saying of “me voici” over the Said of “It’s me here”
that discloses the primordial mode of being otherwise than being as being-for-the-other in
disinterestedness on the hither side of the conatus essendi, i.e., being-for-oneself in interestedness.
When I say “It’s me here” to the third party, the very Said signifies “me voici,” that is, the
primordial exposure to the other. The third party never lessens the ethical weight and exigency of
my responsibility for the other in the response of “me voici” by distributing or sharing it among all
the others but rather redoubles the ethical burden of my response. “The equality of all is borne by
my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights. The forgetting of self moves justice.”844
As will be seen in the next section, Levinas hyperbolizes my responsibility for the other to the
point of my responsibility for the responsibility of the other, that is, substitution, sacrifice, or dying
for the other.
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3. Ethical Hyperbole: Substitution, Sacrifice, and Dying for Others
Provided that the primordial exposure of the accusative me [moi] to the other in the Saying
“me voici” consists in subjecting, offering, and giving myself [soi] to the other, one might doubt
whether the unconditional, asymmetric, and traumatic encounter with the other would entail a selfrefuting denunciation or alienation of subjectivity. It is as if in the Saying “me voici,” the moi gave
up the soi by giving it to the other without assuming to whom it gives itself and thematizing what
it testifies. This is the challenge leveled by Hägglund from the Derridean perspective by arguing
that “Levinas’s denunciation of egoism should be contrast with Derrida’s affirmation of a
constitutive narcissism.”845 Hägglund argues that an asymmetric relation between moi and Vous
can be sustained only on the basis of a symmetric relation between Je and Tu; thus, the command
“Thou shalt not kill” is haunted by Derrida’s statement, “I can kill you, you can kill me, we can
kill ourselves.”846 For Hägglund, Levinas’s ethical ideal presupposes that the other is always a
good friend who accepts my offering, not an enemy who wants to kill me; accordingly, Levinas
has nothing to say about all the situations “where you are confronted with an other who assaults
you, turns down the offered hospitality, and in turn denies you help when you need it.”847 He then
concludes, “Levinas’s ideal ethical relation between two is not only untenable but undesirable; it
would be ‘the worst violence’.”848 Indeed, Levinas has nothing to say about all those situations in
which I first evaluate, measure, and assume whether the other is my friend or my foe since this
question rests on my thematization, comprehension, and knowledge. What Levinas attempts to say
here is that the Moi cannot be innocent in its being-interested-in-the-soi or its conatus essendi, and
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thereby that the Moi in its indifference to the death of the other cannot be justified, as if my
indifference would tolerate, defend, or justify murder of the other.
It is important to remember that the interdiction “Thou shalt not kill” is not real but ethical,
as seen in Chapter Four. The ethical signification of “Thou shalt not kill” emerges from the
primordial exposure to the other, that is, the testimony of “me voici” that I have no reason, origin,
right, or arche which would justify my being-for-myself within myself. I am already opened to
something other than myself prior to the opening of my own Being; this anarchical exposure to the
other characterizes my being-for-the-other. The unconditional submission to the other would
destroy a Je-Tu relation in advance, as Hägglund holds, but the ethical relation of the moi-Vous
begins when all the symmetrical relationships are broken down; phenomenologically speaking, the
former has already begun even before the latter is shattered. What the Saying of “me voici” bears
witness to is the fact that the Saying “After you!” goes first before and without asking “Who are
you?” and not the other way around. The asymmetry between the moi and Vous is the unconditional
condition for the ethical relation, in which the moi first Says the Saying without asking the other
to Say the Saying to the soi.
However, Ricoeur recognizes in the testimony of “me voici” the attestation of a soiconsistency, soi-affirmation, or soi-maintaining. Ricoeur insists that the Saying “me voici”
proceeds from “a trust in the power to say, in the power to do, in the power to recognize the soi as
a character in a narrative, in the power, finally, to respond to accusation in the form of the
accusative; me voici!”849 In short, the Saying “me voici” is the expression of the conatus essendi,
by which the radical passivity immediately turns into the overpowering activity in the reliable
attestation and assurance of the soi. In the accusation of the other, I find my power to be accused;
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in the responsibility for the other, I find my power to be responsible; in the response to the other,
I find my power to respond; ultimately, in Saying “me voici,” I find my power to give myself to
the other so that the other can count, lean, and rest on me. Ricoeur identifies the ethical
responsibility for the other whose ultimate recourse is to the “assurance of being one acting and
suffering”850 and explicates a self-assertive pretense of this responsibility as follows:
Self-maintaining [Le maintain de soi] is for each person that manner of conducting himself
or herself so that the other can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me,
I am accountable for my actions before another. The term “responsibility” unites both
meanings: “counting on [compter sur]” and “being accountable for [être comptable de].”
It unites them, adding to them the idea of a response to the question “Where are you?”
asked by another who needs me. This response is “me voici!” It is the response that is a
statement of self-maintaining.851
According to Ricoeur’s view of me voici, if the accusative moi wishes to give its soi to the other,
it must be able to possess its soi within the substantive Moi who has the capacity to take it to be
something at its disposal; otherwise, there would be no chance to Say “me voici” to the other. To
respond to the other is to secure, preserve, and claim an authentic or proper place in which the moi
remains at home with its soi [chez-soi]. In this identity of the moi and the soi, the subject of the
Saying discovers its subjectivity in the mode of interestedness, being-for-itself, and the conatus
essendi; thus, the identity of the moi and the soi is the ontological condition for disinterestedness
or being-for-the-other. Ricoeur seems to suggest here that the ethical response demands the
ontological preparation to give my being to the other. In his treatment of “me voici,” however,
what Ricoeur fails to capture is the anarchic logic of the anterior posteriority, so that he
misconstrues the radical passivity of the subject and thus compromises the ethical signification of
me voici. For Levinas, the statement of “me voici” does not presuppose the anterior place where
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the substantive Moi begins to speak to the other on the basis of my comprehension, reflection, or
power, but marks the primordial and yet posterior voice that obsesses the accusative moi without
or before representing, reflecting, or thematizing the ethical voice of the other. Levinas asserts that
this anterior place as the authentic locus of being is already the usurpation and domination in which
the subject remains the same in its soi-identification; therefore, the testimony of “me voici”
precludes the reduction of the other to the same and so the absorption of the Saying into the Said.

3-1. Subjectivity of the moi malgré soi
The primordial signification of “me voici” signifies that the accusative moi is given to the
other, even before the substantive Moi gives itself to the other. Phenomenologically speaking, I
am not giving myself to the other in my will, freedom, or power, but what is given to the other is
to be found as the accusative moi in the radical passivity on the hither side of the alternatives of
activity and passivity. Therefore, Levinas claims: “Subjectivity…comes to pass as a passivity more
passive than all passivity.” 852 The accusative moi offered to the other is then different from a
generous, altruistic, or condescending Moi who voluntarily gives itself to the other in its unselfish
will and intention. The act of giving committed by the Moi still rests upon my intention, my will,
my freedom, and my power to give myself to the other. In fact, it is the overpowering activity
under the pretense of passivity since the unselfish subject returns to itself in its conatus essendi by
means of its own act of giving and generosity. However, giving is not a luxury of the Moi who
enjoys the fullness of being (-interested-in-the-soi), in which the moi reterns to the soi in the mode
of being-for-the-soi, but an obligation imposed upon the moi in the mode of being-for-other-thanthe-soi. The Saying “me voici” testifies this obligation that precludes the identity of the moi and
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the soi or the return of the moi to the soi. Giving in the Saying does not refer to giving what I have
in my self-possession and self-maintenance but rather to giving what I have never possessed, that
is, the soi. The moi cannot dominate, control, or govern the soi since it is already de-positioned,
dis-possessed, and dis-placed; it is out of joint with the soi. Levinas thus states: “One must show
in the Saying, qua approach, the very de-position [dé-position] or de-situation [dé-situation] of the
subject, which nonetheless remains an irreplaceable uniqueness [unicité], and is thus the
subjectivity of the subject.”853 For Levinas, Western philosophy, which ceaselessly reduces the
Saying into the Said, fails to recognize this “absolute passivity on the hither side of activity and
passivity.”854 The subjectivity of the moi who Says “me voici” is constituted—less ontologically
speaking, accused, elected, or obsessed—“not by a rest on itself [soi], but by a restlessness
[inquietude]”855 which releases the moi from the ontological mode of being-for-itself and exposes
it to the primordial mode of being-for-the-other. The restlessness in in the mode of beingdisinterested-in-the-soi does not refer to any ontological inauthenticity or destitution, but a
respiration that liberates the moi from the breathless enchainment of being and leads it to otherwise
than being, beyond essence, or beyond its conatus essendi.
The testimony of me voici neither entails a renunciation or desertion of subjectivity through
the total evasion of the moi from the soi nor presupposes an ontological foundation of subjectivity
in the identity of the moi and the soi. Levinas thus contends that the subject is not to be conceived
“in the function of being and non-being, taken as ultimate references. Humanity, subjectivity—the
excluded third, excluded from everywhere, a non-place [non-lieu]—signifies the rupture of this
alternative.”856 If the ambiguous duality of the moi and the soi on the hither side of the identity is
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neglected as in the cases of Hägglund and Ricoeur, Bernasconi claims that “a whole dimension of
Levinas’s thought goes missing.”857 In his early work, entitled On Escape, Levinas already pays
attention to the ambiguous duality of the moi and the soi in terms of escape from being and being
riveted to being. While examining hypostasis as opposed to ekstasis, Existence and Existents
describes a hypostatic solitude of the subject as being out of joint with itself. This out-ofjointedness or “dual solitude”858 prepares the way for Totality and Infinity where Levinas develops
further the ultimate dimension of being “produced as multiple and as split into same and other.”859
It is the Levinasian être on the hither side of the Heideggerian Sein that takes its concrete form in
the ethical relationship between the same and the other. In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas
introduces a neologism “the despite self [le malgré soi]”860 to radicalize the ambiguous duality,
which undercuts the identity of the moi and the soi where Sein, essence, and the conatus essendi
ceaselessly echo. Therefore, the subjectivity of the subject Levinas attempts to defend in Otherwise
Than Being does not consist in the identity of the moi and the soi but in the de-position or desituation in such a way that the accusative moi, despite the soi, does not have its own, authentic,
or proper place in which it could remain at home with the soi. It is “a self despite self in incarnation
as the very possibility of offering, suffering, and trauma.” 861 This duality is expressed in the
hyperbolic terms as follows:
The I [je] approached in responsibility for-the-other, is a denudation, an exposure to being
affected, a pure susceptiveness. It does not posit itself, does not possess itself, and does not
recognize itself; it is consumed, delivered over, dis-locates itself, loses its place, is exiled,
relegates itself into itself, but as though its very skin were still a way to shelter itself in
857
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being, exposed to wounds and outrage, emptying itself in a non-place, to the point of
substituting itself for the other, holding on to itself only as it were in the trace of its exile.862
The Saying of me voici intensifies my responsibility for the other as the one-for-the-other to the
point of substitution as the one-in-place-of-the-other-despite-oneself. Sub-stitution signifies that
the ethical command of the other situates the moi—despite its will, its intention, and its conatus
essendi—under the amplified weight of responsibility for the responsibility of the other. The
Saying as the ethical exposure to the other exceeds and, at the same time, precedes the initiative
of the Moi who would voluntarily open, expose, or give itself to the other in its conatus essendi; it
exposes the radical openness of the accusative moi—without returning to the soi—to the other on
the hither side of the letting-be [Gelassenheit] that lets the other be as it is. In this regard, the
subjectivity of the subject who Says the Saying does not consist in “the mysterious manège of
being’s essence, where, despite all of Heidegger’s anti-intellectualism, the gnoseological
correlation, man called forth by a manifestation, is found again.”863 Instead, Levinas proclaims
that the central thesis of Otherwise Than Being is to clarify that “the overemphasis of openness is
responsibility for the other to the point of substitution,” which ruptures, disrupts, and breaks with
“being’s essence.”864 The subjectivity of me voici does not rest upon the identity of the moi and
the soi where the Said of the Saying alone resounds but, contrarily, appears as the rupture of this
identity by means of (re-)Saying the Said of the Saying that “absorbs me of all identity.”865 Levinas
continues: “This absolution reverses essence. It is not a negation of essence, but a disinterestedness,
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an ‘otherwise than being’ which turns into a ‘for the other’.”866 The radical signification of the
hyperbolic notion of substitution or one-for-the-other-despite-oneself becomes apparent in
contrast with Heidegger’s ontological concept of care and especially solicitude of the other.

3-2. Solicitude [Fürsorge]: Ontological Impossibility of Substitution
In the analysis of care [Sorge] as the fundamental structure of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world,
Heidegger makes a distinction between concern [Besorgen] for things and solicitude [Fürsorge]
for other Daseins. Heidegger states in Being and Time: “Because Being-in-the-world is essentially
care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand [Zuhandenen] could be taken in our previous analysis as
concern, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others [Anderen] as we encounter it within-the-world
could be taken as solicitude.”867 While solicitude is a way for Dasein to relate other Daseins in the
care of solitude, concern is a way for Dasein to relate to the ready-to-hand things in terms of the
care of equipment. Concern and solicitude are two distinct moments of the care that make Dasein
an issue in the web of various relationships with which Dasein comports itself [verhält sich]. In
the mode of Being-in-the-world, Dasein finds itself and comparts itself with others—either
objective things in Zuhandenheit or other Daseins in their own Existenz: “The world of Dasein is
a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is being-with others. Their Being-in-themselves of others within
the-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein].” 868 The ontological structure of the care displays
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world as Being-itself [Selbst-sein] and, simultaneously, as Being-with
[Mitsein]. In his polemic against Heidegger, Levinas never fails to recognize this care-structure of
Dasein’s relationship to others. Indeed, Levinas attacks Heidegger’s ontology not because Being
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and Time remains silent about the question of the other, but because it marginalizes and reduces
this question into the ontological question. As Marion rightly points out, the difference between
two thinkers is not placed between “Dasein without alterity” and “me determined by the other” but
rather between “two different ways of describing the relation of me (Dasein?) to the other.”869 In
order to clarify the hyperbolic signification of substitution in Levinas’s thought, it is important to
first consider how Heidegger understands substitution as opposed to solicitude, although both
terms more or less have to do with the question of the other.
For Heidegger, substituting me for the other, placing me in place of the other, or imposing
my own possibilities upon the other refers to disburdening the other of its care by me. This
disburdening or release deprives the other of its own place and forces it to my domination. This is
one of two extreme possibilities of Fürsorge that turns into Besorgen: “solicitude [Fürsorge] can,
as it were, take away ‘care [Sorge]’ from the other [Anderen] and put itself in his position in
concern [Besorgen]; it can stand in or leap in [einspringen] for him. This kind of solicitude takes
over for the other that with which he is to concern himself.”870 Dasein here takes the other (Dasein)
to be an objective thing in the mode of Zuhandenheit, and thereby their relationship can be
characterized by Besorgen—rather than Fürsorge—in terms of domination and dependency. In
the second possibility of solicitude, Dasein relates to the other qua another Dasein whose authentic
mode of Being consists in Being-toward-death, in such a way that Dasein gives the care back to
the other and lets the other take its own place and take responsibility for its Being. This second
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possibility of solicitude “helps the other to become transparent to him in his care [Sorge] and to
become free for it.”871 This is where Fürsorge becomes the Sorge for the other as another Dasein.
For Heidegger, the authentic care for the other does not consist in substituting one for the other
but in letting the other take its own place and allowing the other to bear the burden of its own
possibilities and, first of all, its own death as its possibility par excellence.
The authentic solicitude of the care for the other signifies that the other as another Dasein
cares for its place, its possibilities, its own death, and its responsibility for Being. The other (Dasein)
exists as “a being for which, in its Being, that Being is itself an issue,”872 and its own Being is at
stake in every case. This fundamental structure of the solicitude displays that the other qua Dasein
cannot be substituted by any other Dasein. The impossibility of substitution is most discernable in
Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of death as the most authentic, non-relational, insuperable,
indefinite, and certain possibility for Dasein.873 I can die for the other in place of the other but not
in the place of the other. My sacrifice or my substitution for the other never takes death away from
the other and thus makes no difference to the ontological fact that the other dies insofar as it exists
as Dasein. Heidegger thus claims, “No one can take the Other’s dying away from him.”874 And he
immediately adds, “Every Dasein itself must take dying upon itself in every instance.”875 Death is
a matter of what Heidegger calls mineness [Jemeinigkeit]; therefore, death is always mine so that
it is not something to be substituted by anyone else’s. Ontologically understood, the mineness of
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death as the authentic mode of Being-toward-death dissolves the possibility of substitution or
dying for the other into the inauthentic moment of Mitsein.
Nevertheless, the idle talk [Gerade] of the anonymous they [Man] persistently attempts to
justify “the temptation of covering up from oneself one’s most authentic Being-toward-death”876
by reducing the ontological possibility of death into the ontic-empirical one. That is to say, the idle
talk constantly entices Dasein to believe that one certainly dies some other day, but not me and not
right now. When it comes to death, the anonymous they would hence declare that “Everyone is the
other, and no one is oneself.”877 In no way does das Man die, but Dasein alone is able to die. In
the face of anxiety of death as the end of Being-in-the-world, however, Dasein discovers itself face
to face with nothingness, that is, “no-longer-being-able-to-be-there [Nicht-mehr-daseinkönnens].”878 It is the anxiety of death that emancipates Dasein from the temptation or illusion of
the idle talk of the anonymous they. In the possibility of the impossibility of its existence, all
relations other than its own relation with itself are completely shattered, and Dasein confronts its
own Being in its authenticity and totality. In this context, death as the non-relational possibility is
to individualize [vereinzeln] Dasein down to its authentic Being as Being-thrown into the Da
where it manifests itself as its able-to-be-toward-death in its isolation [Vereinzelug] from the
anonymous they. The death of others is then subordinated to the ontic issue that hides, conceals,
and dissimulates the existential-ontological mineness of death as such. Accordingly, the death of
others would be only a matter of the idle talk, which keeps publicizing or gossiping that it is no

876

SZ, 253.
SZ, 128.
878
SZ, 250. Ontologically understood, death is the end of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, which de-limits the
existential scope of Da-sein, that is, being-there between not-yet-being-there (before its birth) and no-longer-beingthere (after its death). Thus, death as the end of Dasein circumscribes or encloses the totality [Ganzheit] of Dasein:
“Death is, after all, only the ‘end’ of Dasein, and formally speaking, it is just one of the ends that embraces the totality
of Dasein. But the other ‘end’ is the ‘beginning,’ ‘birth.’ Only the being ‘between’ birth and death presents the total
[Ganze] we are looking for,” SZ 373.
877

287

longer my business. For Heidegger, substitution or sacrifice proceeds from the idle talk, which
distracts Dasein from the authentic Fürsorge in the Sorge for its own place, its Being, and its most
authentic possibility as death. Substitution either of me for the other or of the other for me merely
belongs to the anonymous they; it remains accessible to anybody and yet to nobody but never to
me. Heidegger thus argues, “The ‘anonymous they’ never dies because it cannot die; for death is
in each case mine [je meiner].”879 The other alone dies in its own place, just as I do; there is no
place for substitution and sacrifice in the ontological sense.

3-3. Substitution: Otherwise than Being beyond “To Be or Not to Be”
Provided that the ontological meaning of death becomes exemplarily evident in the
impossibility of substitution or sacrifice due to the mineness of death, Levinas suspects that
Heidegger’s ontology suffers from an ontological obesity on the basis of the identity of the moi
and the soi. The mineness of death characterizes the authentic burden of Being that never allows
otherwise than Being, beyond essence, or beyond the conatus essendi. Ontologically, Dasein
appropriates everything that can serve to its own Being, even its own death as nothingness. In his
last lecture courses delivered in 1975-76, published as God, Death, and Time, Levinas calls into
question Heidegger’s ontological analysis of death by asking whether the meaning of death can be
exhausted by the mineness in the service of the authentic Being.
We understand that shapes or forms pass into and out of being, while something subsists.
Death contrasts with all that: it is inconceivable, refractory to thought, and yet
exceptionable and undeniable. It is not a phenomenon; hardly thematizable, unthinkable—
the irrational begins there. Even in anxiety, even through anxiety, death remains unthought.
To have experienced anxiety does not allow one to think it. Nothingness has defied Western
thought.880
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This passage clearly shows that death does not take any form through which it transparently
manifests itself to Dasein; thus, it is not a phenomenon to be thought in terms of a noetic-noematic
correlation. In Levinas’s view, nonetheless, “Heidegger deduces all thinkable signification from
the attitude of [Dasein] in regard to [its] own death.”881 Levinas claims against Heidegger that
death reveals itself at the point where Dasein fails to think in terms of the dialectic of Being and
nothingness. In the approach of death, Dasein faces otherwise than Being, i.e., the other of Being
that cannot be reduced into the comprehension of Being. As seen in the foregoing chapters, death
never transparently presents itself to Dasein to be understood, grasped, or anticipated in its
authentic Being, but rather approaches as an enigmatic mystery, which heralds that Dasein is “in
relationship with what does not come from itself.”882 In the approach of death, Dasein encounters
what it cannot encompass within its authentic solitude and finds itself in relation with something
wholly other than itself. “The solitude of death does not make the Other vanish.”883 This does not
mean that Levinas understands death as the negation of a phenomenon, such as a pure nonphenomenon or noumenon, which never matters to Dasein, as if death would be completely
irrelevant or meaningless to Dasein itself. Indeed, death appears to Dasein as a para-phenomenon
that overflows, disrupts, and betrays the Seinsdenken; it can be thought only as the unthinkable,
which signals the rupture of the comprehension of Being. Levinas argues: “Death is the end of
what makes the thinkable thinkable, it is in this sense that it is unthinkable.”884 It is a “question
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without givens [donnée], a pure interrogation mark”885 that puts into question Dasein who asks
about its own Being [Seinsfrage].
For Levinas, Heidegger’s Seinsfrage is not questionable enough since it always already
presupposes something “given [donné]”—it is the pre-comprehension of Being that pre-guides or
pre-determines the way of the Seinsfrage. In other words, the Seinsfrage already presupposes or
contains within itself its own answer, as the threefold structure—Gefragte, Befragte, and
Erfragte—of the Seinsfrage indicates. 886 It is Sein of Dasein as a question to be asked and,
simultaneously, an answer to be sought in the question; through the Seinsfrage, Dasein discovers
its answer, its reason, and its right to be within itself. The effort to be or the conatus essendi is the
arche and the telos of every right to be there. The Seinsfrage finds the most proper answer in the
phenomenon of death, which discloses Dasein’s Being-in-the-world in its totality and authenticity.
In the course of the Seinsfrage, Heidegger takes death to be something—to be more precise,
nothing [Nichts]—that transparently appears to Dasein as a flat phenomenon, which makes it
possible for Dasein itself to achieve its own, solitary, and authentic Being. There is no room for
otherwise than Being or beyond essence in the Seinsfrage. Levinas writes, “Thus the totality of the
human being and of its own being-there is sought without any intervention by another, solely in
Dasein as Being-in-the-world. The meaning of death is from the beginning interpreted as the end
of Being-in-the-world, as nothingness. The enigma is erased from the phenomenon.”887 At the
limit of the Seinsfrage, Heidegger attempts to think of what cannot be thought through simply
reducing the unthinkable to the thinkable, the unthematizable to the thematizable, the
885
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unexperienceable to the experienceable, the para-phenomenalizable to the phenomenalizable, and
finally the Saying into the Said. Consequently, the Seinsfrage divests death of its enigmatic alterity
and assimilates it into the authentic moment of the comprehension of Being.
Heidegger’s Seinsfrage remains faithful to or dogmatic in the ontological thematization of
death, which rests on the dialectic of Being and nothingness; it only knows of betrayal of the
Saying by the Said but knows nothing of betrayal of the betrayal, that is, the reduction of the Said
to the Saying. Dogmatic language cannot articulate a para-phenomenon of death beyond the
alternative of a flat phenomenon or a non-phenomenon—both of which are subsumed under the
doxical, thematic, and ontological exposition of the Said. By contrast, Levinas proposes that death
as the question par excellence calls into question the Seinsfrage and brings back the para-doxical
signification of death from the doxical meaning: “The question is the way in which belief, or doxa,
to which the universe is referred, is reversed in a radical fashion; it is the way in which this doxa
reverses itself into a question.”888 Such a question is incomprehensible within the Seinsfrage since
the paradoxical sense of death cannot be captured by the ontological categories. Ontologically,
substitution or sacrifice in suffering “for nothing”—but not for nothingness [Nichts]—is
meaningless or nonsensical since ontological alternatives of Being or nothingness cannot properly
make sense of it. This is where death takes on an ethical and para-doxical sense as “the surplus of
non-sense over sense by which the sense of suffering is possible.”889 Levinas thus claims: “the
death signified by the end could not measure the entire significance of death without becoming
responsibility for another.”890 The paradoxical signification of substitution or dying for the other
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rises to the surface on the hither side of the doxical-ontological thematization of death entangled
in the dialectic of Being and nothingness.
In “Dying for…” (1987), where Levinas’s challenge against Heidegger’s ontological
analysis of death culminates, Levinas argues that Heidegger would fail to capture the ethical
meaning of substitution, which cannot be laid bare by an “order divided between the authentic and
the inauthentic.” 891 According to Levinas’s view of Heidegger, in death as Dasein’s authentic
Being-toward-its-own-end, all relationships to the other dissolve into an inauthentic moment of
Being-with since “everyone [as Dasein] dies for itself” in its own place, which sustains its own
conatus essendi “in the guise of a care for Being, a Being-there, a Being-with-others, and a goingto-death.” 892 At the heart of Heidegger’s view of death, Levinas recognizes the struggle for a
perseverance in Being, that is, the conatus essendi that in turn buttresses the entire architecture of
ontology. By appealing to the biblical resource, Levinas claims against Heidegger that death is the
enigmatic locus which puts me [moi] in relation to other than myself [soi]—it is the very locus that
founds the relation to the other and in which the relation to the other is found: “Saul and Jonathan
were lovey and pleasant in their lives, and in their death they were not divided; they were swifter
than eagles, they were stronger than lions” (II Samuel 1: 23). 893 Death does not isolate me from
the other in the care for my Being-toward-death but rather obsesses and affects me to the point of
“including myself in the death of the other.”894 The death of the other does not let the moi remain
at home with the soi in the interested-in-Being or conatus essendi but affects me even more than
my own death. The primordial and essential way that relates me to the death of the other is neither
a “knowledge about the death of the other” nor “the experience of that death in its particular way
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of annihilating being”; rather, it is “an emotion, a movement, a disquietude within the unknown.”895
In the emotional relation with the death of the other, the fear of the death of the other is not a fear
for myself, but it is itself my fear for the other in the disinterestedness in my conatus essendi.
Levinas calls into question Heidegger’s reflective notion of affectivity [Befindlichkeit], which is
determined by “A double intentionality of the of and the for, and thus a return to the soi, a return
to anxiety for the soi, to anxiety for its finitude.”896 The ethical meaning of death begins with the
primordiality of the death of the other over my own death, that is, the fear of the death of the other
that cannot be reduced to the anxiety for my-no-longer-able-to-be-there.
Dying for the other is the concrete expression of the primordial, pre-original, and anarchical fact that the fear of the death of the other is not an anxiety for myself, my being, and my
conatus essendi; rather, the fear of the death of the other is itself my fear that preoccupies or
overwhelms my being, my nothingness, and my conatus essendi. Levinas thus argues that “Death
signifies in the concreteness of what for me is the impossibility of abandoning the other to his
aloneness, in the prohibition addressed to me of that abandonment.”897 Unlike the moi who is
primordially accused by the ethical interdiction inscribed in the face of the other, Dasein cannot
encounter the face of the other since it is imprisoned in the ontological shackle, which defaces the
face of the other ; it remains indifferent to and thus unaffected by the ethical call of the face: “Thou
shalt not leave the other die alone.” The ethical responsibility for the other takes a concrete form
in my non-indifference to the suffering, pain, and death of the other to the extent that I am dying
for the other. It is the affective relation with the death of the other that signifies a “surpassing in
the human of the animal effort of life, purely life—a surpassing of the conatus essendi of life.”898
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Substitution, sacrifice, or dying for the other is not the question of either to be or not to be; rather,
it is otherwise than being, beyond essence, or beyond the conatus essendi. “Substitution, in which
responsibility does not cease, thus remains otherwise than being.”899 Beyond the alternative of to
be or not to be, of Being or nothingness, the ethical signification of death emerges from otherwise
than being: “otherwise than being is not a something. It is the relation to the other, the ethical
relation.”900
For Levinas, what makes the moi the soi does not correspond to the way the substantive
Moi or Dasein is in the ekstatic identity of the moi and the soi, but to that for which I [je] am
responsible, to that to which I respond, and to that for which I am substituted: “The word I [je]
means me voici, responding to or being responsible for everything and everyone.”901 In short,
“Subjectivity is from the first substitution offered in place of another.”902 However, this does not
mean that Levinas attempts to retrieve an ontological signification of substitution that Heidegger
reduces to the idle talk of the anonymous they. Substitution for the other is not motivated by my
act of giving me to the other in the guise of my passivity; otherwise, it would return to myself, my
being, and my conatus essendi by substituting myself for myself. Rather, it originates from the anarchical or pre-original passivity or “sincerity” in which I am exposed to the other beyond the
alternatives of activity and passivity: “sincerity is not reducible to anything ontic or anything
ontological, and leads as it were beyond or on the hither side of everything positive every
position.”903 It is the moi malgré soi who takes responsibility for the other to the point of being
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substituted for the other prior to taking its own place in which it asks and cares for its own Being
and finally returns to itself.
The Saying of me voici testifies that I cannot be justified by myself and have no reason,
origin, source, or arche, which would justify my own being in my place; my being—be it ontic or
ontological, and authentic or inauthentic—is already the usurpation of the whole world. Dasein as
Being-toward-death asks about what it means to be (already thrown into) there from the beginning
[Anfang] to the end [Ende], but never asks whether it is just or righteous to be the Da. The Saying
of me voici signifies that prior to the Seinsfrage concerning what it means to be the Da, a more
exigent question that primordially obsesses me is whether the Da of my Dasein is not already an
unexcused occupation without the permission of the other. It is, therefore, not enough to say that
solicitude [Fürsorge] lets the other take its own place because my being is already an inexcusable
occupation. Solicitude here becomes a condescending means to justify my place, my being, and
my death in my indifference to others. This is why Levinas needs to hyperbolize his notion of the
ethical responsibility for the other to the point of substitution for the other as a “surplus of
responsibility.”904 Levinas thus states, “From the outset, I am not exonerated. I am originally in
default,”905 as if my being itself already took the place that does not belong to me; there is no
authentic place proper to me.
François Raffoul’s criticism of Levinas’s understanding of Mitsein ironically betrays the
essential point Levinas himself attempts to make: “For authentic Being-toward-death does not
dissolve being-with but only the possibility of substitution, which, we must insist, is an inauthentic
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mode of Being-with.” 906 Raffoul seems to believe that Levinas simply rejects the onticoontological fact that “In its singularity and in this very solitude, Dasein is open to others.”907
However, Levinas does not naively argue that the solitude of Dasein destroys the ontological
structure of Mitsein and divests Dasein of the possibility of any relationship to the other. Rather,
Levinas’s point is that Mitsein and Fürsorge presuppose Dasein’s being-Da upon which all
relations to the other are founded; these relations then merely become inauthentic moments of
Dasein’s Being-toward-death in its isolated individuality [Vereinzelung]. In other words, the
opening to the other is always already conditioned by the opening to Being as soon as Dasein is
thrown into the Da and as long as it is the Da; however, the Da is given to Dasein without why. In
Levinas’s view, this unconditional condition of Da-Sein forecloses the ethical—if not onticoontological—relationship with the other and the possibility of substitution. For Levinas,
Heidegger’s Seinsfrage presupposes Dasein as Being-there, as Being-with, and as Being-in-theworld without justifying what justifies the very Being of Dasein. This ontological presupposition
of Dasein’s Being in its conatus essendi renders any responsibility for the other and even
substitution for the other senseless and ridiculous. However, Levinas’s fundamental thesis apropos
of the signification of me voici is that there is no reason to be there from the very beginning; hence,
I am no longer innocent and have no excuse, no right, and no reason to justify my being. The
Saying of “excuse me” does not mean to say to the other that “You are in my private place” but,
on the contrary, to straightforwardly Say to the other that “I am already invading your place.” The
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moi malgré soi is not the Moi capable of expiating for the other but is “this original expiation—
involuntarily—prior to the will’s initiative (prior to the origin).”908
When it comes to the hyperbolic notion of substitution, it is important to recall exactly
what Heidegger means by the individualization or isolation [Vereinzelung] of Dasein in the
possibility of the sheer impossibility of its existence. The individuality of Dasein should be
understood as a quiddity or “whatness” that makes Dasein Dasein in general rather than as a
haecceity or “thisness” that distinguishes a particular Dasein from other Daseins.909 The interest
of Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein does not lie in the haecceity of Dasein that renders
“me me and not you or you you and not me” but rather in the quiddity of Dasein, that is, the Being
of Dasein in general that distinguishes Existenz from both Vorhandheit and Zuhandenheit. In this
context, Fürsorge signifies this co-responding relationship between two equivalent Daseins in the
symmetric economy of Being: “the Other would be a duplicate of the Self.” 910 By contrast,
substitution does not presuppose the co-responding or I-Thou relationship—either substituting me
for you or you for me—which undermines an asymmetric distance or diachronic proximity
sustaining an ethical relationship. Levinas writes, “To say that the Moi is a substitution is then not
to state the universality of a principle, the quiddity of a Moi.”911 I am not a Dasein among others
but the unique moi in the accusative; I am substituted for the other, but I cannot demand the other
to substitute himself or herself for me. “When one begins to say that someone can substitute
himself or herself for me, immorality begins.” 912 Substitution presupposes an asymmetric
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relationship between the accusative moi and the other; otherwise, it would become a pervasion of
Fürsorge by which the accusative moi reverts to the substantive Moi as Dasein, who knows nothing
of substitution but only of solicitude.
Substitution for the other does not mean that the substantive Moi takes the place of the
other and returns to its own place, but that the accusative moi has already been taken in place of
the other, like a hostage who discovers its soi to be substituted for the other without retuning to
itself. “For under accusation by everyone, the responsibility for everyone goes to the point of
substitution. The subject is a hostage.”913 In the substitution for the other, I am held hostage by
and to the other who has already elected, summoned, and “accused me as unique in the supreme
passivity.”914 As the unique hostage for the other, the moi finds its soi the “non-interchangeable
par excellence.” 915 Slavoj Zizek questions here whether this excessively and exclusively
demanding responsibility of the uniqueness of the subject gives rise to an “inverted arrogance, as
if I am the center whose existence threatens all others.”916 However, this is exactly what Levinas
rejects in his critique of Heidegger’s symmetric notion of Vereinzelung, which neutralizes not only
the uniqueness of the moi but also the alterity of the other into the quiddity of Dasein in general.
That for which I am responsible remains something that cannot be measured, consummated, or
mastered in my self-consistency and self-sovereignty; thus, the ethical responsibility for the other
cannot be assumed as a domination, mastery, or power that would make the accusative moi relapse
into a patronizing, masterful, or heroic Moi who undertakes the supreme responsibility for its
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authentic Being. Rather, it is a “responsibility to which I am straightforwardly exposed, like a
hostage”917 who in no way returns to itself in its self-conceit and self-complacency.
What individualizes the moi as the uniqueness of the soi is not the care for my place, my
being, and my own death in its detachment from the death of others, but rather the hyperbolic and
irreplaceable responsibility for others to the point of being the unique hostage who alone is
substituted for others, for their responsibilities, for their sufferings, and even for their deaths. It is
“the religious soul” that finds itself in relation to “the beyond of the world”918 without lapse into
the way of Being-in-the-world where it encounters itself in its conatus essendi. Levinas states:
“There lies the religiosity of the moi, pre-originally tied to another.”919 The subjectivity of the
religious moi refers neither to egoism by which it remains in its self-relation to itself by
appropriating everything—and even nothingness [Nichts]—to its conatus essendi, nor to altruism
where it makes a relationship to others in favor of its ulterior interest in the conatus essendi. For
Levinas, all those relations are nothing but pseudo-relations which dissimulate the return to the
Moi by reducing, subordinating, and totalizing all relata into the identification of the Moi. In this
totalizing or pseudo relation, the Moi encounters no other than itself and remains the same [même]
in its conatus essendi; there will be no longer any relation at all. Levinas thus claims, “Beyond
egoism and altruism, it is the religiosity of the self.”920 The religiosity of the moi consists in the
substitution, sacrifice, or dying for the other which does not belong to the sacred experience, as if
the Moi took the exact place of the other, as if the Moi and the other would be totalized into a
participation or fusion in the symmetric or reciprocal economy of substitution either of the Moi to
the other or of the latter for the former.
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As seen in Chapter Four, to maintain the ethical relation, the relata must remain separate
from each other and absolve themselves [s’absolvent] from the very relation that they establish;
otherwise, they would fall into a sacred participation, synthetic union, or fanatic fusion—all of
which destroy any relation in advance. It is an absolute distance, separation, transcendence,
proximity, holiness [sainteté], or kidouch that sustains the asymmetric and thus ethical relation to
the other. This absolus relation, from which all relata are absolved, is what Levinas calls in Totality
and Infinity religion: “We propose to call ‘religion’ the bond that is established between the same
and the other without constituting a totality.”921 It is not a pseudo relation in which the Moi finds
itself and returns to itself in its conatus essendi, but rather religion, “unrelating relation,” or
“relation without relation” 922 where the moi discovers its soi already placed in relation with
otherwise than its soi without a return to the soi. Substitution is the holy [sainte] experience in
which the moi is otherwise than being in the mode of disinterestedness in its being, essence, and
conatus essendi. Thus, the subjectivity of the religious moi despite its soi consists in being
responsible to the other to the point of being substituted for the other. The signification of
substitution signifies the primordial significance of the ethical weight and exigency of my
responsibility for the death of the other, as if the death of the other were my business even prior to
my own death. In my indifference to the death of the other, I am already an accomplice in
murdering the other. Levinas’s polemic against Heidegger’s thematization of death lies in the fact
that the ontological-existential interpretation of death entails, vindicates, and justifies my
indifference to the death of the other in the sense that death is only a matter of Jemeinigkeit. There
is no place for substitution in ontology since ontology never allows otherwise than being or beyond
essence, that is, the hither side of the conatus essendi.
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By virtue of being responsible more primordial than being authentic, I am exposed,
summoned, and accused as the survivor who lives at the expense of others. “It is as if I were
responsible for [their] mortality, and guilty of surviving.”923 I am no longer one of Daseins who
let the other die alone, but “I am an other,”924 to the extent that I am, despite myself, standing in
place of the other to be responding to and responsible for its death. “Subjectivity is described as a
substituting for the other, as disinterestedness, or a break with essence; it leads us to contest the
thesis about the ultimacy or the priority of the ontological problem.”925 To be the moi malgré soi
is to be disinterested in Sein, esse, essence, and conatus essendi—all of which are the very
“principals in the first degree” that grow, nourish, and finally fatten up ontology itself under the
rubric of metaphysics. The exceptional and excessive uniqueness of the moi malgré soi in the
anarchical passivity consists in “divesting itself, emptying itself of its being, turning itself ‘inside
out.’”926 It is the primordial fact of otherwise than being that ruptures the ontological order of the
binary opposition of noun and verb, being and nothingness, or authenticity and inauthenticity—all
of which ultimately refer back to the ongoing complicity of Being and beings. “To be or not to be”
is no longer the question for the moi malgré soi since this ontological question is triggered only by
the struggle for being, essence, or the conatus essendi in the neglect of non-indifference to the
death of others. What is at stake is to be otherwise than being beyond on the hither side of the “to
be or not to be” question; substitution, sacrifice, or dying for others is otherwise than being or
beyond essence.
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Conclusion

Every question has a power that would be lost in the answer.927

This dissertation has examined Levinas’s phenomenology of death in order to disclose the
religious dimension of Levinas’s ethics in the political context of the interrogation of the third
party. As the topic “phenomenology of death” already indicates, both Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology (Chapter One) and Heidegger’s ontological thematization of death (Chapter Two)
provide the methodological and thematical ingredients for the consideration of Levinas’s
phenomenology of death, respectively. Given that Husserl’s phenomenological method of the
Rückfrage is to inquire into the way back to the Sinngebung and Heidegger’s ontological
thematization of death based on the Seinsfrage clarifies the mineness [Jemeingkeit] of death,
Levinas finds his own question in death as a “departure without return, a question without givens,
a pure interrogation mark”928 on the hither side of Husserl’s Rückfrage and Heidegger’s Seinsfrage.
This dissertation claimed that death is neither a phenomenon nor a non-phenomenon, but rather a
para-phenomenon in which Levinas diagnoses a built-in limit of ortho-dox phenomenology. In
other words, Levinas faces in the para-phenomenality of death the failure of phenomenology. Far
from simply dismissing both Rückfrage and Seinsfrage, Levinas radicalizes them to the point of
tackling what these questions do not interrogate by means of his own question—it is the paradoxical locus of death beyond the binary opposition of a phenomenon or a non-phenomenon. In
the para-phenomenality of death, Levinas recognizes the alterity of the other that phenomenology
fails to thematize and to make sense of (Chapter Three); this dissertation contends that an ethical
927
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sense of death emerges from the failure of the doxical thematization of death (Chapter Four and
Five).
On the one hand, the failure of phenomenology ushers Levinas to the return to the Sachen
selbst as the ultimate source of the Sinngebung, which cannot be grasped by phenomenology. The
failure of phenomenology discloses that death as the question par excellence is reduced neither to
a pure phenomenon transparently intelligible in the intentional structure of a noema-noesis, nor to
a sheer non-phenomenon completely irrelevant to the phenomenological inquiry. Beyond or on the
hither side of the alternative of a phenomenon or a non-phenomenon, death appears as a paraphenomenon that ruptures, disrupts, or unsettles all phenomenological investigations; in short,
death as the para-phenomenon becomes the proper subject matter of phenomenology only by
betraying phenomenology itself. At the intrinsic limit of the phenomenological methodology,
phenomenology of death inevitably miscarries since death resists phenomenological investigations.
It is the paradox of Levinas’s phenomenology of death that his phenomenological method begins
with the failure of phenomenology itself. This dissertation has argued that the effectual
accomplishment of phenomenology of death necessarily betrays not only death as the Sache selbst
that phenomenology looks for but also phenomenology that seeks the Sachen selbst. For Levinas,
the ethical meaning of death originates not from the triumph of a phenomenological inquiry into
death but rather from its miscarriage. When it comes to death qua the para-phenomenon, therefore,
phenomenology vindicates its raison d'être only in its failure.
On the other hand, the failure of phenomenology leads Levinas to call into question any
kind of thanato-logy, which was exemplarily accomplished by Heidegger’s ontological
thematization of death. According to the Heideggerian version of thanatology, Dasein understands
the impossibility of its own existence as the most authentic possibility, which characterizes the
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solitary finitude of the authentic Being in its totality [Ganzheit]. It would be Heidegger’s
remarkable achievement elaborated in Being and Time that the meaning of death is thoroughly
clarified by the existential architecture of ontology. The ontological meaning of death thus consists
in the fact that the existential finitude exhibits how much heroic and masterful Dasein is able to be
in isolation from and indifference to the death of the other. By appealing to the para-doxical
character of death, however, Levinas challenges Heidegger’s thanatology, which never permits a
para-phenomenality of death and, eventually, reduces the enigmatic mystery of death into the
heroic mastery of death. This dissertation maintained that Heidegger’s architectonic structure of
ontology dissimulates or covers up the para-doxical signification of death, which is more
primordial and exigent than the ontological Jemeinigkeit of death. In order to unveil an ethical
meaning of death, it is necessary to strip off the ontological coverings—Sein, in particular—and
expose the primordial sense of death, which has been concealed in the “Sein-topped” architecture
of ontology. In this context, phenomenology of death does not justify its raison d'être in its
successful achievement to thematize death but in its failure. This does not mean that
phenomenology should first distinguish what can be thematized and what cannot be thematized
and then remain silent about the latter. Rather, phenomenology should thematize what cannot be
thematized—i.e., death—only to fail to do so. The failure of phenomenology is the price Levinas
cannot but pay in his elaboration of phenomenology of death since the ethical meaning of death
emerges from the miscarriage of the thematization of death.
Inspired by the Cartesian idea of the infinite, Levinas attempts to uncover what ontology
has covered up—i.e., the bare nakedness of être that is “produced as multiple and as split into same
and other; this is its ultimate structure.”929 The formal structure of the idea of the infinite, which
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signifies the absolute distance or separation between the idea and its ideatum, takes the concrete
form in the ethical encounter with the other who command me not to murder: “Thou shalt not kill.”
This interdiction is the first word of the other that obsesses and overwhelms me even more than
the anxiety for my death. Based upon Levinas’s essential view of ethics as “a calling into question
of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other,”930 this dissertation showed that the enigma of
death disrupts the authentic [eigentlich] and finite [endlich] spontaneity of the same and thereby
discloses a more primordial and exigent dimension of the ethical meaning of death: the nonindifference to the death of the other. The exigent call inscribed in the face of the other precedes
the Jemeinigkeit of death, as if the death of the other would matter to me more than my own. Death
matters to me not because it is mine but precisely because it is a matter of the other. Indeed, death
is not something or nothing [Nichts] at my disposal, so that it makes me restless, vigilant, and nonindifferent to the death of the other. The ethical signification of death stems from the face of the
other that solicits me: “Thou shalt not let the other die alone.”
One might feel an “intellectual discomfort,”931 as Bertrand Russell did, when he wrote the
Introduction (once rejected by the author) to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Russell’s
complaint came from Wittgenstein’s self-contradictory gesture in the Tractatus; in other words,
whereas Wittgenstein indicated that what cannot be said should remain silent in order to clearly
say about what can be said, he attempted to speak “a good deal about what cannot be said.”932
Likewise, one might wonder whether Levinas tries to thematize the unthematizable, i.e., death.
When describing death as the unknowable, enigmatic, mysterious, and unthematizable locus in
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which Levinas finds the alterity of the other, does he indeed thematize it in a negative fashion? Is
it possible to describe death without thematizing it? Should one remain taciturn about the
unthematizable death in order not to thematize it, like the Tractatian silence? This is where both
the methodological and the thematical challenges converge on the fundamental difficulty of the
topic of phenomenology of death: the problem of how to describe what is resistant to all description.
It is the paradoxical problem that underlies in this seemingly self-defeating gesture of Levinas’s
description of death.
This dissertation goes through this difficulty with a focus on the concept of a paraphenomenality of death by which I attempted to re-describe Levinas’s description of death with
the intention of releasing the ethical signification of death from the ontological shackle. One can
notice here a Hegelian version of a radical gesture. When Kant makes a clear distinction between
a noumenon and a phenomenon due to his “fear of error,” that is, his worry about any confusion
of the two, Hegel criticizes this rigid distinction because what Kant’s fear of error divulges is no
other than his own “fear of truth.”933 I employed the term “para-phenomenon” in order to depict
the para-doxical characteristic of death, which not only avoids the Kantian rigid dualism of a
phenomenon and a noumenon but also disrupts the doxical thematization of death. Levinas’s selfdefeating gesture of the “thematization” of death, in a Hegelian sense, signifies his attempt to
overcome the fear of truth by way of traversing—rather than eluding—the fear of error. The
purpose of this dissertation is to bring to light the ethical meaning of death, which has been buried
underneath the ontological edifice, through probing the paradox of Levinas’s phenomenology of
death.
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This dissertation has highlighted—and sometimes overstated—the radical peculiarity in
Levinas’s attentiveness to the ethical meaning of the death of the other in opposition to the
ontological meaning of the Jemeinigkeit of death. However, the entry of the third party checks,
hampers, and questions any exaggeration of the ethical meaning of the death of the other, which
might entail a pure naiveté of an abstract, angelic, and even anti-ethical ethics. The paradox of
Levinas’s phenomenology of death becomes more evident and problematic in the political moment
of the interrogation of the third party. The appearance of the third party calls into question the
unlimited, infinite, unconditional, and absolute responsibility of the same for the other and
summons again everything that has been rejected in favor of the ethical responsibility, such as
comparison, thematization, calculation, judgment, equality, memory, synchronization, history,
totality, and ontology; thus, it is the political moment in the ethical relation that unveils “the limit
of responsibility and the birth of the question.”934 This dissertation explicated that the political
interrogation of the third party never compromises or undermines the ethical structure but rather
makes it possible for ethics to remain ethical in this “regressive” move. The third party always
already troubles any possible intimate or exclusive I-Thou relationship; hence, ethics remains the
question par excellence in non-indifference to the political challenges of an infinite number of the
third parties.
At the limit of the ethical responsibility, Levinas painfully undergoes a reverse dilemma of
the early Wittgensteinian question, “How not to speak of the unspeakable,” with his own question,
“How to speak of the unspeakable, to thematize the unthematizable, to compare the incomparable,
and to calculate the incalculable.” This dissertation insisted that the Levinasian question becomes
most radical, problematic, and even questionable in the case of death with respect to the third party,
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the theme that remains unthematized in Levinas’s own philosophical oeuvre and the Levinasian
scholarship as well. How can one compare, judge, and calculate the deaths of others other than
one’s own? Can one compare the death of the other with those of others other than the other?
Should one remain here in need of the Tractatian silence? However, is not this kind of silence a
“clever” way of evading the Levinasian question which tacitly divulges our “seal of approval” for
the sufferings, bloods, and deaths of others? In our tolerance, tranquility, indifference, equanimity,
calmness, and silence, we would become the accomplice as an accessory to murder of others.
Levinas plainly insists that the responsibility for others is “the impossibility of being silent, the
scandal of sincerity.” In other words, “one has to say ‘what it is about,’ say something, before
saying only the Saying itself.”935 Levinas’s painstaking endeavor to thematize the unthematizable
yields the most ticklish question of the political problematics in his ethical articulation of death.
The ultimate question of the whole dissertation depends on this Levinasian question: How can one
say [dire] something about the death(s) of the others with respect to the third party? What is
Levinas’s answer to this question? Is any answer here possible? Does Levinas’s own ellipsis
originate from the peculiar fate of his own question that has no answer? Even though there would
be no answer to his question, don’t we have to say something about it?
Rather than finding an answer, Levinas considers what oppresses a question itself. Levinas
thus opens Totality and Infinity by discussing the ontology of war, which never allows any question.
War does not permit any “distance” or “exteriority” to thematize, compare, calculate, and Say
anything—whether the thematizable or the unthematizable, since there is no room for a question
but only an answer: either to be or not to be, either to kill or to be killed. The term “holy war
[guerre sainte]” is thus oxymoronic since war never sanctions a distance, exteriority, proximity,
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separation, and what Levinas calls “holiness [sainteté].” Levinas hence states, “[War] establishes
an order from which no one can keep his distance; nothing henceforth is exterior.”936 The ontology
of war swallows everything into the all-embracing, totalitarian, and sacred [sacré] order that it
generates; thus, “[war] renders morality derisory,”937 senseless, and ridiculous. There is no room
for morality in the ontology of war; indeed, “to be or not to be” is not a question but an answer
given by the ontological order that war establishes. A sacred—not holy—war is the ontological
event in which all beings are transparently present themselves and thereby synchronized into the
presence of war “produced as the pure experience of pure being [être but read: Sein].”938 Levinas
thus maintains that the same, the other, the third party, and all the others become “what they will
appear to be in the already plastic forms of the epic.”939 In the ontology of war, the face of the
other is de-faced and stops Saying “Thou shalt not kill” while the moi loses the sense of
responsibility for others and thus no longer Says “me voici.”
For Levinas, “to be or not to be” is not the primordial question to be asked in the first place.
This dissertation exhibited that Levinas’s phenomenological account of être lays bare the
primordiality of being responsible, which does not consist in being authentic [eigentlich] in the
Heideggerian sense of the term but rather in otherwise than being (authentic). The ontology of war
knows nothing of otherwise than Sein, beyond essence, or beyond the conatus essendi, in which
Levinas recognizes the primordial signification of death, such as substitution, sacrifice, or dying
for others. Levinas’s phenomenology of death displays that the religious dimension of his ethics
lies in the face-to-face relation with others. “For the self, in its being, it is not a question of being.
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There lies the religiosity of the me, preoriginally tied to another.” 940 To be religious does not
require an ontological question since it is not a matter either of “to be or not to be,” of being or
non-being; rather, it is itself otherwise than being. Religion is not a sacred rapprochement in which
the face of the other is de-faced, but rather a holy “rapport sans rapport.”941 Only in this paradoxical rapport, from which the other absolves itself, its face reveals itself uprightly or
straightforwardly [droit] without being absorbed into a mystical fusion or sacred participation.
Prior to the ontological question—to be more precise answer—of “to be or not to be,” the
primordial question is irradicably inscribed in the face of the other who commands: “Thou shalt
not kill.” This interdiction of the other is the question proper that has been suppressed by the
doxical-ontological comprehension of death; nevertheless, it restlessly haunts the ontological
answer of “to be or not to be.” What is at stake here is to be otherwise than being before either “to
be or not to be.” Ethics for Levinas is not an answer (to ontology) but a question par excellence
(against and despite ontology).
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